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This research focuses on US and Brazilian international cooperation regarding food security. 
The study takes into account, as a starting point, the traditional division into ‘North-South’ 
and ‘South-South’ to verify how international cooperation varies according to the donor and 
which elements remain similar. The research aims to investigate the distinctive approaches 
of the United States and Brazil to offer aid and assess if there are notable differences in terms 
of perception or effectiveness in improving food security. International assistance provided 
by the US and other developed countries has been claimed to differ from horizontal 
cooperation among developing nations, which is supposedly not conditional and said to bring 
about better results. However, the increasing complexity of international and domestic 
realities, as well as the efforts to bring convergence in foreign aid practices, are turning 
outdated these divisions between horizontal and vertical approaches.  
This Dissertation uses a comparative analysis to scrutinize US and Brazilian international 
cooperation practices in food security through five main variables: budget, institutions, laws, 
discourse and impact. These variables will allow us to estimate what is the real importance 
of aid provided in this area, how it is done, by which institutions, under which legal 
framework, and how it is presented and justified by official sources. Finally, a broad survey 
will show how aid donors are perceived in their main African beneficiaries. Mapping the 
perception of the main recipients in relation to their donors will help to consider if the 
Brazilian horizontal approach is met with a more positive review than the traditional vertical 
assistance given by the US.  
This Dissertation comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 builds the theoretical background for 
the Dissertation and present the methodological framework for the cases studied and the 
comparison of the North-South and South-South cooperation. Chapter 2 assesses the US 
participation in the global aid regime in the field of agriculture and food security. Chapter 3 
analyses the Brazilian international cooperation in the same area. Chapter 4 establishes a 
comparison among the cases presented and provides an assessment of how the main 
beneficiaries view the assistance received. Finally, the conclusion draws final observations 
on aid practices, as well as recommendations to improve aid policy and make these initiatives 
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The League of Nations is often seen as the starting point of modern-day international 
cooperation1. In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference stressed the importance of accepting 
certain rules and obligations for fostering cooperation and understanding among states. 
Similarly, the United Nations (UN) Charter, signed in San Francisco in 1945, lists it as a key 
objective in Chapter I, Article 1, that one of the purposes of the UN is to foster international 
cooperation to resolve international problems of an economic, social, cultural or 
humanitarian nature, and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, without distinctions of any kind.  
Until that time, though, ‘international cooperation’ referred to the general disposition of 
nations to have amicable relations instead of conflictive ones. With a few humanitarian 
exceptions in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, the concept of ‘cooperation’ as a 
synonym for foreign aid was almost nonexistent. 
(…) the gift of public resources from one government to another (or to 
an international organization or nongovernmental organization), sizable 
and sustained over time, an important purpose of which was to help 
improve the human condition in countries receiving the aid, was un- 
heard of—even unimagined—in policy circles or by the public. 
(Lancaster, 2008: p. 5) 
Therefore, international cooperation in this Dissertation is used to refer to the phenomenon 
of external aid or international development cooperation, not in the broad sense used by 
liberal institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane (2005, 1988) and Joseph Nye (1986). 
However, even when referring to international cooperation as foreign aid, there is no 
consensually agreed definition. China usually calls it ‘aid’, the USA uses ‘assistance’ and 
Brazil prefers the term ‘cooperation’. These nomenclatures are neither neutral nor empty of 
meaning. As the research showed, they revealed much about the donor’s or partner’s 
ideology and intentions, but, above all, they are indicators of the restructuring that is taking 
 
1 There is no universally agreed nomenclature to refer to foreign aid. While OCDE members call it Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), Brazil uses International Development Cooperation (IDC). These 
nomenclatures are neither neutral nor empty of meaning. They reveal much about the donor’s or partner’s 
ideology and intentions. The distinctions in what these concepts includes will be scrutinized throughout the 




place in the global aid system. Although the specificness of each concept is explained later 
on, the terms ‘foreign aid’, ‘international assistance’ and ‘international cooperation’ are used 
interchangeably, as they all describe, despite particularities, the object of study of this 
Dissertation. Here, these terms will be used interchangeably to describe and explain the 
initiatives.  
The concept of international development assistance started to take shape after World War 
II, with the Marshall Plan. From its beginning, US assistance was tied to purchasing US 
goods, leading to the perception that aid was always conditional and self-interested. The Cold 
War is considered a main factor which contributed to the emergence and development of 
foreign aid programs, as it motivated the United States, the largest net aid donor, to 
proactively engage in providing international assistance as part of its strategy of communist 
containment. 
In 1969, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), in an attempt to better track/measure resource 
flows to developing countries from its member-states, coined the concept of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). This is defined as ‘government aid designed to promote the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries, excluding loans and credits for 
military purposes’ OECD (2020). The concept of ODA has been updated and used since then 
in assessments of aid given by DAC member-states. 
While aid begun as initiative of developed nations, by the late 20th century, it had become a 
generalized practice in relations among states, independently of their level of development 
(Lancaster, 2008: p. 5). This process of expansion of international assistance began with 
Afro-Asian decolonization in the mid-twentieth century. In 1955, the Bandung Conference, 
which brought together 23 countries from Asia and 6 from Africa, is considered a milestone 
in the process of awakening the so-called ‘Third World’ to partnerships without the 
involvement of European states or the hegemonic powers of the Cold War. The promotion 
of cooperation was one of the principles expressed in the Conference’s final communiqué, 
which established the basis of ‘solidarity of the people of the South’ (UNDP, 2013). 
In 1978, the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries was 




Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (PABA). It was in this plan that the 
concept of "horizontal cooperation" would be coined, which advocated "the sharing of 
information and technical expertise among developing countries in areas such as health, 
education and agriculture" (Leite, 2011: p. 71). The concept has been constantly reaffirmed 
in developing countries official discourse, which emphasizes that the horizontal approach 
should be ‘without any kind of domination or hidden interest’ (Goulet and Sabourin, 2012: 
20).  
In the 1980s, the establishment of the Global System of Preferences among Developing 
Countries (SGPC), proposed at the G-77 ministerial meeting in Brasilia and concluded in 
Belgrade in 1988 with the participation of over 40 countries, was a successful outcome of 
South-South cooperation at a time of unfavorable international conjuncture. The MNA, the 
UNCTAD, the SGPC and other alliances between developing states and international 
organizations were instrumental in expanding the reach of South-South cooperation and 
making it more effective. By holding regular discussion meetings, expanding contact 
channels, and offering information, they provided, especially to poorer countries, ways of 
overcoming social, economic, and political vulnerabilities (Ramos, 2006). 
In this way, South-South cooperation emerged in opposition to the traditional framework of 
cooperation between North and South, which has often been seen as a method for opening 
up recipient countries to the economic ambitions of more developed nations. Thus, these new 
partnerships were based on humanitarian values, governmental rhetoric, and political 
justifications different from those of the previous approach. Since then, the global aid system 
has been going through a process of restructuration. The inclusion of rising powers and new 
approaches to aid changed considerably the international development cooperation scene, 
bringing about new concepts and South-South cooperation to the core of the international 
development debate.  
In Africa, while traditional donors remained responsible for an integral part of aid flows, new 
donors emerged as an alternative to conventional vertical Western sources of international 
financing. After achieving their independence, despite being free of overt political 
domination, neocolonialist practices remained widespread in many African countries by 




financial ties with the United States and former European colonial powers. Therefore, the 
horizontal and unconditional aid offered by emerging countries presented something that 
Africans had formerly been denied: the right to self-determination in relation to their own 
development paths (Cook, 2012: p. 92). 
A set of favorable conditions enabled the intensification of these emerging powers’ 
engagement in Africa and the development of joint cooperation initiatives. First, this 
expansion coincided with the recovering of most economies in Africa, following a long 
period of economic stagnation, caused by a persistent debt crisis, lack of investment, 
depressed commodity prices, droughts and climate hardship, and protracted conflicts. These 
countries went through an extended period of neoliberal economic restructuring, which made 
room for investment, stimulating the economy and creating business opportunities for 
international capital, while at the same time restricting the role of the state and often 
undermining local businesses. Governments and elites also played into the dynamics of 
development cooperation in Africa, by using investment as a tool to build up their 
commercial and political interests, occasionally resorting to corruption to do so (Scoones et 
al., 2016). 
Moreover, the 2008 global economic and financial crisis created a greater need to find new 
destinations for investments by unattached capital, increasing agricultural commodity prices 
and boosting demand for assets, especially land. Investments by a range of foreign companies 
went to Africa, often closely linked to emerging countries’ governments, in what some called 
a ‘global land rush’. Thus, the mid-2000s accentuated a tendency of concentrated interest in 
agricultural investments in Africa, in which Brazil, along with many other investors, was also 
involved. After the global crisis subsided, the heat of the land rush receded too. Many 
investors woke up to the difficulties involved in establishing large land concessions in remote 
parts of Africa. Nonetheless, part of the legacy of the period persisted, with new ventures and 
partnerships that permanently changed the African aid scenario (Scoones et al., 2016).  
In the US case, its model for economic engagement with Africa has often appeared one-sided, 
with US-driven neoliberal strategies being criticized for giving signs of neocolonialism or 
even for representing a ‘neocolonial model’. US-Africa relations were (and to some extent 




profound inequalities, and numerous examples of political meddling and military 
intervention. However, the increased focus of the United States on humanitarian actions and 
its advancements in human development and infant mortality led US presence to be seen at 
the end of the day more positively (Cook, 2012: p. 93). 
Beyond this overview of the continent’s prospects, each African country had different 
experiences and specific realities, thus the need to choose Ethiopia and Mozambique as 
concrete examples of aid beneficiaries by the two donors analyzed, the United States and 
Brazil.   
Food Security Background 
Due to the large scope of foreign aid, this research focused on policies and programs in the 
area of food security. Initial elaborations on the concept of food security echoed the strategic-
military concern of the World Wars that a country’s inability to provide food to its population 
made it vulnerable to foreign dominance. In 1974, at the first World Food Conference of the 
UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the understanding that countries needed to 
increase their self-sufficiency in food supply was reinforced due to successive crop failures 
and climatic problems, particularly in Africa, which led to an international food supply crisis. 
At that time, food insecurity was understood as simply a measure of food availability.  
In the following decades, there was a gradual realization that despite substantial increases in 
food supply fostered by the Green Revolution, relevant populations of developing countries 
remained unable to access food. Amartya Sen summarized this in Poverty and Famines by 
stating that starvation is not the condition of there not being enough food, but of some people 
not having enough food (Sen, 1981; Ashley, 2016:1). This led to an expanded version of 
food security, adopted by FAO’s report The State of Food Insecurity in the World of 2001: 
‘Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social 
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 2002).  
This definition comprises three key aspects: food availability, economic accessibility and 
adequate nutrition. Thus, for cooperation initiatives to effectively reduce food insecurity, 




challenges when measuring food security, with approaches ranging from household surveys 
to proxy indicators. This research focused on data from national level2, such as gross 
household production and purchases, food stocks, and agricultural productivity.  
Increasingly, food security is drawing the attention of scholars, politicians and practitioners 
alike. Abundant literature addresses its multidimensional and interdisciplinary nature, which 
involves issues such as climate change, national security, humanitarian assistance, trade, 
development, and agriculture, among others (Mergos and Papanastassiou, 2017; Ashley, 
2016; Anderson, 2016). As Juma Calestous stated, the perception that agriculture is ‘just a 
steppingstone in linear stages of economic development no longer holds true. Future 
strategies for economic inclusion and sustainability demand a systems approach in which 
agriculture will remain important’ (Juma, 2015:x).  
Despite collective progress in global food security that led the world to be closer than ever 
before to ending hunger, undernourishment, and extreme poverty at a planetary level, 
significant challenges remain. FAO estimates that about 795 million people of the 7.3 billion 
people in the world (in other words, one in nine) were suffering from chronic 
undernourishment in 2014-2016 (FAO, 2017a). The African continent witnessed a reduction 
in the proportion of its undernourished population, which went from 27.6 percent in the early 
1990s to 20 percent in 2014-16. However, in absolute terms, the number of people 
undernourished increased by around 50 million (FAO, 2017b).  
Throughout the last century, the global aid regime tried to address the issue of hunger and 
undernourishment, though with limited success (Akonor, 2008; Andrews, 2009; Lancaster, 
2008; Birdsall and Fukuyama 2011; Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Over the last decades, 
scholarly and policy circles have identified ‘emerging donors’ as one source of important 
quantitative shifts in international assistance flows (Manning, 2006). The dynamism of 
South–South cooperation emerged as a result of structural transformations in the 
international system, associated with clear rebalances in the distribution of economic and 
political power at the international level in the last three decades (Santander and Alonso, 
 
2 For more information on the methods and difficulties to correctly assess food security gains that matter, see 




2018: p. 1925).  
There has been an increase in the relative economic weight of the South in relation to the 
North. According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007, the economies of emerging 
and developing countries surpassed the share of advanced economies in the global gross 
domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2018, emerging and 
developing countries contributed to more than 59%, while the advanced nations’ contribution 
was 40% (IMF, 2019). These changes affected the distribution of global production, trade, 
investment and aid.  
The rise of developing countries as non-DAC donors brought about hope that food insecurity 
would be tackled more effectively, since one of the features of these countries’ new role is 
found in their attempt to establish a paradigm for international aid that is different from the 
established donors, by questioning some of the foundational terms and challenging the 
dominant aid discourse of vertical cooperation (Modi and Cheru, 2013). However, it is still 
unclear whether this rise means a clear departure from past practices, or if similar interests, 
goals and practices are being pursued, disguised as solidarity (Stolte, 2015; Stolte, 2012). In 
this sense, this research aimed to examine these ambiguities and uncertainties.  
Although there is a burgeoning literature about international aid to Africa, emerging and 
traditional donors included (Dias, 2018; Brautigam, 2015; Rotberg, 2013; Amanor, 2013; 
Shambaugh, 2013; Chin and Quadir, 2012; Kragelund, 2011; De Haan, 2011; Brautigam, 
2009; Rotberg 2009; Taylor, 2009; Riddell, 2008; Alden, 2008;), there is much yet to be done 
in terms of systematically and critically analyzing policies, motivations and objectives of aid 
providers in a comparative manner. As Perch and Bradley stated, ‘South-South cooperation 
is, in many situations, largely unproven: the evidence base for its impact on reducing poverty 
still largely unwritten’(2012: p.3). This Dissertation aims to fill this gap by deepening our 
knowledge of the cooperation provided by two key agricultural powers (the US and Brazil), 
as they are three key agricultural powers and approach international cooperation 
distinctively.  
The USA is a traditional Western donor of foreign aid: its projects have a history of financing 




major agriculture producer and exporter, only recently started to provide aid and its initiatives 
suffer from oscillations and discontinuities. This is exemplified by the gains of importance 
as an actor in the food security agenda during the 2000’s, due to results in poverty reduction, 
and the following downsizing of its profile, due to political turmoil and economic stagnation.  
To assess the influence of the United States and Brazil as development cooperation providers, 
this Dissertation aimed at delivering a deeper understanding of how these countries’ foreign 
aid operated: their national dynamics needed to be unpacked by mapping institutions, 
legislation, discourse, funding and interests informing decision-making processes. These 
variables shaped not only their aid policies, priorities, practices and effectiveness, but also 
why they have taken certain shapes or paths including roads not taken (Costa Leite et al., 
2014: Summary). 
The hypothesis that the differences between the foreign aid given by the United States and 
Brazil were more related to domestic factors and distinctive foreign policy goals was tested. 
The cases studied found that although horizontal and vertical intellectual constructs exerted 
some influence in policy decisions, especially in Brazil, neither countries strictly fall under 
these narrow categories, as both have acted out of parameters of what is considered South-
South or North-South aid. 
Historically, nonetheless, the vertical vs. horizontal divide did contribute to make different 
perspectives on foreign assistance explicit, which ultimately influenced and transformed the 
global development system as a whole. This is demonstrated by the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (2012), which is considered a turning point in the 
international development system. The new equilibrium set in Busan attributed a greater role 
to non-traditional players, a welcomed approach that contributed to move forward the debate 
from aid to development cooperation, hence representing a synthesis of how South and North 
development paradigms can be able to converge (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 6).  
The case studies 
The US international development assistance took shape after World War II, with the plan to 
rebuild Europe’s infrastructure and stabilize the region conceived by the US Secretary of 




goods and was part of a strategy to diminish Soviet influence in the region. The following 
key US initiative on international development was the Point Four Program launched by 
President Harry Truman in 1949. The program’s goals clearly reflected US national interests: 
‘creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing production in 
developing countries; diminishing the threat of communism by helping countries prosper 
under capitalism’ (USAID, 2018d).  
Another factor that contributed to US initiatives being subject of criticism is its long-lasting 
practice of tying food aid to national producers. This approach was incorporated into 
legislation through Public Law 480 of 1954, which aimed to channel food surplus from the 
post-war period to developing nations. Later, the practice was reedited by the Food for Peace 
program of 1961, whose goal was to “increase the consumption of US agricultural 
commodities in foreign countries”. Current US legislation still determines that food used for 
aid be produced in the US and shipped to recipient countries via US-owned modes of 
transportation. This food-aid policy gave rise to opposition from the international community 
and UN agencies, which increasingly advocated that food aid supplies should be purchased 
within affected countries, in order to support home-grown markets, eliminate shipping 
burdens, and lower the overall cost of food and environmental impact.  
Despite improvements in recent years, the US aid system remains attached to these old habits, 
since proposals of reforming US food-aid policies usually face fierce opposition from US 
agricultural groups (Wraith, 2013). Ethiopia has been the largest African recipient of Official 
Development Assistance from the United States in the total net disbursements period of 2006-
2015 (approximately 6.465 billion USD)3. Therefore, it was chosen to serve as an example 
and key model of US aid practices (OCDE, 2017: p. 76; OCDE, 2011: p. 66).   
In relation to Brazil, the boom of commodity prices in the 2000s was met by the 
intensification of social programs and the integration of workers to the labor market, which 
boosted employment rates and strongly expanded the lower middle class (De Negri and 
Cavalcanti, 2014). Since 1995 the minimum wage was increasing year after year well beyond 
 
3 Sudan was ranked as second with 6.295 billion USD and Kenya in third with 6.139 billion USD. (OCDE, 
2017; OCDE, 2011) Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/fin_flows_dev-2017-en-fr; 




the medium wage. These conditions helped Brazil to reduce the share of its population in 
poverty and to leave the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s map of hunger in 2014. 
Internationally, these social achievements enhanced Brazil’s status on the world scene and 
increased its legitimacy as a global actor in this area. Public policies in the field of food 
security were important not only to boost Brazilian international prestige, but they also 
contributed to motivate significant growth in cooperation projects undertaken by the 
government. 
Mozambique was selected as a concrete example of a beneficiary of Brazilian international 
cooperation in Africa due to its relevance to both Brazil’s food aid and foreign policy more 
broadly. The country belongs to the group of Portuguese speaking countries (PALOP), which 
together accounted for 74% of the resources spent on technical cooperation in Africa in 2010 
(Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p. 5). Mozambique receives the largest proportion of Brazil’s 
overseas agricultural aid and investment, consistently being placed as the main recipient of 
government’s technical cooperation from 2005 to 20134 (Ipea, 2013, Ipea, 2017; Cabral and 
Weinstock, 2010: p.5; Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013: p. 57) 
Furthermore, Mozambique was also chosen due to the importance of the Brazilian presence 
in the country with ProSavana, which polarized public opinion in that country and fostered 
transnational networks of civil society organizations against the program (Shankland and 
Gonçalves, 2016). The international assistance given to Mozambique has spurred debates on 
agricultural cooperation not only within the involved governments but also within the 
international academic community (Cabral et al., 2016: p. 55).  
It is worth restating that this study is focused on the donors, their policies, actors, approaches, 
budget and political discourse. The analysis of the receivers was used as a subsidiary source 
of information to assess how the assistance was welcomed in a relevant beneficiary country, 
what were its impacts, how it was implemented, and if it actually helped on the ground. In 
order to do so, it was necessary to briefly overview the main historical, socio-economic and 
political characteristics of the receiving countries, as these factors influenced the donors’ 
policies and practices. 
 




The objective was to analyze and compare cooperation initiatives in Africa in the field of 
food security since the middle 2000’s. In doing so, I sought to answer these research 
questions:  
• Do aid initiatives from Brazil, a non-DAC member, contribute more to underscore food 
security than DAC donors?  
• What are the differences between aid provided by a high-income and a low/middle-
income country? 
• To which extent can international cooperation help decrease food insecurity in the 
African continent? 
• Is vertical and horizontal assistance perceived differently by recipient countries? 
• Is it possible to assess differences in effectiveness between vertical and horizontal 
approaches?  
The goals of the research were: 
• To map and scrutinize how foreign aid became a widely spread practice: its concepts, 
its importance as a foreign policy tool, its mention in official discourse, and its key 
players in the countries studied. 
• To find similarities and variations in the approaches, methods and goals of the 
assistance. 
• To evaluate if distinctive approaches were welcomed differently by African partners. 
• To estimate to what extent international cooperation was seen as reducing food 
insecurity in recipient countries. 
• To recommend policy improvements to enhance positive results in the global aid 
system.  
This Dissertation tested the hypothesis that the dissimilarities between aid practices put forth 
by the US and Brazil were more related to internal pressures and limitations, as well as to 
distinctive foreign policy goals, rather than being influenced and dictated by vertical or 
horizontal intellectual constructs. In fact, the research showed that neither international 
cooperation actions taken by Brazil followed the rules of conduct of South-South cooperation 
(SSC) nor the US always acted within the dictates and parameters of what is considered 





This research covers the period from the mid-2000s onwards, with an emphasis on the 2005-
2015 years. The choice of this timeframe is justified by the growing importance of 
international cooperation in the foreign policy agenda of both Brazil and the US. A series of 
domestic and international events contributed to the increase of these countries’ share in 
international aid flows.  
In Brazil, food policy implemented under President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s government 
was the starting point of this research. During the 2000s, the boom of commodity prices, 
fostered by a large and rapidly expanding Chinese economy, led to more investments in 
agribusiness and increasing commercial revenues for agricultural exporters. This helped 
Brazil to reduce the share of its population in extreme poverty and boosted Brazilian exports. 
Consequently, in 2007, when President Lula started his second term, Brazil significantly 
expanded the budget and scope of international cooperation projects, especially in Africa 
(Amorim, 2010; Amorim, 2004; Cabral et al., 2016; Cabral, and Shankland, 2013; Júnior, 
2008; Gonzalez and Pereira, 2012; Saraiva, 2001).  
As a traditional donor, the United States has been a key participant in the global aid regime 
for decades. In absolute terms, the US government has been one of the main sources of 
development assistance throughout the globe, and in particular in Africa. However, the mid-
2000s also represented a turning point, with President George W. Bush’s initiatives 
increasing US foreign aid from $ 11 billion in 2002 to $ 18 billion in 2006. These initiatives 
were quite unexpected from a conservative Republican, president whose party has shown 
long-standing antagonism toward foreign aid. To some, this signaled a reluctant acceptance 
that poverty (and US inaction or aloofness towards it) generates hostility and resentment 
towards the United States in disenfranchised regions, thus jeopardizing its national security 




Chapter 1. Theoretical, conceptual and methodological references 
 
This Dissertation works mainly with the concept of international cooperation and its various 
denominations, such as international development cooperation, foreign aid and international 
assistance. This concept emerged as an international practice in the second half of the 
twentieth century, as a real innovation introduced into the practice of foreign policy. 
International Relations’ theories perceive international cooperation differently. For scholars 
who embrace realist thinking, aid is mostly a diplomatic instrument guided by self-interest 
and its impact on the beneficiary is of secondary concern. According to this perspective, 
countries operate in an anarchic environment and are guided mainly by self-preservation and 
national security interests. As a result, foreign aid is perceived as being only minimally 
related to the needs of recipient countries, whose economic and humanitarian needs are 
downplayed (Liska, 1960; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998). According to Morgenthau, 
foreign aid should be: 
‘considered an integral part of the political policies of the giving country – 
which must be devised in view of the political conditions, and for its effects 
upon the political situation, in the receiving country. In this respect, a policy 
of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or 
propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation.’ 
(Morgenthau, 1962: p. 309)  
A series of qualitative scholarly studies conducted in the 1970s and 80s were used to underpin 
the realist argument that foreign aid was a tool for enhancing national power and security by 
showing the national-interest motivations in the aid programs of individual countries, i.e. the 
US was motivated by the Cold War, the French by preserving its postcolonial influence in 
the African continent (Lancaster, 2008). 
Marxist and dependency scholars perceive international assistance as an instrument of 
wealthy nations to control and exploit developing ones. These intellectuals point to many 
instances when foreign aid was tied to the export of goods and services or to secure access 
to raw materials (Rodney, 1973; Escobar, 1997). 
By contrast, liberal internationalists and other liberal traditions in international relations 
understand foreign aid as a result of the need of states to cooperate in addressing problems 




international ‘public goods’, such as reducing greenhouse gases’ emissions and halting 
environmental degradation, among others (Lancaster, 2008).  
Foreign aid has also been viewed through the prism of constructivism. Constructivism’s 
approach to social analysis deals with the role of human consciousness in social life and it 
argues that human interaction is also shaped by ideational, not just material, factors. 
Ideational factors and shared ‘intersubjective’ beliefs influence interests of actors (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 2001), in turn, influencing the foreign policy of states. A main proponent of this 
view in the literature on foreign aid is David Lumsdaine. In Moral Vision and International 
Politics, he argues that:  
‘foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of the economic and 
political interests of the donor countries alone; the essential causes (of 
foreign aid) lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of donor 
countries and in their implicit belief that only on the basis of a just 
international order in which all states had a chance to do well was peace 
and prosperity possible.’ (Lumsdaine, 1993: p. 30) 
All in all, none of these theories of international politics explain adequately the complexities 
of international cooperation, which is influenced by too many domestic and international 
interacting variables to allow the adoption of a single theory. Moreover, this research shares 
the perspective of professor Amado Cervo, elucidated in his book Inserção Internacional: 
formação dos conceitos brasileiros, which states that the universal explanatory scope of 
theories is limited, since they are linked to interests and values from the countries where they 
are elaborated and for which they are useful (Cervo, 2008: p. 8). Thus, this Dissertation draws 
from the framework of analytic eclecticism (Katzenstein and Sil, 2010), which argues that 
science has no absolute basis, thus one must allow more room for plural approaches. These 
scholars seek to raise the field of International Relations to that of pluralist science without 
resorting to a single epistemological foundation for knowledge:  
The utility of this research program derives from it giving a place to 
researchers using a plurality of theories. It shows that problem-driven 
pragmatism is interesting, coherent, and most importantly, possible. This 
legitimizes research that transgresses and transcends paradigmatic lines, 
allowing for eclectic analyses using theoretical frameworks from different 




In line with analytical eclecticism, our dialogue among diverse theories was guided by 
‘integrative pluralism’, a tendency identified as one of the most promising ways to attune 
different paradigms and approaches in the area of International Relations. According to its 
proponents, ‘integrative pluralism accepts and preserves the validity of a wide range of 
theoretical perspectives and embraces theoretical diversity as a means of providing more 
comprehensive and multidimensional accounts of complex phenomena’ (Tim Dunne, Lene 
Hansen and Colin Wight, 2013: p. 416).  
In a somewhat similar view, Robert Keohane claims that it is not possible to achieve a general 
theory of international relations: ‘no general theory of international politics may be feasible. 
It makes sense to seek to develop cumulative verifiable knowledge, but we must understand 
that we can aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations rather than 
to discover universal laws, and that our understanding of world politics will always be 
incomplete’ (Keohane, 1988: p. 379). 
Therefore, this study adopts several theoretical references which can guide us to the object 
of the analysis, namely international cooperation, its formulation and results. The analysis of 
the cooperative instances developed by the United States and Brazil demonstrated the mutual 
influence of both domestic and international factors in the construction of foreign policy and 
cooperation strategies. In this sense, a theoretical perspective that helped in the understanding 
of a country’s foreign aid is the ‘two level game’ of Double-Edged Diplomacy, by Putnam, 
Evans and Jacobson (1993). According to this approach: 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither 
of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as their 
countries remain interdependent yet sovereign. (Putnam, Jacobson and Evans, 
1993: p. 436) 
An important outcome arising out of the studies in ‘two level game’ is developed by Helen 
Milner in Interests, Institutions and Information. The author starts from the premise that 
states are not unitary actors, but rather are composed of several actors with distinct 




Milner suggests that domestic politics is more influential than external factors in explaining 
cooperation5. Her central argument is that cooperation is affected less by fears of other 
countries’ relative gains or cheating than it is by the domestic distributional consequences of 
cooperative endeavors (Milner, 1997: p. 9). Drawing from the denial of the state's premise as 
a unitary actor and the introduction of a myriad of stakeholders in the decision-making 
process, one of Milner's conclusions is that the chances of cooperation become more remote 
the more divided a government is, lowering the chances of more international cooperation.  
In addition, this research recognizes that inter-state relations correspond only to a fraction of 
the overall phenomenon of international relations. The latter is composed of flows of 
information, goods, individuals, social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and others. Transnational relations are characterized as interactions that cut across national 
boundaries and in which at least one of the actors is not a state or an international organization 
(OI). This is why subjects that were previously absent from traditional analyzes now emerge 
as important actors in the international cooperation arena. The theoretical contributions on 
transnational networks, such as Thomas Risse-Kappen's (1995) Bringing Transnational 
Relations Back In, make it a valuable contribution to this research.  
Another theoretical reference used in this study is the literature on the diffusion of policies. 
Maggetti and Gilardi define policy diffusion as ‘the process by which policy choices in one 
unit are influenced by policy options in other units’ (2013, p. 3). The diffusion of policies is 
also understood as ‘the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system’ (Rogers apud Lütz 2007: p. 132). 
In this way, the policy diffusion framework studies the dissemination of a certain political 
practice between autonomous but interdependent units. 
It is possible to distinguish between a narrow concept and a broad concept of policy diffusion. 
In its stricto sensu (narrow) version, the diffusion occurs in a decentralized way, since it is 
characterized by the absence of a central governmental setting. However, the diffusion can 
also occur centrally and interstate, directly or through an international organization (Bender, 
 
5 Here cooperation is being used in a broad, systemic sense - for instance, complying with the rules of an 
international regime or lowering trade tariffs – not as a synonym for foreign aid. Even so, the argument is valid 




Keller and Willing, 2014). Since South-South cooperation in the area of food security often 
helps recipient countries to develop regulatory and institutional frameworks similar to those 
of the donor country, it can be considered as a form of international diffusion of one’s social 
policies. 
In International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998), Finnemore and Sikkink 
analyze the stages of policy diffusion. The process begins with the emergence of norms at 
the internal level, through committed internal actors - norm entrepreneurs - which act on 
organizational platforms for the construction of these normative frameworks. After internal 
consolidation, the process of adhesion to this set of rules by other states begins until a certain 
moment - tipping point – is reached, triggering more countries to adopt new norms more 
rapidly, even without domestic pressure for such change. Empirical studies suggest that, at 
this point, often an international or regional demonstration effect or ‘contagion’ occurs in 
which international and transnational norm influences become more important than domestic 
politics for effecting norm change (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: p 902).  
Although it is not possible to predict exactly when the process of widespread adoption of a 
country's standards by the international community begins, the tipping point is an important 
indication of the broad acceptance of the standard, and it occurs when critical states adhere 
to them. For instance, in Brazil’s case, its food security policies of the early 2000s were 
adopted by the UN World Food Program (WFP), which created a Center for Excellence in 
Combating Hunger in the Brazilian capital to spread its policies worldwide. Although famine 
problems mainly affect countries with scarce economic and social resources, even developed 
nations have shown interest in Brazil’s hunger alleviation strategies. The Catholic Student 
Community (KHG) has set up a support committee for the Zero Hunger Program in Germany. 
In Italy, there is a parliamentary front in favor of the Zero Hunger. And in New York, an 
income transfer program, inspired by Bolsa Família, started implementation in 2015 (MDS, 
2007). 
Finally, as this Dissertation encompasses the analysis of international cooperation’s results 
and impacts, theoretical contributions on aid effectiveness were needed. One key concern of 
these theories is the effects of foreign aid over local agricultural productivity. Since the 




They showed that food aid’s key potential adverse effect would be depressing local food crop 
prices, thus reducing the income of farmers. The economic explanation for this seemed 
simple: food aid from abroad increases supply, which ceteris paribus would cause prices to 
fall. However, the correlation is not as simple and direct as it seems. Empirical studies over 
the last decades have found it difficult to produce robust data showing this causality. 
Although current literature acknowledges that food aid can have adverse effects on food 
markets, this is rarely the case. When negative effects do occur, they are more related to 
programmatic failures in the projects’ design and implementation, such as poor targeting, 
rather than to the provision of food itself (Margolies and Hoddinott, 2012; Yamano, 2000; 
Lentz, Barrett and Hoddinott, 2005). In the Ethiopian case in particular, food aid was not 
found to have a direct correlation with local prices (Kirwan and McMillan, 2007).  
Another key study addresses the widespread claim that aid would generate long-term 
dependency. According to Margolies and Hoddinott (2012), there is no strong evidence that 
suggests that aid necessarily causes dependency. One argument presented against the aid 
dependency claim is that food transfers usually account for a small part of total household 
needs. Moreover, beneficiaries are often uncertain about who will receive assistance 
targeting, or if payments will be made regularly. Thus, food aid flows have been shown to be 
so unpredictable that household dependence would be unlikely simply because of erratic 
delivery and timing (Margolies and Hoddinott, 2012: p. 5). 
The authors also debunk the argument that food aid creates disincentives for labor. Food aid 
programs are designed to avoid encouraging recipients to leave the labor market, by 
providing only small improvements to household assets. Confirming this assumption, data 
from rural Ethiopia revealed no empirical evidence of negative dependency effects; rather, it 
showed a potential positive effect on work supply (Margolies and Hoddinott, 2012: p. 4). 
Adding to this discussion, a recent quantitative study ran a simulation of the effects of 
removing in-kind food aid in Ethiopia. The model ran two scenarios: one where food aid was 
simply eliminated and another where in-kind aid was replaced by cash-transfers. The results 
showed that the removal would generate demand stimulus for local agriculture, expanding 
the food producing sector by 2.2% in the former scenario where the aid was not replaced and 




commodity group that experienced a positive impact, while most of the other sectors faced 
adverse effects. However, in the second scenario, when households receive cash transfers, all 
sectors were positively stimulated via inter-sectoral multiplier effects.  
This phenomenon occurs because while the first scenario solely stimulates local supply (by 
removing the food aid), it does not boost demand, since former aid beneficiaries remain with 
severe budget constraints. On the other hand, in the second scenario, both demand and supply 
are stimulated, as the removal of in-kind aid boosts local supply, while cash-transfers increase 
budgets, thus creating greater demand. The only significant adverse effect the model found 
was a ‘modest’ deterioration in the external current account, since imports would tend to rise 
and exports to fall. The author concluded by stating that the results allowed a cautious policy 
recommendation in favor of cash transfers (Gelan, 2006: p. 436-458). 
This result was reinforced by another quantitative study analyzing the correlation between 
types of food aid and food production in the recipient nation. Three delivery modes were 
scrutinized: in-kind transfers, local purchases (cash transfers), and triangular purchases (food 
aid bought in a third country). The study concluded that in-kind donations generally 
presented a negative correlation with local food production, whereas locally procured food 
aid had a positive association with food production. Finally, triangular purchase presented 
no clear linkage with agricultural production. Consequently, locally purchased food aid was 
recommended as the form of food aid with better chances of enhancing food security (Wolf, 
2014). 
All in all, empirical studies and project evaluations reinforce the conclusion and 
recommendation of the main international development agencies, which is the adoption of 
cash vouchers in local procurement projects as the most efficient and less risky way to 
provide aid. However, as it will be shown in the following Chapter, the pressure of US 
agricultural commodity producers, transportation companies and their representatives in 




the only OECD donor to still provide most of its assistance as in-kind donations6 (Riley, 
2017: p. 479).  
1.1. Discussion on the Definitions of International Cooperation 
Not only foreign aid is one of the most widely used policy instruments of the international 
development community, but a very complex one. Its complexity stems from the dramatically 
different forms assistance is defined and take shape: it occurs in distinctive modalities, 
through numerous channels, including a multitude of actors (Mussa, 2010: p. 10; Margesson, 
2013). Beyond these variations, countries adopt various concepts and methods to assess their 
aid. Comparing approaches from Southern and Northern countries that do not share the same 
metrics or designations can be challenging. As mentioned in the methodology section, five 
variables, or aspects, of US and Brazilian aid will be employed as guidelines for our 
comparison.    
The US aid follows the standards set by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the OECD. These parameters include restrictions on what sort of loans and grants can be 
counted as Official Development Assistance (ODA) defined by the OECD as ‘government 
aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. By 
contrast, as most donors from the geopolitical South, Brazil does not follow OECD’s 
guidelines for giving or assessing its foreign aid.  
Rather than the result of difficulties in assembling and validating the data required to fulfill 
OECD metrics, Brazil’s refusal to follow ODA parameters is first and foremost a 
consequence of the limitations of the ODA concept to encompass initiatives carried out by 
the Brazilian government. The official designation adopted by Brazil which would be 
equivalent to that of ODA is the concept of International Development Cooperation (IDC). 
This metric allows for a much broader range of possibilities to be included as foreign aid, 
 
6 The shift from tied to untied assistance began with the European Union in 1995, followed by Canada, 
Australia, and the individual European donor governments, which led that, by 2010, tied procurement had 





since much of the assistance that Brazil provides to developing countries would not fall under 
the DAC’s category of ODA.  
The Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA)7 has been leading efforts to 
collect data on Brazil’s South-South development cooperation. It periodically publishes 
reports from Brazilian Cooperation for International Development (Port. Cooperação 
Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional - COBRADI), mapping outlays from over 
one hundred federal government’s agencies and covering a period spanning from 2005 
onwards. These reports were designed to make Brazil’s contribution to international 
development more transparent to the public, advocating the need for a conceptual adjustment 
to understand the Brazilian role as an aid-provider and the new dynamics of international 
cooperation (Lima, Campos and Junior, 2014). 
Insofar as Brazil’s foreign aid efforts are neither assessed by the IMF, the IDB nor the OECD, 
thus COBRADI reports are the best available survey of Brazilian governmental cooperation 
practices and institutions. Its modalities and definitions will help guide the comparative 
analysis in this Chapter, even though its metrics do not necessarily reflect the governmental 
official position (Campos, Lima and Gonzalez, 2012; Leite, 2011). Other governmental 
institutions apply different frameworks to describe aid-related activities. Secondarily, this 
Dissertation makes use of ABC’s quantitative data, but that refers only to technical 
cooperation under the agency’s management.  
According to João Brígido Bezerra Lima, Planning and Research Technician at the 
Directorate of Studies and Economic Relations and International Policies (DINTE) at IPEA8, 
the creation of the IDC concept addressed the need to assess governmental disbursements of 
international assistance that are not characterized as transfers of financial resources under the 
conditions historically adopted by OECD donors. Bezerra Lima explained that the metric 
needed to be adapted to the Brazilian reality, a developing nation with scare resources to 
finance international development, but willing to cooperate with Southern partners.  
 
7 IPEA is a public autarchy of the Brazilian Federal government, linked to the Strategic Affairs Secretariat of 
the Presidency.  




To understand more precisely the dissimilarities between the aid provided by DAC donors 
and the Brazilian one, each part of the definition of ODA is analyzed, so that the respective 
distinctions regarding IDC come to the fore. As seen above, ODA is defined as government 
aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. 
‘The OECD maintains a list of developing countries and territories; only aid to these 
countries counts as ODA.’ This is not valid for Brazilian IDC activities, which are not 
restricted to any group of countries (IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 33). Brazil’s cooperation 
portfolio even includes projects with developed countries, such as France, Germany, Italy 
and the United States, among others. 
Resuming the definition of ODA: ‘Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, 
or channeled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the 
World Bank.’ Brazil has these categories of aid, bilateral and multilateral, but it also engages 
in trilateral cooperation, which are triangular partnerships with foreign governments and 
international organizations to assist a third nation. Usually, in triangular cooperation, Brazil 
acts in partnership with a developed country which is the one financing the aid, while Brazil 
provides mostly technical assistance.  
It is easy to understand why Brazil welcomes triangular cooperation in its portfolio. As a 
country with little funding for foreign aid projects, partnering with a developed nation willing 
to bear most of the costs, Brazilian aid can go to countries otherwise out of reach. Brazil's 
leading partners in trilateral cooperation are as follows: Japan, the United States, Germany, 
France, Canada, Argentina and Spain. More recently, Australia and Belgium have indicated 
interest in working in partnership with the Brazilian government in the field of technical 
cooperation (IPEA and ABC, 2010). Brazil has made increasing commitments in this area 
because triangular cooperation allows the scale and impact of its aid to increase, since the 
efforts of two external partners are combined, optimizing the results (IPEA and ABC, 2010: 
p. 33). 
Another dissimilarity between ODA and IDC, as far as the multilateral dimension of 
cooperation is concerned, highlights the differences in which contributions to international 
organizations are eligible for their official records. The OECD keeps a list of ODA-eligible 




as multilateral ODA. According to Bezerra Lima from IPEA, this list is too limited, as it 
contains international organizations considered ‘exclusively from the North’ (IPEA and 
ABC, 2010: p.17). Brazil’s IDC, however, includes contributions to a broader range of 
international organizations, as it can be seen in the table below.  
Table 1.1. Federal government expenditures with regular contributions payments (2011-
2013) in BRL 
Expenditures 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Regular budget of the United Nations (UN) 63,362,513 74,428,005 82,251,512 220,042,031 
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/Ministry of 
Health (MS) 
12,412,463 12,626,366 24,242,901 49,281,730 
World Health Organization (WHO)/MS 12,529,809 - 31,457,202 43,987,011 
Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization 
(ACTO)/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) 
698,074 740,771 39,801,703 41,240,548 
Organization of American States (OAS)/MRE 10,653,559 15,583,115 9,757,010 35,993,685 
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)/MRE 
3,158,374 7,765,637 7,621,025 18,545,037 
Capital Master Plan UN – headquarters 
renovation 
5,036,626 12,626,366 - 17,662,991 
The United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO)/MRE 
3,787,548 4,421,747 8,769,124 16,978,419 
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture 
(IICA)/ Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply 
(Mapa) 
3,693,064 3,796,149 6,323,017 13,812,229 
World Trade Organization (WTO)/MRE 3,942,241 3,969,088 5,836,360 13,747,689 
Pan American Centre for Foot and Mouth Disease 
(Mapa) 
4,243,949 4,383,773 4,893,295 13,521,016 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO)/Mapa 1,969,701 2,096,521 2,194,169 6,260,391 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)/Ministry 
of Defense (MD) 
1,106,581 1,419,189 2,210,976 4,736,746 




of Communications (MC) 
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science 
and Culture (OEI)/Ministry of Education (MEC) 
- 1,955,577 2,082,908 4,038,485 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL-
France)/ Ministry of Justice (MJ) 
- - 1,657,674 1,651,674 
Other contributions 81,291,335 61,546,333 248,966,09
5 
391,803,762 
Source: IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 159. 
The last part of the definition of ODA acknowledges that aid should include grants, ‘soft’ 
loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and the provision of technical 
assistance. This also does not correspond to the IDC metric, which does not encompass the 
provision of loans. Brazilian resources offered as aid are totally non-refundable, that is, they 
have no expected return. This does not mean that Brazil does not provide loans to support 
international development, because in fact it does. But these are not taken into account and 
reported as IDC. 
Brazil’s biggest financer for international development is the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES), but surprisingly its loans are not included as IDC. IPEA was contacted to explain 
the reasons why international funding from BNDES to development programs were not taken 
into consideration for IDC metrics. The answer provided by Jose Romero Pereira Júnior, 
researcher of the National Development Program (PNPD) at DINTE / IPEA was the 
following:  
With respect to the BNDES, IPEA, with the support of the IPC-IG and the 
French Development Agency (AFD), and in partnership with the Bank, 
carried out a recent study (still pending publication) on Bank practices in 
the area of financing infrastructure and services in foreign countries. 
Analyzing data referring to the last ten years, it was verified that the 
BNDES does not make international cooperation for development and does 
not practice ‘concessionality’ (either in the form of ODA or in others), since 
these are resources from the Workers' Assistance Fund (Port. Fundo de 
Assistência ao Trabalhador - FAT), the Bank has a obligation to guarantee 




do not include international development cooperation when analyzing the 
Bank's practice9. 
Another explanation lies in the fact that BNDES international loans do not have a 
predetermined standardized interest rate, repayment schedule, or grace period. They are 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, thus making it impossible to calculate the grant element 
of its loans (Baker, 2010). Another issue is that although directed to finance international 
development, these loans were granted to projects carried out mostly by Brazilian companies, 
such as Vale, Petrobras and Odebrecht. 
Furthermore, Brazilian law does not have a regulatory framework authorizing the 
government to give public money to other governments or even establishing clear conditions 
to use public money in aid projects in foreign countries (The Economist, 2010: p. 52)10, which 
creates room for legal inadequacy, loopholes and opacity. In this sense, by restricting the 
scope of IDC and leaving out BNDES loans, the government reduces what it needs to be 
accountable for the general public regarding its foreign investments (Leite et al., 2014: p. 
22).  
Estimates on BNDES’s development aid amount to 4 billion dollars per year from 2004 to 
2010. This level of financing would be roughly similar to countries like Canada and Sweden 
(The Economist, 2010: p. 52). Even if these loans do not follow the specific metrics of ODA, 
they reach the same levels of other developing nations state-backed loans, such as China’s. 
Moreover, in the same manner as other forms of foreign aid, they follow a logic of promoting 
the donor’s national interests abroad, acting in practice as a soft power11 tool. As a result, 
even if BNDES loans cannot be precisely assessed because of difficulties to gauge the 
specifics of loans and how they relate to international parameters, they need at least to be 
acknowledged as having a relevant participation in Brazil’s role in the global aid system.  
 
9 Translated by the author. Conversation by emails exchanged on March 2019.  
10 Available at Annex VII: ‘Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.’ Economist, 17 July 2010, p. 52+. The 
Economist Historical Archive, http:// tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9AFda3. Accessed 20 June 2019.  
11 Soft power is a concept put forth by Joseph Nye in the book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power (1990). It refers to a country’s ability to influence and co-opt others through appeal and 






During the period studied, BNDES loans were instrumental to the internationalization of 
large Brazilian companies, helping to leverage the country in the international market, mainly 
in the areas of goods, services and engineering. According to former Minister Celso Amorim, 
lending money to African and Latin American countries was part of a larger strategy to gain 
increasing presence in these countries (Castro, 2017). The main problem with this strategy 
occurred in 2009, when Brazil was facing the consequences of the international economic 
crisis and the BNDES found a way to keep lending even without its traditional sources of 
supplies. Before 2009, funds for BNDES loans originated almost exclusively from taxes, 
especially the Workers' Assistance Fund (FAT), but after changes in the bank’s regulations, 
they started to be financed through Treasury debts, leading to monetary inflation12. This 
allowed BNDES loans to increase exponentially at a time when public debt was increasing. 
It is worth recalling that BNDES’s total amount of credit operations in the financial system 
in 2008 was around 140 million reais, but, in 2013, it jumped to 550 million (Hermes, 2014).  
Although international loans from national development banks are a common practice, some 
aspects of the Brazilian case raised concerns in the domestic and international public opinion. 
First, the choice of beneficiaries of the loans was criticized for being politically and 
ideologically motivated. Secondly, the loans were granted without enough studies on their 
viability and without proper assessment of risks of default. Thirdly, there was no effective 
guarantee method in case of default, and the Brazilian government would take the burden 
when default happened, such as in the cases of Mozambique and Venezuela (Rebello, 2018).  
Moreover, international loans from the Brazilian development bank were usually destined to 
Brazilian companies to implement projects in receiving nations. These companies were found 
to be involved in large corruption schemes, such as those revealed by the Lava-Jato (Car 
Wash) Operation led by the Brazilian Federal Police. Finally, in addition to lack of 
transparency, critics argued that the financial contribution to international development made 
by BNDES was draining resources still very much necessary in Brazil, which had many 
economic weakness and bottlenecks, including poor infrastructure. 
 




In relation to loans provided by the US government, although accounted as ODA, they 
represent a very small part of US aid. Although loans represented 32% of total assistance 
between 1962 and 1988, this figure declined substantially from the mid-1980s onwards. By 
2001, they began to represent less than 1% of total aid. This decrease in loan programs was 
a reaction to the debt crisis faced by developing countries, which led the United States to 
adopt measures to ensure that foreign aid would not add to the already existing debt burden 
of these nations. Currently almost all US financial assistance is provided as a grant rather 
than a loan (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: 28).All in all, the comparison between ODA and 
IDC show that, on the one hand, IDC may give the impression of Brazil’s aid being greater 
than it actually is, since it includes contributions to more international organizations than 
ODA; on the other hand, it downplays the role of Brazil, as it does not comprise concessional 
loans, such as the ones from its national development bank.  
In a recent report, the OECD assessed Brazil’s development cooperation to find out that the 
official figures published by the Brazilian government accounted for significantly higher aid 
than ODA metrics would indicate. Based on IPEA’s data, the OECD estimated what Brazil’s 
ODA for 2012 and 2013 would be. To achieve a closer approximation of the actual value of 
ODA, the OECD took into consideration only expenses with activities in low and middle-
income countries and contributions to multilateral agencies focused on promoting the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries. In the case of a multilateral 
agency that does not work exclusively on developmental activities in developing countries, 
the respective percentage of these contributions was not considered. The OECD excluded 
bilateral peacekeeping activities (OECD, 2018: p. 450).  
The values found were of 411 million dollars in 2012 and 316 million in 2013. Regarding 
the discrepancy between the two metrics, the IDC values for the same period were 513 
million and 396 million respectively13 (as Table 1.1 shows), which means there was a 
difference of 102 million in 2012 and 80 million in 2013. While the OECD excluded items 
from IDC statistics, it also did not include the ones that were already missing, such as loans 
given out by BNDES. The OECD’s report justifies this by arguing that DAC statistics are 
 




based on Brazil’s official data. If that data excludes some activities that would be included 
as ODA, they will also be absent from OECD’s estimates (OECD, 2018: p. 450).  
Although the US government follows ODA’s criteria, its reports and other official documents 
present their own concepts and definitions. For instance, the US has an official definition of 
foreign aid under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) that establishes aid as any 
tangible or intangible item provided by the US government to other countries or international 
organizations, including but not limited to trainings, services, technical advice, agricultural 
commodities, or money (§634(b)) (USA, 1961). The table below shows the particularities of 
each metric and definition.  
Table 1.2. ODA, IDC and US aid definitions and characteristics  






list kept by 
OECD 




Contribute to international 
development, understood as 
the strengthening of groups or 
populations from other 
countries to improve their 
socio-economic conditions. 
Promote five strategic 
objectives: Peace and 
Security; Investing in 
People; Governing Justly 
and Democratically; 
Economic Growth; and 








Technical assistance, food 
donations, financial resources 
invested in other countries, 
Any tangible or intangible 
item, including but not 
limited to any training, 
service, or technical 




foreign nationals and 
international organizations14. 
 
Excludes local procurement, 
and loans. 
 
total resources invested by the 
Brazilian federal government, 
in the government of other 
countries, nationals of other 
countries in Brazilian 
territory, or in international 
organizations with the 
purpose of contributing to 
international development 
personal, or mixed 
property, any agricultural 
commodity, US dollars, 
and any foreign 
currencies owned by the 
US government 





plurilateral15 and multilateral 
Bilateral and multilateral 
(trilateral also – with 
Brazil) 
Military aid Excluded Excluded  Included  
Financial aid  
(debt relief, 
public loans) 
Included Excluded Included  
 
14 In none of the above cases, the Brazilian government has transferred resources from the Treasury to other 
countries. The sum represents the amounts recorded for the promotion of cooperation, such as daily expenses, 
tickets, technical staff hours, scholarships, research funding, food and medicine donations, and administrative 
and management expenses associated with logistics and the coordination of initiatives and projects. (IPEA and 
ABC, 2018: p. 270) 
15 Plurilateral cooperation in COBRADI reports is referred as cooperation with ‘groups of countries’ (IPEA and 




Source: made by the author (OECD, 2018; IPEA and ABC, 2018; Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018) 
Efforts have been made to unify and standardize concepts, as well as to integrate Brazil’s and 
other emerging donors to the OECD data base. In December 2014, the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) scheduled a meeting of Ministers in Paris to discuss a new 
definition for ODA. In August, in an article entitled ‘The Future of the ODA Concept: The 
Political Dimensions of Seemingly Technical Discussion,’ the possibility of a definition of 
ODA was proposed, which included cooperation actions beyond the scope of ODA, thus 
integrating the expansion of the international performance of countries such as Brazil and 
China (Lima, Campos and Junior, 2014). 
The discussion on a new concept of ODA is timely, as changes in the international system 
point to a more active role for emerging countries, which are not all OECD members. To 
deny their weight in the dynamics of international cooperation for development is to 
disregard a wide range of actions that have taken place around the world, possibly hampering 
a more precise and comprehensive overview on the current dimensions of the field (Lima, 
Campos and Junior, 2014). 
1.2. Methodology 
This Dissertation made use of several methodological tools according to each step of the 
research. This work begins by outlining two study cases: the United States and Brazil. As 
noted above, these were chosen due to both countries being key agricultural powers, main 
food producers and exporters, while representing distinct approaches to international 
cooperation and foreign policy. The detailed theoretical-interpretative analysis of the actors 
and processes involved in foreign aid, provided by the cases studied, aimed to demonstrate 
how the aid policies of a flagship North-South donor and a key South-South partner were 
historically formulated and implemented.  
The cases provided deep knowledge and evidence to international behavior in the area 
chosen. More precisely, it allowed to assess the role that a set of socio-political factors played 
in accounting for the different international cooperation models adopted in these two 
countries. To this end, intensive fieldwork was carried out, including the review of policies, 




and professionals associated with development cooperation policy management and 
decision-making for each country.  
Therefore, this study relied heavily on the empirical side of the research undertaken. Despite 
having counted with the support of several theoretical frameworks, the cases and their 
comparison represent the core of this Dissertation. A common critic of the case approach is 
that it has a weaker foundation for generalization, since it delivers information about specific 
examples but not about general mechanisms, making it difficult to confirm or reject theories 
from case studies. However, this does not represent a hurdle to this work, as its goal was not 
to infer directly from case to theory. Rather, the resemblances and dissimilarities between 
the cases represented the research puzzle itself (Litta, 2011: p. 77). 
The methodology for the first part of the Dissertation falls into the category of ‘interpretative 
case studies’, which ‘are selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than 
an interest in the formulation of general theory.’ Arend Lijphart argued that although these 
studies make explicit use of established theoretical propositions, generalization and 
theorization is applied with the aim of throwing light on the case, rather than improving 
generalizations or confirming theories (Lijphart, 1971: p. 692). 
After laying down the foundation of the cases studied, this Dissertation proceeds to the 
comparative analysis between the two donors. The comparative method is considered one of 
the best suited to deal with low number of cases (the ‘small-N problem’). In its classic 
version, the comparative method can be defined as ‘a set of logically based procedures for 
systematically testing against empirical evidence alternative (or competing) hypotheses 
about causal connections between phenomena, and thereby either corroborate or reject them.’ 
(Caramani, 2009: p. 3) In this sense, it aims at identifying causal regularities (Sartori, 1991; 
Collier, 1993; Lijphart, 1971). 
The theme, scope and goal of this Dissertation prevents it from strictly attributing causality 
to the plethora of political, social, economic, international, domestic and regional influences 
that contribute to the determination of foreign aid practices. Even if causal attribution was 




to test against empirical evidence alternative hypotheses on cause-effect relationships. That 
is, there is no way to control variations.  
This does not hinder the application of the comparative method. Instead of looking for ‘laws’ 
between variables and creating (or refuting) theories, the comparison here was used to test 
certain hypothesis about the foreign aid provided by the countries concerned. Therefore, this 
study aimed to establish relations among the variables, comparing their behaviors and 
influences in the international cooperation approach of each donor. Although the comparative 
analysis’ goal was to establish correlations and not stricto sensu causation (Keohane et al., 
1994: 75), in this sense, it mainly addressing who, what, when, where and how questions, 
and leading to descriptive inferences, the assessment also estimated why the countries studied 
adopted the approaches to foreign aid (or international cooperation) that they did. In order to 
do so, a broader comparative method was developed. 
This methodological step consisted in using five key variables to assess the international aid 
provided by the United States and Brazil in the area of food security. These were: budget, 
institutions, legislation, discourse, impact/results and perceptions. As foreign aid (whether 
stated or implicitly) is a soft-power tool, the analyses of the aid approaches of the United 
States and Brazil would not be complete without an assessment of how aid is received by 
beneficiaries. A survey estimated how cooperation was welcomed in selected African 
countries - in this case Ethiopia and Mozambique - by mapping the perception of decision 
makers and civil society representatives from the recipient countries. Mapping the perception 
of the main recipients in relation to their donors helped to assess, for instance, if the approach 
used by Brazil is met with a more positive review than the assistance given by the United 
States. The survey used a specific analytical model in which arithmetic codes are attributed 
to negative and positive assumptions that African governments have regarding the role 
cooperation has played in addressing food security. The specific methodological steps 
followed in the design, implementation and analysis of the survey are presented as follow. 
Although a complete analysis of Chinese aid is not the focus of this Dissertation, the survey 
includes questions mapping the perception of this donor, as a merely illustrative counterpoint 
to enrich the comparison among different aid partners. China is also a key player in the 




The survey uses an analytical model based on several steps. At the first stage, preliminary 
questions determined the profile of the respondents – their titles and institutions – and their 
knowledge and experience in the area of agriculture and food security. Their general 
understanding of the field was assessed by the question: How would you rate your knowledge 
and experience in the area of agriculture and food security? More than 80% of the 
respondents answered that they had some knowledge and experience in the area – that they 
had previously worked and researched in the area. Then, three questions assessed the 
respondent’s acquaintance with each donor:  
- How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security 
received by Ethiopia from the US government?  
- How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security 
received by Ethiopia from the Brazilian government?  
- How would you rate your knowledge of international aid in the area of food security 
received by Ethiopia from the Chinese government?  
The possible answers were: 
- I have extensive knowledge and experience. I have worked, researched and/or known 
the area for more than 10 years. 
- I have reasonable knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or 
known the area for up to 5 years. 
- I have limited knowledge and experience. I have worked in, researched and/or known 
the area for up to 3 years. 
- I have no knowledge and experience. I have never researched or worked in this area. 
The vast majority of respondents in Ethiopia and Mozambique have some level of knowledge 
and experience with the aid given by the United States: 73,3% of Ethiopians, 83,3% of 
Mozambicans, and 78,3% in average for both countries. This result contrasts with the 
knowledge of the Brazilian cooperation, which was high in its main aid beneficiary, 




while 80% of Ethiopians have no knowledge of Brazilian aid, which is unsurprising, since 
Brazilian aid is scarcely present in that country16.   
Secondly, key-issues related to foreign aid’s capacity to address food security’s three pillars 
were selected:  
1. Food stocks 
2. Food availability  
3. Nutritional value 
The questions inquired on a selected donor country in one of the three issues identified. 
Table 1.3. Questions per beneficiary country  
FOOD STOCKS  How would you rate American external agricultural aid in relation to the 
formation of food stocks?  
How would you rate Brazil's external agricultural aid in relation to the 
formation of food stocks?  
How would you rate China's external agricultural aid in relation to the 




How would you rate American agricultural aid in relation to food 
availability?  
How would you rate Brazilian agricultural aid in relation to food 
availability?  




How would you rate American agricultural aid in relation to the 
nutritional value of food?  
 
16 73% of Ethiopian and 12% of Mozambican respondents have no previous knowledge about Chinese aid in 




 How would you rate Brazilian agricultural aid in relation to the 
nutritional value of food?  
How would you rate Chinese agricultural aid in relation to the nutritional 
value of food?  
GENERAL 
ASSESSMENT  
How would you rate your general perception of the US foreign aid in 
agriculture?  
How would you rate your general perception of Brazil's foreign aid in 
agriculture?  
How would you rate your general perception of China's foreign aid in 
agriculture?  
 
Respondents were asked to pick up one of five alternatives, which covered a spectrum from 
strongly positive to strongly negative perception. For instance, in the of Food Stocks, the 
options were: 
 a. Projects help to greatly increase food supplies. 
 b. Some projects help to increase food supplies. 
 c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant. 
 d. Some projects hamper the formation of food stocks. 
 e. Projects make it very difficult to increase food supplies. 
On Food Availability, the options were: 
 a. Projects greatly increase the availability of food. 
 b. Some projects increase the availability of food. 
 c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant. 
 d. Some projects hamper the availability of food. 
 e. Projects make it very difficult to access food. 




 a. Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do 
very well for health. 
 b. Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very 
healthy. 
 c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant. 
 d. Food from external aid has reduced nutritional value. 
 e. Food from foreign aid has no significant nutritional value and is therefore harmful to 
health. 
Finally, for the overall perception, the options were: 
 a. It is very positive. 
 b. It is predominantly positive, but it has flaws. 
 c. I have no opinion about it. It is not significant. 
 d. It is predominantly negative, but it has qualities. 
 e. It is very negative.  
 At the third step, already evaluating the answers, arithmetical figures were attributed to 
the individual perceptions, in order to give them a further arithmetical treatment and 
translate the results into quantitative measures. The different variations of ‘a’ answers 
portraying very positive perceptions were valued as 2. The ‘b’ ones showing moderately 
positive perceptions value 1; the neutral views of ‘c’ answers value 0, ‘d’ moderately 
negative answers are valued -1, and ‘e’ strongly negative perceptions are -2. 
  
 Table 1.4. Quantifying perceptions 
 Answer  Correspondent 
Arithmetical Value 
 a. strongly positive    2 
 b. moderately positive   1 




 d. moderately negative   -1 
 e. strongly negative   -2 
  
At the fourth step, the results of all respondents for each topic are gathered, leading to the 
Collective Perception Index. Finally, at the fifth step, all the perceptions of all issues are 
added, arriving at the Final Perception Index of the donor country. For this, the following 
formulas will be used.  
The Perception Index (PI) by Pillar is measured by: 




 𝑄𝑎 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 'a′ answers  
 𝑄𝑏 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 'b′ answers  
 𝑄𝑐 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 'c′ answers  
 𝑄𝑑 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 'd′ answers  
 𝑄𝑒 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 'e′ answers  
 𝑁𝑅 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The result of each donor country is compared to estimate whether there is a difference in the 
way aid is welcomed by African partners.  
The survey was either answered in person or sent electronically. It was applied in person 
during my stay in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in August 2018, and by distance in Mozambique, 
from January to June 2019. I also counted with the support of two colleagues, Arthur Catraio 
and Rodolpho Vasconcellos, in gathering respondents to the survey and revising the results17. 
Around 300 people were contacted, ranging from high representatives of main segments of 
 
17 Catraio is a PhD candidate from Fundação Getúlio Vargas at Rio de Janeiro, who visited Ethiopia in March 
2019. Vasconcellos is a PhD from the Department of Administration of the University of Brasilia. As they have 
a sounder background on Statistics and Quantitative Methodologies, they provided guidance in the methodology 




the government, academia, civil society, and NGOs. Of those, 266 people visualized the 
survey, 84 people responded, but 18 responses were incomplete and only 66 qualified as 
valid (34 from Mozambicans and 33 from Ethiopians). The combined participation rate18 
was of 32,9% and the completion rate19 was of 78,95%. The survey took an average of 15 
minutes to be completed.  
Amid the respondents are counted high representatives of civil society, academia and NGOs, 
such as the American Relief Agency for the Horn of Africa and the Ethiopian Institute of 
Agricultural Research. Answers were also received from the first top layer of national 
government agencies, such as the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 
H.E Dr. Eyasu Abraha Alle.  The result of each donor country was compared to estimate 
whether there is a difference in the way US and Brazilian aids are welcomed by African 
partners. Complementing the survey, a series of interviews further assessed the perception 




18 From the people who have seen the survey, how many participated.  




Chapter 2. The United States’ International Assistance  
The first record of US foreign aid in American history is found on the Congressional 
Record of May 8, 1812. It authorized the humanitarian delivery of wheat flour to Venezuela, 
which had suffered an earthquake, severely damaging Caracas, and causing many deaths. In 
the following decades, the US Congress approved the provision of food aid to many foreign 
populations suffering from disasters (Riley, 2017: p. 5). 
Only with the end of World War II and the rise of the US as a global superpower would the 
United States become a main aid donor (OECD, 2015). Its role in the modern global aid 
regime started with the Agriculture Act of 1949 to stabilize prices of agricultural 
commodities, especially its Section 416 (b), which provided a permanent legal basis by which 
surplus food could be donated to friendly overseas countries as development aid. President 
Truman presented yet another initiative on international development, the Point Four 
Program (1949), which aimed at opening markets to US companies and reducing the 
‘communist threat’20.  
In that period, the US government established a pattern for America’s international food 
assistance that prevails until today based on providing aid through the donation of US 
agricultural commodities. President Dwight D. Eisenhower reinforced the linkage between 
foreign aid and national production with the signing of the Agricultural Trade Development 
and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly known as PL–480, which channeled agricultural 
surplus commodities to ‘friendly’ nations. This law fostered a permanent program of foreign 
aid distribution, since prior to that the United States mostly offered aid (mainly humanitarian) 
to countries while experiencing natural disasters or war (Department of State, n.d). 21. As 
such, it represented the first permanent, large-scale US international food aid program 
(Schnepf, 2016: p. 2, 8).  
 
20 In the original Point Four Program: ‘creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing 
production in developing countries; diminishing the threat of communism by helping countries prosper under 
capitalism’. Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values (accessed September 17, 
2017). 
21 Department of State (n.d). Office of the Historian. USAID and PL–480, 1961–1969. Available at: 




The administration of John F. Kennedy reinvigorated Eisenhower’s PL–480, renamed Food 
for Peace (1961), and sought to redirect its focus from surplus liquidation to humanitarian 
needs (Kennedy, 1961). In September 1961, President Kennedy signed into law the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87–195), which established the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in order to centralize aid initiatives, coordinate capital 
disbursement and technical assistance22. Kennedy also expanded US foreign assistance by 
establishing the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. All these initiatives ultimately 
aimed at serving the US foreign policy goal of halting the spread of communism (Radelet, 
2003: p. 106).  
President Lyndon B. Johnson underscored the Food for Peace program as a cornerstone of 
US foreign assistance. He revised it with the Food for Peace Act of 196623, which required 
agreements established under it to ensure receiving nations would tackle production 
limitations. To strengthen food aid’s strategic role as a diplomatic tool, President Johnson 
transferred the functions of director for the Food for Peace program from the White House 
to the State Department, where he would serve as a special assistant to the Secretary of State. 
Johnson’s administration used PL–480 agreements to leverage support for US foreign policy 
goals, or at least to reduce criticism of the US’s international stances, especially in the 
ongoing Vietnam War. However, the program would soon face limitations, given 
Congressional reductions in foreign aid expenditures by the end of the decade24. 
Despite the efforts to link foreign aid to US national interests abroad, foreign assistance 
continued to face congressional reluctance to approve its outlays. To make things worse, by 
the end of the Cold War, aid had lost its main raison d'etre as a tool to halt communist 
influence and, therefore, it also lost much of its remaining support (Radelet, 2003: p. 106-
107). The dim scenario for aid was accompanied by the decrease of government commodity 
surpluses and the boom in agricultural exports, which made large-scale food aid programs 
used to distribute food and help sales no longer necessary (Riley, 2017). 
 
22 Department of State. Office of the Historian. USAID and PL–480, 1961–1969. (N/A) Available at: 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480 (accessed October 24, 2018). 
23 PL 89–808. 
24 Department of State. Office of the Historian. USAID and PL–480, 1961–1969. (N/A). Available at: 




After September 11th, 2001, however, international assistance came to the fore once again. 
President George W. Bush presented a series of programs which, combined, led to an increase 
of US foreign aid from approximately 11 billion dollars in 2002 to 18 billion in 2006 – the 
largest increase in decades. Thus, the 2000s witnessed a turning point in US foreign aid 
regime:  
One of the most remarkable foreign policy initiatives under President 
George W. Bush was the strong increase in development assistance, as 
the administration increased US development aid to sub-Saharan Africa 
dramatically from 2001 onwards. In 2012 prices and exchange rates, the 
annual net bilateral disbursements increased from 3.585 million dollars 
during 1990– 1999 to 5.377 million during 2000–2009, reaching 8.924 
million dollars during 2010–2013 (Olsen, 2017: p. 2107). 
President Barack Obama aimed to continue his predecessor’s engagement in international 
development, despite the severe deterioration of both domestic affairs and global context. 
When he stepped into the presidency in January 2009, the United States was facing its biggest 
economic crisis since the 1930s. More Americans had lost jobs in 2008 than in any year since 
World War II, and 800 thousand more would lose theirs in Obama’s first month in office 
(Norris, 2016).  
Adding to this, in 2010, Congress became dominated by Republicans, who were determined 
to fiercely oppose Obama’s policies, and the Middle East’s unrest persisted, with the 
unending war in Afghanistan (Norris, 2016: p. 5). All in all, the political environment was 
far from favorable for new commitments regarding global development, and Obama’s 
campaign pledge to double US assistance to Africa seemed unfeasible25 (Norris, 2016: p. 5). 
However, despite the intensely confrontational period in Washington, the Republican-led 
Congress approved high appropriations for foreign assistance, leading it to reach its peak 
since the years of the Marshall Plan26. These disbursements were not able to make up for the 
 
25 ‘It is hard to overstate how bad relations with Congress were on both policy and appropriations. Witness the 
fact that significant numbers of House Republicans openly flirted for a period of time with the idea during 2011 
of crashing the US debt ceiling with potentially cataclysmic results for global markets and stability.’ (Norris, 
2016: p. 5). 
26 ‘Adjusted for inflation, annual foreign assistance funding over the past decade was the highest it has been 





escalating commodity prices and, in the end, the total volume of food aid decreased (Riley, 
2017: p. 463)27.  
In his 2010 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD), Obama sought to elevate global 
development as a pillar of US foreign policy28. Three main aid areas shaped Obama’s 
development vision: global health, food security, and climate change. The Global Food 
Security Initiative was materialized with the Feed the Future (FTF) program, launched by 
Secretary Hilary Clinton in May 2010. The initiative boosted agriculture aid funding and 
included training for farmers, research, and the introduction of new technologies to improve 
productivity and develop markets. Agriculture gained ground as a major component in the 
US aid program, and funding obligations in the sector doubled between 2008 and 2012 
(Tarnoff, 2015: p. 8, 16).  
In order to achieve this amidst budgetary constrictions and low legislative support, the 
Obama administration sought to reform existing programs, rather than creating new ones. 
Obama’s legacy to global development efforts were more on development’s ‘how’ than its 
‘what’ (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: Summary), that is, much of aid’s priority-sectors 
remained the same but the ways by which they were implemented were revised (CRS Report, 
2017: p.18). 
2.1. Africa in US Foreign Policy 
There is no consensus about the relevance of Africa to US foreign policy. Various authors 
see the continent as a less strategic ally and of limited importance to the interests of the United 
States (Okumu et al., 2018: p. 430-436). This perception is somewhat contradicted by the US 
position as the largest single contributor of aid to Africa (Harris, 2017: p. 21). What is less 
debatable is that the US government has given limited political attention to the region after 
 
27 The dropping sizes of traditional food aid shipments persists due to a combination of American budgetary 
restrictions, the adoption of local procurement methods and continually increasing prices for food globally 
(Riley, 2017: p. 478). 
28 ‘The directive recognizes that development is vital to US national security and is a strategic, economic, and 
moral imperative for the United States.  It calls for the elevation of development as a core pillar of American 
power and charts a course for development, diplomacy and defense to mutually reinforce and complement one 
another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security.’ Available at: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy 




the end of the Cold War, which represented a period of significant decline in US assistance 
to Africa (Olsen, 2017: p. 2100). Thus, at the end of the 20th century, for all intents and 
purposes, Africa remained geopolitically insignificant (Clough apud. Metelis, 2016: p.2). 
One factor that contributed to this lower standing is the bipartisan character of African 
matters. The US main political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, generally agree 
upon the overall direction of the policy towards that continent, which leads to less politicized 
foreign policy initiatives, and, in turn, in a less prominent place in Congress’s debates (Olsen, 
2017: p. 2100). This ‘almost benign neglect of African issues through its [Congress] 
subcommittee activities’ can also be explained by ‘the prevalent assumption held in 
Washington that Europe had a special responsibility for Africa due to its colonial past 
relations’ (Okumu et al., 2018: p. 430-436). 
All these factors contributed to reduce the level of personal engagement of the US President 
and the White House in the making of US African foreign policy. This opened space to 
greater involvement of government bureaucracies in policymaking. The State Department, 
its Bureau of African Affairs and the Department of Defense, through its Office for African 
Affairs, are considered the most influential ones (Okumu et al., 2018: p. 430-436).  
One consequence of less engagement by the President and Congressmen is the prevalence of 
continuity in US policies towards Africa, since state bureaucracies tend to be  more stable 
and less prone to radical reorientations (Okumu et al., 2018: p. 430-436). This somehow 
elucidates in part why African programs implemented under George W. Bush’s Republican 
administration were kept by Barack Obama’s presidency.   
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, African affairs gained momentum in Washington, leading 
to a series of new initiatives. In 2002, the formation of the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) marked the resurgence of US efforts to bring peace and security to Africa, as 
well as to promote development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth (Pham, 
2014: p. 246). 
The arrival of the first African-American president to the White House increased 
expectations of Africa becoming a focus of more political and presidential attention. Barack 




the chance of a new relationship between Africans and Americans. Notwithstanding, the 
continent’s strategic relevance did not suffer major revisions and Africa maintained its 
relative low-profile position in US foreign policy. Obama’s priorities for the continent 
focused on strengthening democratic institutions and spurring economic growth, trade, and 
development. The novelty of Obama’s relationship with his African counterparts was his 
notion that US engagement with Africa should move beyond the simple provision of 
assistance and foreign aid to a new model of partnership ‘between equals’ (Pham, 2014: p. 
246). 
2.2. US foreign aid legislation 
Two initial laws provided the legal basis for US food aid programs: Section 416(b) of the 
Agriculture Act of 1949; and PL-480 (1954), renamed as the Food for Peace Act (FFP). Both 
laws founded programs to provide in-kind donations of food accumulated under the US 
Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) commodity price support programs, while responding 
to humanitarian, economic development, and geopolitical goals in foreign countries. Since 
then, the main food aid programs signed into law were the Food for Progress, the McGovern-
Dole Food for Education, the Local and Regional Procurement, and the Bill Emerson 
Humanitarian Trust programs. They include both emergency and non-emergency food 
delivery, and also certain agricultural development activities (Schnepf, 2016: p. 3).  
US legislation has a series of requirements for American in-kind food donations. These 
conditions limit the flexibility and the timeliness of the US response to emergency food 
crises, since they demand that:  
• all agricultural commodities be sourced from the United States29;  
• at least 50% of the US food aid must be shipped on US-flag vessels;  
• at least 20%, but not more than 30%, with a minimum of $350 million, of 
funding must be available for non-emergency food aid;  
• at least 75% of in-kind food transfers dedicated to non-emergency 
assistance must be in a processed, fortified, or bagged form;  
• at least 50% of any bagging must consist of whole-grain commodities 
bagged in the United States; and  
• at least 15% of non-emergency food aid funding must be made available to 
qualifying nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for monetization—that 
 
29 This is an example of ‘tied aid’, which consists of conditioning aid to the procurement of goods and services 




is, the process of selling donated US commodities in recipient-country 
markets to generate cash for development programs. (Schnepf, 2016: p. 3) 
Many attempts were made to update and relax these rules. In the years covered by this 
Dissertation, both the Bush and the Obama administration tried to improve US food aid 
procedures by removing legislative impediments added over the years that increased the costs 
and slowed the delivery of food aid shipped from the US (Riley, 2017: p. 479). For instance, 
Bush requested, without success, to add, in the 2008 Farm Bill, the usage of 25% of Title II’s 
budget (the main funding of aid) to purchase food in or near recipient countries rather than 
sending it from the US. Similarly, Obama’s 2014 Farm Bill proposal for Congress also 
included a reform in the food aid system to increase the use of other methods of delivery, but 
the Members of the agriculture committees rejected the demand. Again in 2016, Obama 
attempted to increase the budget for aid given through local and regional procurement (LRP), 
however, the House Appropriations Committee declined and reprimanded his ‘continued 
efforts’ to change the traditional way the United States gives food aid, that is, through in-
kind donations (Riley, 2012: p. 484). 
2.2.1. Section 416(b) Program 
The Section 416(b) Program is managed by the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and it 
regulates the donation of agricultural surpluses to countries in need (Margesson, 2013: p.6). 
Depending on the agreement with the receiving country and the cooperating sponsor, the 
commodities donated under Section 416(b) can be directly distributed to a target population, 
or they can be sold (i.e., monetized) in the recipient country with the proceeds then used to 
support emergency and non-emergency activities, such as agricultural, economic, or 
infrastructure development programs (Schnepf, 2016: p. 8).  
The Section 416(b) program has been an unstable component of food aid, since it is entirely 
dependent on the availability of surplus commodities in the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) inventories. Consequently, the program’s helpfulness has oscillated along with the 
price paid by the federal government agricultural commodity support programs. In the mid-




depletion of government-owned grain stocks by 2006 and the suspension of the Section 
416(b) program (CRS RL 34081, 2016)30. 
2.2.2. Food for Peace (FFP)  
Originally authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act of 1954 (PL-
480), Food for Peace (FFP) became the main legislative vehicle for US international food 
assistance. It disciplines the delivery of US commodities to recipient countries either for 
direct use, in food distribution programs, or for sale in the local market, monetization. The 
program has five statutory objectives: combat world hunger, malnutrition and their causes, 
promote sustainable agricultural development, expand international trade, foster private 
sector and market development, and, finally, prevent conflicts (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10). 
The FFP includes six sections, referred to as titles. The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) manages Title I, whereas USAID manages Titles II, III and V. Finally, 
Title VI is administered by the Department of the Treasury.  
Title I, called Economic Assistance and Food Security, regulates the concessional sales31 of 
US agricultural commodities to selected developing countries so as to spur economic growth, 
supporting non-emergency food security projects. The 1996 Farm Bill allowed private 
entities to benefit from Title I loan agreements. Since a main goal of the program was to 
promote trade of US agricultural goods, it prioritized subsidizing credit to nations with the 
greatest commercial potential for US agricultural commodities (Riley, 2017: p. 463). 
Title I food aid programs have been inactive since FY2006. The main reason for Title I’s 
downward trend is found in its meager market or economic development results after 1990, 
which, in turn, is related to changes in beneficiary countries. In the beginning, most Title I 
sales had been done in nations with rather strong economies, such as Japan, South Korea, 
Turkey, Brazil, and India. So, when these markets expanded and became important customers 
 
30 Once the program has been inactive since the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY2007) and the focus of this dissertation 
begins on the mid-2000s, Section 416(b) program will not be under further scrutiny. 




for US agricultural products, many perceived this as a direct consequence of their 
participation in the Title I sales program (p.464).  
The 1990 Farm Bill brought about a new direction to the program, shifting the focus of sales 
agreements to poorer and more food-insecure countries. These nations did not enjoy the 
economic strength of the initial beneficiaries and were less likely to emerge eventually 
become important markets for US agricultural products. As Title I stumbled to create new 
paying consumers of US agricultural products, the program started to be perceived as 
inefficient, and its outlays steadily diminished until it was discontinued.  
Title II, named Emergency and Development Food Assistance Programs, disciplines in-kind 
donations of agricultural commodities to governments and eligible organizations. Public and 
private agencies, such as private voluntary organizations (PVOs), NGOs and cooperatives 
are qualified to receive Title II funds. The program offers food aid as a grant (not needing to 
be repaid).  
Title II can be employed to address both emergency humanitarian needs and nonemergency 
assistance with development-oriented goals. However, most of its outlays have been 
progressively diverted from development projects to emergency relief. In 1985, there were 
more than 35 million people benefiting from Title II development projects, but in 2013 this 
number dropped to 6.2 million (Riley, 2017: p. 475). 
Title II has been gaining importance since the 1980s, becoming the largest funding source 
for US food aid. Since 2000, Title II outlays have accounted for 73% of the US’s total annual 
international food aid spending. A partial motive behind the funding shift from Title I to Title 
II was the international pressure from major trading partners who argued that US use of 
concessional sales terms for exporting surplus commodities was displacing normal 
commercial activity. These concerns influenced the development of an international 
framework to monitor and discipline international food aid (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10; Riley, 
2017: p. 470). 
The 1990 farm bill contained some of the most significant food aid legislation since the 
foundation of PL-480 in 1954. The bill made enhancing global food security a formal 




segment, Title III. Called Food for Development, Title III consisted of grants of US 
agricultural commodities to ‘countries willing to commit their own resources to agricultural 
growth and development’ (Riley, 2017: p. 456). Analogously to what occurs in Title I, the 
food aid was sold, though grants could be forgiven insofar as the proceeds were used in 
development endeavors addressing food insecurity32.  
Title V was created by the Food Security Act of 1985 and it funds the Farmer-to-Farmer 
Program (F2F), which provides technical assistance to farmers, farm organizations, and 
agribusinesses in developing countries. The program relies on American volunteers from 
farms, universities, cooperatives, private agribusinesses and nonprofit organizations to 
transfer their knowledge and expertise host-country farmers and organizations. It finances 
non-emergency initiatives to foster long-lasting broad-based growth in the agricultural 
sector, encompassing food processing, production and marketing. A secondary goal is to 
foster understanding of international development issues in the American population and, 
reciprocally, increase international understanding of the US development programs (FY 2016 
US International Food Assistance Report: p. 26). 
In the 2008 Food for Peace Act, Congress named the program the John Ogonowski and Doug 
Bereuter Farmer-to-Farmer Program, to pay tribute to a pilot killed in the 9/11 attacks, John 
Alexander Ogonowski, and to one of its first advocates, former Congressman Douglas Kent 
Bereuter. In 2016, the program provided 884 volunteers, who carried out missions in 45 
countries.  
Evaluations measure the impact of the F2F program through the changes of local practices. 
Besides training, the volunteer assistance makes recommendations, which, if accepted, lead 
to behavior change and improvements in productivity. Around nine thousand 
recommendations have been made and around four thousand of those (46%) were reportedly 
adopted. The F2F program is estimated to have boosted more than 7.8 million dollars to the 
beneficiaries of the technical cooperation (FY 2016 US International Food Assistance 
Report: p. 26). 
 




Title VI, named Enterprise for the America's Initiative of the Food for Peace Act, authorizes 
official debt relief. It links aid programs to debt owed to the United States to structural 
adjustments and open investment policies.  
In the last decades, several of these categories of food aid were discontinued. Title I declined 
to zero in 2006. Title III was defunded in the late 1990s. Section 416(b) ceased in 2006 
(Riley, 2017: p. 456).  
2.2.3. Food for Progress (FFPr) 
Authorized by the 1985 Farm Bill (P.L. 99-198; §1110), the Food for Progress program 
aimed to improve agricultural productivity and to expand trade of agricultural products in 
foreign countries. It established the conditions for countries to receive donations of US 
agricultural commodities which ought to be sold in the local market, sometimes with the help 
of a third party (i.e. PVOs, cooperatives, NGOs, and IOs, among others). The proceeds are 
used to support agricultural, economic or infrastructure development programs (USDA, 
2019a). 
The 1985 Farm Bill also contained provisions that significantly increased the cost of US food 
aid. Firstly, it increased the percentage of aid that must be sent abroad on US flag ships from 
50% to 75%. Secondly, the percentage of food aid with value added in the US also grew to 
75%, and, finally, it imposed a quota of aid leaving from ports of the Great Lakes region. All 
measures would significantly increase the cost of US aid, thus reducing the number of 
agricultural commodities actually sent to food insecure populations (Riley, 2017: p.453) 
The FFPr program focuses on promoting agricultural policy reforms that incorporates free 
enterprise elements through changes in commodity pricing, marketing, input availability, 
distribution, and private sector involvement. This approach reflected President Ronald 
Reagan’s belief that the private sector was the most suitable to deal with economic problems, 
and that, thus, US aid should use free markets to deal with developing countries. The program 
is administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA, which negotiates 
multi-year contracts with cooperating sponsors (organizations or governments), requiring the 
monetization of donated commodities in support of eligible developing countries, especially 




infrastructure, such as improved production practices, marketing systems, farmer training, 
agri processing, and agribusiness development.  
In response to requests for commodities, USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
purchases produces from the US market and ships them to the recipient country, using either 
appropriate Title I funds or CCC financing. Upon arrival, USDA transfers them to the 
implementing organizations for monetization.  
Since 2006, Food for Progress program has relied entirely on CCC financing, inasmuch as 
Congress has not appropriated any funds for it since then. Despite requiring that the program 
should provide at least 400,000 metric tons (mt) of commodities each fiscal year, purchases 
have been around 212,600 mt. In addition, once the commodity requirement is based on 
weight, the program’s actual cost fluctuates along with commodity prices (Schnepf, 2016: p. 
10). In 2014, the program was active in 35 countries with around one hundred projects. 
However, projects have modest budgets and the program’s total size is relatively small 
(Riley, 2017: 469). 
2.2.4. McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program 
(MGD Program)  
Named after its two main advocators, US Senators George McGovern and Bob Dole, the 
MGD program was authorized by the 2002 Farm Bill33. The initiative began in 2000 through 
a pilot program called the Global Food for Education Initiative, which aimed at providing 
meals for children in 38 countries. The program’s initial budget was $300 million.  Program 
is classified by the US government as an initiative in education, not in agriculture, since it 
helps support education and child development in food insecure countries (USDA, 2019b).  
In May of 2002, President George W. Bush officially signed into law the McGovern-Dole 
Program, committing to in-kind donations of US agricultural commodities, as well as 
financial and technical assistance, to support school feeding, maternal, infant, and child 
nutrition programs in countries experiencing critical food needs.  
 




The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA administers the program, but, as it 
occurs with many US aid projects, the government outsources the implementation to 
qualifying charitable private voluntary organizations (PVOs), cooperatives, and IOs, or it is 
executed directly by the receiver foreign country. The implementing partners use the 
commodities for direct feeding or, in limited situations, for local sale, with the proceeds 
supporting school feeding and nutrition projects (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10). 
From the pilot project in 2000 until the end of 2014, the MGD Program provided 
approximately two billion dollars34 to children of more than 40 countries (Schnepf, 2016: p. 
6), including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malawi, 
Moldova, Nicaragua, Niger, Ethiopia and Pakistan. In 2008, the program’s creators, Senators 
McGovern and Dole were made World Food Prize laureates for their efforts to curb hunger 
in the world and in particular for this program35, which, at that time, boosted school 
attendance by 14 percent and girls’ attendance by 17%36.   
2.2.5. Local and Regional Procurement (LRP) Projects 
LRP programs are based on awarding cash grants to the acquisition of agricultural 
commodities from markets close to populations going through food crises and disasters. Two 
main advantages stem from purchasing locally rather than trans-shipping commodities: first, 
it expedites the provision of aid, since acquisitions are not delayed by international shipping 
operations. Second, it spares transportation costs, which allows more food to be bought with 
the same amount of funding (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10). On the other hand, LRP projects face 
limitations, which include the unavailability of enough field staff, inadequate regional market 
supplies, insufficient infrastructure, as well as adverse market effects on local producers or 
consumers (Hanrahan, 2010: Summary).  
 
34 Between 2000 to 2002, the funds were given to the Global Food for Education program, which was a 
precursor to the McGovern-Dole program. For FY 2000-2001 it was $300 million; for 2002, $112 million; for 
2003, $100; for 2004, $50; for 2005, $90; for 2006, $96; for 2007, $99, for 2008, $99; for 2009 $100. From 
2010 to 2014, the yearly average was $184 million, all in nominal prices (current-year prices), not adjusted for 
inflation. (Ho and Hanrahan, 2010: p. 10; Schnepf, 2016: p. 6). 
35 Available at: https://www.worldfoodprize.org/en/events/laureate_award_ceremony/2008_ceremony/ 





US legislation institutes limitations to LRP activities. They must provide food aid to affected 
populations without significantly increasing commodity costs for low-income consumers 
from the region. In addition, US law prohibits the resale or trans-shipment of the commodities 
procured to any country other than the recipient country, and the use of the eligible 
commodity for any purpose other than food aid (Schnepf, 2016: p. 10). 
This type of food aid was not invented by LRP programs. Purchasing aid food in local 
markets has been a popular practice for decades. The World Food Program (WFP) began 
locally procuring food in Asia in the 1970s and in Africa in the 1980s (Lentz, Barrett, and 
Gomez, 2012: p. 1). The United States was one of the last donors to join LRP, inasmuch as 
initial attempts to instate local procurement programs were rejected by Congress, which 
defended the interest of national commodity producers and agribusiness stakeholders 
(Hanrahan, 2010: p. 6).   
In 2008, two policy-changes started to shift US aid programs in the direction of cash-based 
food aid. First, the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (i.e. the 2008 Farm Bill) 
authorized funding of 60 million dollars for the USDA to undertake a five-year Local and 
Regional Procurement Pilot Project between 2009 and 2012. Second, the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-252) authorized USAID to use LRP in support of 
emergency food security projects (Hanrahan, 2010, Summary). Thus, in 2008, both US 
agencies responsible for foreign aid were granted funds to implement LRP projects.  
Currently, USAID funds cash-based assistance through the Emergency Food Security 
Program (EFSP) through the Office of Food for Peace, which provided more than 2.2 billion 
dollars for projects distributing cash and vouchers between 2010 and 2014. The 2014 Farm 
Bill also authorized up to 80 million dollars for LRP, rendering the 2008 pilot program 
permanent (CRS, 2019). 
These changes made US policy more similar to other OECD donors, such as the European 
Union (EU), Canada, and Australia, which provide almost all their food aid in the form of 
cash and have substantially accelerated the diffusion of LRP as the delivery mode of choice 
in international food assistance (Hanrahan, 2010: Summary). In the wake of these changes, 




in 1999 to 67 percent in 2010 (WFP Interfais 2011 apud. Lentz, Barrett, and Gómez, 2012: 
p. 1-3).  
2.2.6. The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) 
The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust is not a food aid program per se, but rather a reserve 
of US commodities and cash to meet unanticipated humanitarian food aid needs in 
developing countries (Hanrahan, 2013: p.9). Originally authorized by the Agricultural Act of 
1980 (P.L. 96-494) as the Food Security Wheat Reserve, and by the Africa Seeds of Hope 
Act of 1989 (P.L. 105-385), the BEHT has been reauthorized by subsequent farm bills 
(Schnepf, 2016: p.5). 
The fund is under the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture, but the USAID Administrator 
oversees the use of the resources (USAID, 2018a). USAID is also responsible for initiating 
requests and sending them to the USDA for approval (Hanrahan, 2013: p1). This allows the 
Office of Food for Peace to meet urgent needs when other Title II resources are not available 
(USAID, 2018a).  
When it was signed into law in 1980, the Trust was designed to hold up to four million metric 
tons of wheat. Subsequent reauthorizations allowed it to include other commodities, but 
wheat has been the only commodity held in reserve ever since (Hanrahan, 2013: p. 9). In 
2008, as global food prices spiked, the USDA sold the remaining stocks of wheat, converting 
the trust into an all cash reserve. The Trust was last used in 2014 (Schnepf, 2016: p. 18; 
USAID, 2018a).  
2.2.7. The Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP)  
The EFS is a cash-based food-assistance program administered by USAID that provides 
grants to eligible organizations for rapid response to the highest priority emergency food 
security needs. Initially sanctioned by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its subsequent 




permanently authorized as part of the FAA (22 USC. 2292(c)) by the Global Food Security 
Act (GFSA)37 of July 2016 (Schnepf, 2016: p. 18).  
EFSP’s stated purposes are ‘to mitigate the effects of manmade and natural disasters by 
utilizing innovative new approaches to delivering aid that supports affected persons and the 
communities hosting them, build resilience and early recovery, and reduce opportunities for 
waste, fraud, and abuse.’ (USAID FY 2017 EFSP Report: p. 1)  
USAID uses cash-based assistance, such as the EFSP, primarily when US-purchased, in-kind 
food aid cannot arrive fast enough to respond to an emergency or when local market 
conditions demonstrate it is the most appropriate approach. This evaluation is based on four 
criteria: market appropriateness, feasibility, project objectives and cost (USAID, 2018b). 
EFSP funds have relied on three principal forms of emergency food security assistance: local 
and regional procurement (40% of outlays), food vouchers (26%), and cash transfers (14%). 
From FY2010 through FY2015, USAID awarded EFSP grants totaling 3.3 million dollars 
for cash-based food assistance, with the majority of this aid going to Syria. Implementing 
partners include US and foreign NGOs, cooperatives, and IOs. (Schnepf, 2016: p. 18). 
USAID implements the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) through its Office of 
Food for Peace (FFP), with funding from the International Disaster Assistance account. The 
FFP Office manages the majority of US international food assistance authorized by Title II 
of the Food for Peace Act, which in FY2015 totaled about 1.47 billion dollars38. 
Even though Congress ended up approving programs for the local purchase food, the main 
emergency food assistance strategies in the United States are still built upon the provision of 
in-kind commodities produced in the United States. Whether stemming from the EFSP or 
from local and regional procurement (LRP) projects, cash transfers to address food insecurity 
internationally are subject to regulations and restrictions to limit their scope and usage. In 
this sense, they are only allowed ‘on a case-by-case basis when in-kind food aid is 
unavailable or impractical, and only when compelling evidence exists of an urgent need 
 
37 P.L. 114-195; §7. 
38 House Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Hearing. Publication info: 




where LRP, cash transfers for food or food vouchers in place of other options will save lives, 
reduce suffering or serve substantially more people in need’' (USAID, 2014a: p. 2) 
2.2.8. Feed the Future (FtF) 
Established in 2010, Feed the Future (FtF) is a major Obama Administration foreign 
assistance initiative that combats hunger, malnutrition, and food insecurity39. FtF backs US 
pledges made at the G8 Summit of 2009 and the following L’Aquila Food Security Initiative 
(LFSI). It also supports the implementation of President Obama’s 2010 Policy Directive on 
Global Development, by acting as a coordination mechanism for all US international 
agricultural and food security development programs (CRS Report 44216, 2016). 
It is considered a new paradigm for international development, going beyond the traditional 
US practice of donating or selling US-sourced food aid commodities in local markets, an 
approach which has been criticized for being supply-driven, poorly oriented to respond to 
local needs, and inept to enhance local production (CRS Report R44216, 2016). Instead, 
FtF’s cross-sectoral approach focuses on bridging the gap between agricultural research 
outputs and global food security. The initiative helped develop and deploy over 900 
innovations in agricultural practices in partnering countries from 2011 to 2016. These 
innovations include improved crop residue management for livestock feeding and transgenic 
rice lines that are tolerant to drought, for example (USAID, Feed the Future, n.d).  
The initiative has assisted 19 low-income countries, 12 of them in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
(Tumusiime and Cohen, 2016; CRS Report R44216, 2016). The initiative coordinates all 
actions by the government regarding foreign donations and food security, once FtF guidelines 
are extended to all US international agricultural development programs, including ‘the Food 
for Peace Title II non- emergency food aid, the Food for Progress program, and McGovern-
Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program’ (CRS Report 44216, 
2016). FtF cuts across existing programs to facilitate coordination and potentially prevent 
 
39 The program was maintained by President Donald J. Trump. USAID (2018c). Office of Press Relations. 
Statement by Administrator Mark Green on the Reauthorization of The Global Food Security Act. Friday, 
October 12, 2018. Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/oct-12-2018-




duplication and gaps. Thus, FtF is influencing the overall US international agricultural 
assistance, moving it away from in-kind donations to technical cooperation.   
The initiative targets the poorest countries while prioritizing those that demonstrate to have 
the greatest potential to improve their food-related indexes: ‘the ones identified as having the 
greatest needs, strongest host-country commitment and resources, potential for agriculture-
led growth, and opportunities for regional synergies’ (CRS Report, 2017: p.9).   
FtF is assessed through a set of publicly released metrics that justify the countries and projects 
chosen to receive investments. The program also relies on various indicators to monitor and 
evaluate progress, which are compiled in an annual report to Congress, thus fostering the 
program’s transparency and accountability (CRS Report R44216, 2016). 
From 2010 to 2014, USAID invested 4.7 billion dollars in the FtF program and other federal 
agencies have invested 6.6 billion dollars more in development activities under the initiative 
(CRS Report R44216, 2016). USAID leads the initiative, coordinating ten other agencies and 
departments. Their actions include (USAID, 2018: p. 10):  
• Investing in cutting-edge scientific and technological agricultural research 
often provided by US universities and firms to develop stronger seeds and 
greener fertilizers so farmers can grow more; 
• Developing agricultural markets, expanding trade and using mobile phones 
to provide real-time prices, so farmers can sell what they grow at a profit;  
• Providing access to capital and extension services, so farmers can expand 
farms, buy equipment and learn the best techniques for growing and storing 
crops; and,  
• Helping countries design and implement phytosanitary standards to ensure 
the safety of their domestic food supply and exports.  
Feed the Future is the only original Obama foreign aid initiative specifically signed into law 
(the Global Food Security Act of 2016, P.L. 114-195 - GFSA). The initiative and the 
legislative support provided by the GFSA have given food security and agricultural 
development a more prominent role in the US development policy and budget (CRS Report, 
2017). 
FtF’s whole-of-government approach faces criticism in relation to its capacity to implement 
and monitor activities across different government agencies. Another issue raised is that 




long standing separate programs, such as Food for Peace, since FtF brings forward a new 
paradigm of aid-provision. Moreover, FtF’s country-led planning met resistance from civil 
society actors who were afraid that privileging government-led planning would marginalize 
civil society’s efforts to promote development (CRS Report 44216, 2016). 




 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
USDA 366 239 541 430 385 432 448 344 481 341 375 
Food for Peace 60 10 10 13 13 13 10 10 15 na na 
Title I 50 ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne ne 
Title V (Farmer-to-farmer) 10 10 10 13 13 13 10 10 15 na na 
Food for Progress 220 130 166 238 166 190 246 150 127 149 153 
McGovern-Dole IFECN1 86 99 99 168 174 206 192 184 165 192 202 
Local and Regional 
Procurement (LRP) 
ne ne 0 5 24 23 0 0 0 0 0 
Section 416 (b) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BEHT2 0 0 266 6 8 0 0 0 174 0 20 
USAID 1,839 1,870 2,351 2,552 3,803 3,829 3,929 3,847 4,146 4,436 3,697 
Food for Peace 1,839 1,870 2,351 2,552 2,746 2,628 2,583 2,312 2,302 2,446 2,697 
Title II 1,839 1,870 2,351 2,552 1,933 1,660 1,610 1,355 1,324 1,466 1,696 
Title III 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Feed the Future3 ne ne ne ne 813 968 973 957 978 980 1,001 
Emergency Food Security 
Program 
ne ne ne ne 244 232 374 578 866 1,009 na 
World Food Program 
(WFP) 
 
US contribution 1,123 1,184 2,070 1,767 1,553 1,243 1,460 1,494 2,227 2,006 1,778 




US contribution na na na na 90 29 30 28 30 30 32 




US contribution 61 60 58 79 86 34 123 52 132 164 na 
Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program 
(GAFSP) 
 
US contribution ne ne ne ne 67 100 135 143 0 123 0 
Total 3,389 3,353 5,020 4,827 5,984 5,666 6,126 5,908 7,016 7,099 5,882 
na = not available.  




1IFECN = International Food for Education and Child Nutrition. 
2Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. 
3Omits Feed the Future funding provided through the Millenium Challenge Corporation, US African 
Development Fund, Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, and Peace Corps. 
 
Source: Tandon et al., 2017: p. 2. 
 
 
2.3. Organizational Framework   
According to the US Constitution, the Executive Branch and Congress are the main powers 
responsible for US foreign policy (Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, 2011). Beyond 
that, there is only a broad outline of who should take part in foreign policy making, without 
specific laws or regulations directing how decisions should be made. Much depends upon 
personalities and management-styles of the President and high-level officials, a situation that 
paves the way for personal relations to override formal lines of authority (Whittaker, Smith, 
and McKune, 2008: p. 5).  
There is a plethora of state agencies directly or indirectly involved in the provision of foreign 
aid. Due to limitations of scope, this Dissertation focused on the ones that are most relevant 
and directly related to food security and agriculture. They are analyzed in detail below. 
However, prior to that, it is important to briefly mention the steady growth in the participation 
of private sector entities, both nonprofit and commercial ones, in US foreign assistance.  
Currently, most development and humanitarian activities are not directly implemented by US 
government personnel, who are in charge of selecting implementers, monitoring projects and 
ensuring their effectiveness and financial accountability. They work as intermediaries 
between Congress (which sets requirements and budget) and those implementing projects in 
the private sector, guaranteeing that projects meet aid objectives. Private sector aid actors 
currently carry out the vast majority of aid projects. They are constituted by firms, nonprofit 
NGOs, universities, charitable PVOs, and individual contractors (Margesson, 2013).  
The rise of the private sector in foreign aid, especially since the 1990s, has also been followed 




detail below. Both processes have brought about changes in the organizational structure of 
US aid and how it is perceived domestically and globally40.   
2.3.1. Department of State  
The Department of State is the main governmental agency in foreign affairs and the leader 
of interagency coordination in developing and implementing US foreign policy. It provides 
support to the international activities of other governmental entities, including the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense (DoD) and USAID (Whittaker, 
Brown, Smith, and McKune, 2011).  
Heading the State Department is the Secretary of State, who should serve as the President’s 
principal foreign policy advisor. Beneath the Secretary in the senior hierarchy are the Deputy 
Secretaries - one for Policy, one for Management and Resources - and the Counselor of the 
Department. Further beneath them are a series of Under Secretaries who are responsible for 
policy and management areas. Assistant Secretaries for regional and functional bureaus then 
follow in terms of authority and responsibilities (Whittaker, Brown, Smith, and McKune, 
2011).  
Despite the State Department’s prominent role in US foreign affairs, its direct involvement 
with aid donation has been of secondary importance. From the foundation of USAID in 1961 
until recently, the agency was in charge of that part of US foreign policy. This is the reason 
why this work did not deeply extend in the analysis of the State Department’s functions, 
organogram and activities, focusing instead on USAID, the USDA, and the DoD.  
2.3.2. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
The United States Agency for International Development was created by the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, during President John F. Kennedy’s administration. It brought 
together in a single agency several existing foreign assistance organizations and programs. 
 
40 Comments made off-record by Dr. Michael Tetelman, Deputy Director of the Global Education, Employment 
and Engagement (G3E) business unit at FHI 360, a global non-profit human development organization.  He 
has close to twenty years’ experience designing and developing programs worldwide that promote economic 
growth, strengthen government service delivery, and that build human and institutional capacity. He has 




This transformation created opportunities for US international development assistance to 
grow intensely, leading the 1960s to be known as the ‘decade of development’ (Lancaster, 
2008: p. 69). 
USAID’s stated purposes have not significantly changed since they were first outlined 50 
years ago: ‘furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free 
markets while also extending a helping hand to people struggling to make a better life, 
recovering from a disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country’ (USAID, n.d.-
b). Possibly to justify the cost of aid to the domestic audience (USAID, n.d.-b), official 
websites and statements leave no doubt that the primary objective of the US government in 
providing foreign assistance is to promote its own international security and prosperity. The 
instrumentalization of US aid as a tool to foster foreign policy goals is evident from the 1960s 
up until now:  
USAID promotes American prosperity through investments that expand 
markets for US exports; create a level playing field for US businesses; and 
support more stable, resilient, and democratic societies. (USAID, n.d(b). 
There is no doubt that investing in global development progress is vital to 
US national security. However, US foreign assistance through the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) also benefits the US 
economy and US workers. As one of the most internationally competitive 
economies in the world, the US is a major exporter of goods and services, 
and our exports are in demand the world over. As countries get richer, they 
want to buy more US products and services. By supporting economic 
growth and self-reliance in developing countries, USAID helps create 
better, stronger and more resilient markets for US exports. When 
countries commit to moving forward, USAID programs can provide the 
needed capital, technology, ideas, and know-how to assist them. USAID is 
both from and for the American people (USAID, 2019). 
USAID is headed by an administrator and deputy administrator, both appointed by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate (USAID, 2017a). USAID is divided into organization 
units called bureaus, which are divided into subdivisions. USAID has both geographic and 
functional bureaus, which are respectively responsible for supervising activities in each 
country and the programs across geographic boundaries (USAID, 2014b). 
USAID operates programs in nearly a hundred countries divided into five geographic 




and the Near East41. USAID’s field presence amounts to an important source of strength for 
the US. One reason for that is its provision of first-hand information and direct access to local 
populations. Secondly, it promotes US national and security interests (i.e. boosting US 
exports, stabilizing conflict-prone areas, etc.). Thirdly, it also acts as a soft-power 
mechanism, promoting a caring (or at least non-threatening) image of the US government.  
For much of its existence, USAID enjoyed considerable autonomy and relative prestige. In 
recent decades, however, these have continuously been stripped away. Despite the greater 
need for international assistance in the 1990s, especially in Africa, leading that decade to be 
called the ‘lost decade’, the end of the bipolar order of the Cold War caused the African 
continent to lose its strategic importance and aid its main raison d’etre. In a response to this 
new international setting, the government reshaped its foreign priorities and USAID’s role. 
This led the agency to endure budget cuts, which reached its staff, training and offices 
worldwide. For instance, in 1980, USAID had 4,058 permanent employees, but, by 2008, 
this number dropped to 2,200.  
In most cases, the decrease in presence was followed by a rise of military presence in the 
regions concerned. As it will be seen, the Department of Defense has increasingly taken part 
in US foreign assistance. Even if this shift from civilian to military presence remains to be 
fully understood, there is little doubt that there were cost in terms of soft-power and long-
term projects sustainability. USAID’s decentralized structure allows its programs to be more 
receptive to local conditions and needs (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 123-131). 
In contrast, the Armed Forces in the field are bound to a much stricter hierarchy and are less 
committed to promote local development, which is not their expertise nor main focus42. 
Another key feature of USAID’s loss of prominence and autonomy is found in the growing 
involvement of the State Department in US foreign assistance programs, with USAID being 
placed in a subordinate position. In 2001, the State Department took over USAID’s account 
and its direct relationship with the Office of Management and Budget. In 2004, the Secretary 
of State - rather than the USAID Administrator - was named to chair the Millennium 
 
41 Available at:  http://www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/usaid.php (accessed on: November 20, 2018). 
42 Informal conversation with Yonatan Holz, former Reconstruction Team Member of the US Air Force. 




Challenge Corporation (MCC), one of the main initiatives of the George W. Bush 
administration. The pinnacle of this process happened in 2006, when USAID was effectively 
integrated into the State Department, which became responsible for the administration of the 
Agency’s budget, while the head of USAID began acting as the State Department’s Director 
of Foreign Assistance. 
According to USAID’s former Administrators Brian Atwood (from 1993 to 1999) and Peter 
McPherson (1981 to 1986), USAID’s partial-fusion with the State Department has not 
worked properly. The missions and personnel requirements of the two organizations are 
different and incompatible. USAID is an operational and program-management agency, with 
a staff comprised of professionals with the technical and managerial skills. By contrast, the 
State Department deals with more urgent matters and a more politically influenced agenda, 
one that is prone to sudden changes due to domestic pressure and international instability. 
Moreover, diplomats and other State Department personnel are trained to operate with a 
different rationale. With the semi-merger of the two agencies, the urgency of the State 
Department’s mission and the collective mindset of its personnel stood out, to the detriment 
of the development agenda (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 128). 
All these changes led USAID to lose power and influence within the government and abroad. 
Thus, policymakers began to look for other vehicles to implement their development 
initiatives, leading other players to increase their participation in the foreign-aid arena. For 
instance, the DoD created independent organizational structures to carry out aid-programs, 
under the umbrella of the Africa Command, founded in 2007.  
USAID’s reduced role in aid policy-making allowed presidential initiatives and 
congressional earmarks for foreign aid programs that were politically motivated, and not 
necessarily in tune with local needs and realities. More often than not, these projects 
concentrated on providing emergency support, at the expense of fostering long-term 
development. Unsurprisingly, short-term and easily achievable goals are politically 
appealing, since they show direct and quick results, which, in turn, can be instrumentalized 
to boost one’s popularity. On the other hand, USAID, as a long-standing governmental 




The proliferation of players in US international assistance has also brought about other 
domestic and international complications. Internally, it has led to incoherence and poor 
integration across programs and to a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities. Abroad, it 
has caused confusion among recipients and other donors as to which agency represents the 
America government in development issues.  
Brian Atwood and Peter McPherson add that ‘there is no evidence that this broad array of 
new development agencies has done any better than the old, more unified USAID, and much 
evidence that this organizational structure has done worse’. They argue that this 
‘organizational chaos’ has significantly increased the costs of implementing foreign aid 
programs, delayed their implementation, and reduced their impact (Atwood, McPherson and 
Natsios, 2008: p. 123-131). 
2.3.3. US Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
Originally created in May 1862 by President Abraham Lincoln, the Agriculture Department 
has responsibility for developing and implementing federal laws related to farming, forestry, 
and food. ‘The People's Department’ (USDA, 2012), as Lincoln called it, aims to ‘provide 
leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, rural development, nutrition, and related 
issues based on sound public policy, the best available science, and efficient management’ 
(USDA, 2015: p. 1).  Besides helping American farmers, USDA’s mission statement also 
mentions helping feed other nations throughout the world. This is further detailed in one of 
the main USDA’s strategic goals:  
(1) enhance America’s ability to develop and trade agricultural products 
derived from new technologies while supporting grower choice among all 
segments of agriculture;  
(2) ensure that US agricultural resources contribute to enhanced global food 
security; and  
(3) promote productive agricultural systems that enable food- insecure 
countries to feed themselves. (USDA, 2015: p. 8) 
 
According to the USDA, the US government has a strong interest in promoting effective 
agricultural systems in the developing world, because failing agricultural systems and food 




(USDA, 2015: p. 8). This reiterates the main US justification for giving aid: protect its 
national security and interests.  
The agriculture sector and farm exports have been one of the brightest points for the US 
economy. US agricultural exports continue to out-pace US agricultural imports since 1960, 
generating a surplus in US agricultural trade. The period 2009-2013 stands as the strongest 
five-year period for agricultural exports in our nation's history with a total export value of 
more than $657 billion. 2013 was a record for US agriculture exports, which reached 144 
billion dollars. The value of bulk commodities exported has trended upwards at a 10 percent 
growth rate per year from 2005 to 2015. USDA estimates that every 1-billion-dollar worth 
of agricultural exports supports 6,600 jobs and generates an additional $1.3 billion in 
economic activity (USDA, 2015: p. 14). 
The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) links US agriculture to the world by fostering US 
exports and promoting global food security. Thus, it is the agency part of the USDA which 
administers US food assistance programs by helping foreign countries to improve their 
agricultural systems and build their trade capacity. In addition to USDA’s foreign aid 
programs, FAS also administers programs designed to open international markets to US 
agricultural products. ‘FAS also carries out activities that promote productive agricultural 
systems in developing countries and contribute to increased trade and enhanced global food 
security. Working bilaterally and with international organizations, FAS encourages the 
development of transparent and science-based regulatory systems that allow for the safe 
development and use of agricultural goods derived from new technologies’ (USDA, 2015: p. 
29). 
The FAS has a global network of 93 offices covering 171 countries. These offices are staffed 
by agricultural attachés and locally hired agricultural experts who are the eyes, ears, and 
voice for US agriculture around the world. FAS staff identify problems, provide practical 
solutions, and work to advance opportunities for US agriculture and support US foreign 
policy around the globe (USDA, n.d). 
Several USDA programs, such as the Scientific Cooperation Exchange Program, Cochran 




and policymakers to promote food security and economic growth (USDA, n.d.-b). These are 
similar to technical cooperation projects implemented by Brazil and other developing 
countries under the prism of South-South cooperation.  
The USDA is frequently criticized for not having enough independence and for serving the 
agricultural sector interests in detriment to those of the general population, a phenomenon 
called ‘regulatory capture’. This means that the USDA is overly influenced by the industry 
it regulates and its inspectors are vulnerable to pressure, since they are responsible for 
enforcing the law at facilities that also pay for their services (Perkowski, 2014). 
A number of leading nutrition experts warned the 2015 Dietary Guidelines for Americans is 
giving advice that does not match the latest medical research. This is considered the result of 
influence from food manufacturers, producers, and special interest groups. The absence of a 
top-line message about limiting raw and processed meat has many experts, including 
spokespeople from the American Cancer Society, criticizing the guidelines. David Heber, 
founding director of the University of California, Los Angeles, Center for Human Nutrition 
stated that ‘the public has been confused and will remain confused by these guidelines’ (Heid, 
2016). Moreover, in 2016, the Food & Water Watch claimed that, according to at least 10 
government scientists, the USDA censored research outcomes that run against the interests 
of corporate agribusinesses (Schwab, 2016).  
2.3.4. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation was one of President George W. Bush’s major 
transformations in the US governmental structure regarding international assistance. 
Announced on March 14, 2002, MCC was formally established by Congress in January 2004 
with bipartisan support as an independent, sub cabinet-level agency with a chief executive 
officer and a board of directors that included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, 
and the USAID Administrator, among other high government officials. The new aid agency 
aimed to finance low-income countries under the threshold of the World Bank’s classification 
for upper-middle income nations, which are countries with a per capita Gross National 




(Tarnoff, 2018: p 3-4). MCC would provide selected countries with grants to promote 
sustainable economic growth, reduce poverty, and strengthen institutions.  
According to MCC’s website, grants are of three kinds. Compacts, which are large, five-year 
projects of large-scale investment. Concurrent Compacts for Regional Investments—grants 
that promote cross-border economic integration and increase regional trade and 
collaboration. And Threshold Programs — short-term, narrowly-defined efforts focused on 
policy and institutional reform in countries that come close to passing MCC’s eligibility 
criteria43(MCC, n.d; Tarnoff, 2018: p.9). 
Upon the approval of a receiving country, by the time of the signing of the compact, a local 
entity is formed, known as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which is responsible 
for being the focal point for managing and overseeing the program. Its board is usually 
comprised of government officials and representatives of civil society. Ministers who are 
associated with the projects’ sectors usually represent the government (Tarnoff, 2018).  
To access grants, countries need to be categorized as ‘good performers’, that is, they go 
through a competitive selection in which MCC’s Board examines their performance on 17 
policy indicators. Applying countries need to show that they meet standards of honesty, 
competency, and business-friendliness, and that they tackled their populations’ basic needs 
(Tarnoff, 2018: p. 2; Lancaster, 2008a: p. vii). By establishing these criteria, the new agency 
sought to address the criticism that foreign assistance did little to change the reality of those 
who receive it.  
Besides competitive selection based on objective performance indicators, MCC projects 
follow two other guiding principles which differed from US traditional aid practices: country-
led solutions and country-led implementation. Under such framework, program proposals are 
developed solely by qualifying countries and they are fully responsible for the 
implementation of their compacts. MCC only oversees the project through independent fiscal 
agents. In addition, MCC demands partnering governments to submit their proposals with 
broad-based civil society involvement, which in turn would allegedly render results more 
 
43 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), n.d. About MCC. Available at:  https://www.mcc.gov/about 




sustainable and legitimate: ‘projects that are driven by partner countries and incorporate local 
perspectives lead to sustainable know-how and self-sufficiency that continue long after 
MCC’s investment ends’44. Finally, recipient countries are requested to abide to public 
transparency regulations in all phases of the project (Tarnoff, 2018: Summary). All these 
requirements end up by building the capacity and know-how of local governments in partner 
countries and increase their accountability.  
As the criteria to grant assistance is based on objective performance indicators and it is not 
directly linked to US foreign policy goals, some argue that MCC provides an opportunity to 
countries that were normally overlooked by US aid45. However, it cannot be said that 
the MCC does not serve US interests. In fact, as the MCC’s website clarifies, investments 
should not only ‘support stability and prosperity in partner countries but also enhance 
American interests’46.  
Despite being considered innovative, some MCC principles resemble those part of the 
rhetoric of the horizontal approach to international assistance, i.e. South-South 
cooperation. Instead of tiding the aid to the implementation of predetermined solutions 
decided by the donor, MCC’s ‘country-led solutions’ request the receiving country to identify 
its priorities (local ownership) for achieving sustainable economic growth and develop its 
own proposals for solutions with the involvement of its civil society. This is quite similar to 
those made by horizontal approach advocates:  
The South-South cooperation agenda and South-South cooperation 
initiatives must be determined by the countries of the South, guided by the 
principles of respect for national sovereignty, national ownership and 
independence, equality, non-conditionality, non-interference in domestic 
affairs and mutual benefit. 
The basic objectives of South-South collaboration, according to the Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries endorsed by the General 
Assembly in 1978 (resolution 33/134), are to foster the self-reliance of 
 
44 Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d. About MCC. Available at:  https://www.mcc.gov/about (accessed 
on: November 15, 2018). 
45 153 Cong Rec E 1458. June 29, 2007. Congress-Session: 110- 1. Reference Volume: 
Vol. 153 No. 107 Pg. E1458. Available at: https://congressional-proquest-
com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/congressional/docview/t17.d18.c1dfdd555e001efc?accountid=11752 
46 Millennium Challenge Corporation, n.d. About MCC. Available at:  https://www.mcc.gov/about (accessed 




developing countries by enhancing their creative capacity to find solutions 
to their development problems in keeping with their own aspirations, values 
and specific needs. (UNOSSC, 2018) 
There was speculation over why to create a new agency and not use USAID or the State 
Department’s structure. The Bush administration maintained that the initiative represented a 
new concept in aid delivery, and for this reason it should have a new organizational 
framework, unfettered by existing authorities and regulations (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 2). USAID 
did not have a good reputation in Washington, especially among the Republicans (Lancaster, 
2008a: p. 19-22). It was argued that directing the funds of the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA) to USAID would put the MCC’s innovative approach at risk. Regarding the reason 
why the MCC was not allocated to the State Department, there was speculation in some 
quarters that the State Department had limited experience running development programs.   
Fearing that close collaboration between the two agencies would lead to the absorption of the 
MCC by USAID, the new agency sought to distance itself from the old one. So much so that 
initially the USAID Administrator was not among the members of the MCC’s Board. 
Although the MCC’s proposal was altered to add USAID to its board, the agency continued 
to avoid contact with USAID, leading the MCC to lose many opportunities to learn from 
USAID’s extensive experience (Tarnoff, 2018). 
All this accounted for the agency’s rough start. It took the MCC a considerable amount of 
time to acquire its reduced staff of less than 300 employees and to start operating. More than 
a year after its founding, in June 2015, the MCC had approved only two compacts and had 
disbursed barely any. Even with advancements in the following years, MCC never achieved 
anywhere near the level of the funding initially proposed by President Bush in 2002 of 5 
billion dollars annually. In most years since the MCC was established, its enacted 
appropriation has been below the President’s request, and the total amount of funding, from 
2004 until 2018, was slightly over its intended biennial budget of 11 billion dollars (Tarnoff, 
2018: p. 10; Lancaster, 2008a: p. 19-22).  
Many attempts to assess the MCC’s impact were made. For grants already finished, 61 
evaluations had been completed and 58 were planned or ongoing as of December 22, 2017. 




conducted in five compact countries. They showed the MCC met their targets in those cases. 
Aside from standard impact measurements, the MCC process of admittance motivated 
countries to implement reforms to improve their performance indicators and qualify for the 
grants. As stated in NEXT: A Strategy for MCC’s Future of February 2016, the program 
aimed to ‘push for partner government reforms that will have greater systemic impact, 
including prioritizing those that support sustainability and address corruption’ (MCC, 2016). 
As an example, Yemen is a case in point. Following its suspension from the program in 2005, 
its government approved a number of reforms to improve its indicators and the country was 
reinstated (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 23-28). 
Another positive externality results from the MCC’s principle of country-led 
implementation. Receiving countries end up building government capacity in order to run 
the development projects, while maintaining accountability and oversight of the use of the 
funds. For instance, Cabo Verde and Honduras have adopted, for general practice, the MCC’s 
transparent procurement methodology (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 24; Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016.). 
Until 2018, the MCC approved 33 compacts in 27 countries, totaling more than 11 billion 
dollars. Projects have emphasized infrastructure, especially transportation, a sector which 
accumulated 26% of MCC funds until September 2017. The second main sector funded was 
agriculture, with 17% of outlays. Most investments were directed to sub-Saharan Africa, 
which has received most of MCC spending. On February 24, 2016, the MCC released a 
document entitled ‘Next: A Strategy for MCC’s Future’. The strategy reviews and reaffirms 
the MCC model and the principles on which that model is based, and it also establishes 
several priority goals for the following years (Tarnoff, 2018: p. 19). 
2.3.5. Department of Defense (DoD) 
The Department of Defense has long played a role in US foreign aid initiatives. Since at least 
the 19th century, US military forces have provided support to stabilize emergency situations 
in times of crises, such as earthquakes and floods. More recently, US military forces have 
also provided aid to man-made disasters such as famines and forced population movements. 
The aid the DoD provides ranges from logistical support to the provision of low-cost 




Disaster, and Civic Action (OHDACA) account and implemented by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is the central DoD body for global security cooperation 
programs (Serafino, 2008: Summary; Margesson, 2013). 
Opinions about the appropriate non-combat role for the US military have evolved over time. 
After 9/11, the US government became inclined to use military staff in preventive, deterrent, 
and preemptive activities. This strategy expanded the DoD’s role in foreign assistance 
activities stemming from the perception that the DoD was in a privileged position to respond 
to international emergencies. Its massive staff by far exceeded (and it still does it today) the 
ones of the State Department and USAID, allowing it to gather more manpower to carry out 
aid activities.   
In 2018, the military had more than 200,000 personnel deployed to more than 700 overseas 
posts. By contrast, the State Department had around 70,000 people working in 250 embassies 
and consulates overseas, with roughly 65 percent of this being supporting positions occupied 
by non-Americans (Adams, 2018).  Moreover, not only do commands have considerably 
more personnel than embassies, but their personnel are also oriented toward planning 
activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information 
and furthering US policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact (Serafino, 
2008: p. 23). Roughly, there are seven military employees for every civilian diplomat 
working on US policy toward Africa. But even when there are career diplomats specialized 
in Africa available for deployment, they are often overlooked in favor of military 
commanders (Rickman and Booker, 2018). 
The DoD also has substantially larger budgetary resources. For instance, its annual budget is 
around 700 billion dollars (FY 2018), while the State Department’s is approximately 50 
billion (FY2018). Some argue, however, that although the DoD enjoys greater human and 
financial resources, these do not necessarily provide it with the needed competence and 




stated that US military civilian affairs experts do not have the adequate skills-set to carry out 
the wide variety of tasks needed to foster international development (Serafino, 2008: p. 23)47. 
According to Yonatan Holz, former Reconstruction Team Member of the US Air Force48, 
one advantage of using military officers in providing aid is that they already have personal 
relationships with local leaders. An essential part of the job of the military personnel 
deployed in the field consists of gathering local support to their presence and operations. 
They have routine visits and patrols to engage in a strategy called ‘key leader engagement’, 
in which they gather support for US military presence and information on what local needs 
are. According to Mr. Holz and his experience in Afghanistan, even UN agencies with large 
field presence, such as the WFP, ask the US military to help them taking donations to conflict 
and remote areas. 
This is not to say that military officers are not aware of the implications of the Armed Forces 
providing aid. Mr. Holz acknowledges it is not good for ‘the hand giving aid to be the one 
pulling the trigger’. This can lead to the militarization of the United States’ image abroad and 
compromise the supposed neutrality of aid agencies, ultimately jeopardizing the safety of 
their personnel. Indeed, a key DoD document recognizes that state-building tasks may be 
‘best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals.’ (DoD, 2005).  
Therefore, even DoD officials have made it clear that Congress should provide the State 
Department and USAID with the resources to build their capacity to carry out foreign 
assistance. In a speech in 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advocated the 
strengthening of civilian agencies: ‘It has become clear that America’s civilian institutions 
of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far 
too long — relative to what we spend on the military, and more important, relative to the 
responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world.’ He also stated that the 
 
47 Military officers were by criticized US civilian agencies’ personnel for being ‘poorly trained in information 
gathering’ and seldomly having in-depth regional or linguistic expertise (CSIS Task Force Final Report 2007 
apud. Serafino, 2008: p. 23), both essential skills and requirements for promoting in successful sustainable 
development projects. 




percentage of the federal budget destined to these vital activities was small compared to the 
rest of the government (DoD, 2008; Serafino, 2008: p. 23). 
Another criticism regarding the potentially detrimental role of the DoD in foreign aid is 
related to its lack of coordination with the State Department and other aid agencies. The 
DoD’s increasing engagement in foreign assistance adds yet another actor to a cluttered cast 
of aid organizations in the US government (Lancaster 2008a: p. 9). There is also criticism 
regarding the DoD’s failure to ensure its programs’ sustainability. In view of the priorities 
and goals that guide the Armed Forces, the policy rationale for US military aid is to ensure 
US national security. Thus, promoting sustainable international development is not – as it 
should not be – the focus of their initiatives.  
Not only may the use of DoD in aid be ineffective in promoting foreign policy goals, it may 
also impede their advancement. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of 
December 2006 stated that the usage of DoD personnel for counter-terrorism programs was 
being considered suspicious in Latin America, ‘making it difficult to pursue meaningful 
cooperation on a counterterrorism agenda.’49 In 2007, another analyst claimed that ‘African 
publics and governments have already begun to complain that US engagement is increasingly 
military’ (Loftus apud. Serafino, 2008: p.23). It should be obvious that the military cannot 
be the foundation of US relations with the African continent. The DoD may provide weapons, 
training and vehicles to African militaries, but it cannot offer trade deals, and it can poorly 
offer infrastructure or agriculture projects (Booker and Rickman, 2018). There has been a 
growing unease in Africa with US militarism, which is tangible in the refusal of African 
countries to host the US Africa Command, causing it to be headquartered in Stuttgart, 
Germany (Booker and Rickman, 2018). 
2.4. Assessing Aid Outlays 
In absolute terms, the United States accounts for the largest ODA donor in the world, giving 
about 24% of all official development assistance in 201750 (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: 
 
49 Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign a Report to Members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations United States. Senate Richard G. Lugar, Chairman One Hundred Ninth Congress Second 
Session December 15, 2006.  P. 12 Available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
109SPRT31324/pdf/CPRT-109SPRT31324.pdf (accessed on: January 14, 2019) 




Summary). The current US foreign aid system was created by the 1961 Foreign Assistance 
Act, which attempted to streamline the government’s efforts to provide assistance around the 
world. Its statute defines aid as “unilateral transfers of US resources by the US Government 
to or for the benefit of foreign entities” (USA, 1961). These resources include not just cash 
transfers and commodities, but also technical assistance, educational programming, health 
care, and others.  
Implementing mechanisms also vary and they can include direct hires, contracts, loans, grants 
and others. However, in recent decades, assistance has been provided almost exclusively on 
a grant basis. Recipients include foreign governments, foreign militaries and security forces, 
as well as local businesses and charitable groups, international organizations such as the 
United Nations, and other nongovernmental organizations (McBride, 2018).  
The 1990s represent the lowest point for US aid flows. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the fading of the communist threat, aid levels were cut substantially. In 1997 they were less 
than 20 billion dollars, which corresponded to 0.8 percent of the total federal budget. 
However, in 2016, US foreign assistance was estimated at 49 billion dollars, or 1.2% of the 
overall budget. About 48% of this assistance was for bilateral economic development 
programs, including political/strategic economic assistance; 33% for military aid and non-
military security assistance; 14% for humanitarian activities; and 5% to support the work of 
multilateral institutions (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: Summary). Thus, aid funding levels have 
been at their highest since the period immediately following World War II, when the United 
States invested heavily in rebuilding Western European economies (Id.).  
According to US official nomenclature, foreign aid encompasses economic assistance and 
military assistance. Economic assistance is defined as foreign aid for programs with a 
development or humanitarian objective. Military assistance is defined as foreign aid for 
programs primarily for the benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which 
subsidizes or substantially enhances military capability. The majority of US aid is comprised 







Figure 2.1. US Foreign Assistance in billions (in constant 2017 US dollars) 
 
Source: Made by the author (USAID, 2017b)51 
 
Development aid programs foster sustainable, broad-based economic progress and 
sociopolitical stability in developing countries, while humanitarian aid programs focus on 
the immediate alleviation of humanitarian emergencies, both natural and man-made disasters, 
as well as problems resulting from conflict associated with failed or failing states. Economic 
assistance captures US voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations, non-military 
security assistance, as well as humanitarian and non-military development programs funded 
by the Department of Defense (USAID, 2017c).  
The evaluation of US aid focused on US economic assistance, especially Official 
development assistance (ODA), which is defined by the OCDE as ‘government aid designed 
to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries’ and excludes 
loans and credits for military purposes.  
As aforementioned, the US foreign aid rose from the 2000s onwards. In current dollars, US 
aid was higher in 2005 than at any time in US history, even deducting the outlays for Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This increase has lifted the US out of bottom place on OECD 
donor’s list as a percentage of Gross National Income - GNI (Lancaster, 2008a). Figure 2.2 
shows the increase of Official Development Assistance in 2005, reaching a peak of 33.8 
billion. With the exception of 2006 and 2007 when ODA decreased, in all other years, aid 
outlays remained close to (or over) 30s billions, which is double what it was until 2001. 
 
51  The data from USAID that the table was based on is on US aid obligations, which are binding agreements 
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Figure 2.2 also corroborates that although the Obama administration did not manage to 
surpass the 2005 peak, it kept donations high even in a much more adverse financial scenario 
domestically and internationally.  
Figure 2.2. United States ODA in USD billion 
 
Source: Made by the author (OECD, 2019).  
 
Aid may be provided multilaterally, when given to a multilateral organization, such as the 
United Nations or the World Bank, or it can be given bilaterally, directly from donor to 
recipient, or it can be given bilaterally to projects implemented by a multilateral development 
agency, which OECD calls ‘multi-bi/non-core contributions’. Traditionally, the US allocates 
most of its aid in bilateral programs. From 2010 to 2016, approximately 80% of US ODA 
was provided bilaterally, from which 20% was bilateral but implemented by multilateral 
organizations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).  
Figure 2.3. Breakdown of ODA in 2010-16 and distribution of multilateral and multi-bi ODA 
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The UN Millennium Development Goals of 2000 and the Monterrey Consensus (2002) 
established a level of 0.7% GNI as a target for developed countries to donor to foster 
international development through Official Development Assistance (OAD) (OECD, 2020).  
As shown by Figure 2.4, the aid given by the US throughout the decade 2006 to 2016 
remained between 0.15% to 0.20% of its GNI. This demonstrates that despite the US being 
the single largest donor, proportionately to the size of its economy and its national income, 
the aid it gives it is relatively small, since it is far below the UN goal. If one considers the aid 
in percentage of GNI, the US leading position as donor falls down several spots, losing to 
Sweden, Luxemburg, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Belgium, 
Austria, France, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Australia, Canada, Iceland, New 
Zealand, Japan, Portugal, and Italy. The US aid is smaller even than the medium of DAC 
countries’ aid, which is between 0.27% to 0.32% of GNI (OECD, 2018).  
Figure 2.4. US ODA in Billion USD, 2015 constant prices, and as a share of GNI
 
Source: OECD (2018) 
 
In the longer view, agricultural development aid disbursements over recent decades suggest 
that agricultural development became a higher priority within the foreign assistance budget, 
increasing from 2.2% of total economic aid in 2005 to 4.5% in 2015, and notably higher in 
real dollar terms than a decade prior. This trend began in the later years of the George W. 
Bush Administration and was maintained by the Obama Administration, even in the face of 
some early resistance in Congress (CRS Report, 2017: p.9). 
Most of US global aid goes to Africa, more specifically to Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia has 
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in the total net disbursements period of 2006-2015 (approximately 6.465 billion USD)52. 
Therefore, it was chosen to be a case study in this Dissertation (OCDE, 2017: p. 76; OCDE, 
2011: p. 66).   
2.5. Presidential Diplomacy 
After the Cold War ended, US foreign aid started a long period of inactivity, when aid’s value 
as a diplomatic and national security instrument was disregarded. President George W. Bush 
halted this trend and brought US foreign aid to the limelight. Some consider that his 
administration represented ‘a combination of transformation and chaos’ in the US foreign aid 
system (Lancaster, 2008a). Regardless of whether the changes were positive or negative, one 
thing is certain: it was the most ambitious renovation of US aid since President Kennedy.  
In 2002, Bush announced the new National Security Strategy (NSS), which declared 
international development was a foreign policy priority, along with defense and diplomacy.  
This was the first time, for many decades, that a US president promoted international 
development as a key priority for both foreign policy and foreign aid (Lancaster, 2008a). 
Similar priorities were showcased in the NSS during his second term, in 2006 (The White 
House, 2006).  
Internationally, the United Nations had a major Conference on Financing Development, 
which was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002. There, President Bush pledged to 
increase US aid by 5 billion dollars per year until 2006 and announced the creation of the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a new aid agency. These were Bush’s 
deliverables in a Conference marked by European leaders’ declarations of aid budget-
increases and Bono Vox’s participation stressing the importance of aid to combat poverty 
(Lancaster, 2008a: p.16). 
Bush profited from favorable external and domestic situations to propose his foreign aid 
makeover. Development gained international momentum with the Monterrey Conference, 
while, internally, both houses of the US Congress were controlled by the Republican Party. 
 
52 Sudan was ranked as second with 6.295 billion USD and Kenya in third with 6.139 billion USD. (OCDE, 




Besides, the fresh memory of the 9/11 attacks served as a reminder to a customarily aid-
skeptical and aid-averse public opinion that problems abroad could produce terrible 
consequences at home. This sentiment remained present in Bush’s second term and inspired 
his new diplomatic approach.  
In his inaugural speech, in January 2005, President Bush declared that ‘the survival of liberty 
in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. (…) So, it is the 
policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our 
world.’ (The White House, 2005). This speech was translated into  a new policy, presented 
in 2006 by his Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a speech at Georgetown University: 
‘To achieve this bold mission, America needs equally bold diplomacy, a diplomacy that not 
only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself.’ This was the basis 
of Bush’s ‘transformational diplomacy’, of which foreign assistance was to be an essential 
component (Lancaster, 2008a: p.29). 
Part of the ‘transformational diplomacy’ reform included the ‘dual hatting’ of the USAID 
administrator, who also became the director of US foreign assistance, a new role that gave 
the administrator authority over not only the USAID budget, but of foreign assistance budgets 
located in the Department of State as well. Also, part of this reform was the integration of 
USAID into the State Department structure. Thus, the USAID administrator was to report to 
the Secretary of State.  
Regarding Bush’s discourse, foreign aid and promoting development was a reoccurring 
theme. On January 23, 2007, at the State of the Union Address, he called Congress ‘to take 
on the challenges of hunger and poverty and disease’ (Bush, 2007: p. 474). He constantly 
stressed the importance and innovation of the MCC: ‘We’ve also changed the way we deliver 
aid by launching the Millennium Challenge Account. This program strengthens democracy, 
transparency, and the rule of law in developing nations, and I ask you to fully fund this 
important initiative’ (Bush, 2008). 
The fight against hunger was also present in his statements, such as the 2008 State of the 




the world’s food aid comes from the United States’. And in his address to the White House 
Summit on International Development, on October 21, 2008: ‘I believe our nation is better 
when we help people fight hunger and disease and illiteracy’ (Bush, 2008: p. 525-540).  
The increased commitment to promote development in Africa was mentioned in February 
2008, when Bush was leaving for his fourth trip to the African continent. In the Smithsonian 
National Museum of African Art, he reinforced that his new approach to foreign aid was 
pioneering a new era in development, treating ‘African leaders as equal partners, asking them 
to set clear goals, and expecting them to produce measurable results. For their part, more 
African leaders are willing to be held to high standards.’ (Bush, 2008: p.544). 
Bush also renovated the terms traditionally used to describe US donor-receiver relations with 
African countries: ‘America is serving as an investor, not a donor.’ (Id., p. 545). His renewed 
model of aid would ‘foster sustainable economic growth, and promote good governance, and 
advance a model of true partnership that gives poor nations a real stake in their own 
development’ (Bush, 2008: p. 592).  
At the beginning of President Bush’s second term, he promised to double US international 
assistance again by 2010. In his address to the White House Summit on International 
Development, on October 21, 2008, he stressed that his administration made international 
development one of their biggest priorities: ‘For the past eight years, the United States has 
provided more foreign assistance than at any time in the past half century.’(Id., p. 592).  
It is worth noting Bush mentioning local procurement as the most suitable way to combat 
hunger: ‘And tonight, I ask Congress to support an innovative proposal to provide food 
assistance by purchasing crops directly from farmers in the developing world, so we can build 
up local agriculture and help break the cycle of famine’ (Bush, 2008: p. 539).  Again in the 
White House Summit on International Development, on October 21, 2008: ‘I believe that as 
the United States moves forward, we ought to purchase up to a quarter of our food from local 
farmers. In other words, of all the food aid we get we ought to take a quarter of that, and 
purchase the food directly from local farmers. If it’s in our interest to help build a local 
agricultural industry, then instead of just giving food, we ought to purchase food from the 




food is desperately needed. And I support the World Bank’s strategy to increase investment 
in agriculture.’ (Id., p. 594). 
All in all, Bush’s presidential diplomacy devoted unexpected attention to international and 
African development. Hunger, which has not traditionally been a priority theme in US foreign 
policy, continued to have secondary importance. For instance, in a White House compilation 
of 71 speeches given by Bush, totaling around 600 pages, hunger was mentioned only 9 
times. On the other hand, Africa appeared 51 times. 
When Barack Obama took charge of the US presidency on January 20, 2009, the international 
community was leaving a major food price crisis (2007–08), which led international 
agricultural commodity-prices to spike. The United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) reported that from June 2007 to June 2008, its food price index increased 
by 44%, with wheat and rice prices increasing by 90% and maize prices by 35% (CRS Report, 
2017: p.9),which led the number of people facing hunger worldwide to reach historical levels. 
Despite all international attention drawn to food security issues, Obama’s Inaugural Address 
focused on other affairs and the theme was barely mentioned:  
To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make 
your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and 
feed hungry minds. And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, 
we say we can no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our 
borders, nor can we consume the world's resources without regard to 
effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it (Macon, 
2009).  
In 2009, at the G8 Summit in Italy, G8 donors launched the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative 
(LFSI), pledging to give 22 billion dollars to enhance smallholder agriculture in developing 
countries in the three following years. This was the opportunity for Obama to unveil what 
would be the main foreign aid initiative of his administration: Feed the Future (FtF). Obama 
pledged to provide a minimum of 3.5 billion dollars to FtF (from FY20 10 to FY2012), which 
would integrate the Global Partnership to promote agricultural gains and food security in 
developing countries.  
In May 2010, the Department of State rendered FtF official. According to the Obama 




‘addressing the root causes of hunger that limit the potential of millions of people,’ and by 
‘establishing a lasting foundation for aligning our resources with country-owned processes 
and sustained, multi-stakeholder partnerships’ (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011: p. 1). In November 
2010, the Bureau for Food Security within USAID was established to lead FtF’s 
implementation (Tumusiime and Cohen, 2016: p. 5; CRS Report, 2017: p. 9). 
At the London G20 Summit in 2009, President Obama announced his desire to take part in a 
new global food security initiative, which would take form in the Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program (GAFSP). Obama stated that the United States was ready to lead in 
this endeavor: ‘In the coming days, I intend to work with Congress to provide 448 million 
dollars in immediate assistance to vulnerable populations - from Africa to Latin America - 
and to double support for food security to over 1 billion dollar so that we are giving people 
the tools they need to lift themselves out of poverty. We will also support the United Nations 
and World Bank as they coordinate the rapid assistance necessary to prevent humanitarian 
catastrophe.’ He concluded adding that those efforts were not ‘just charity’ but attempts to 
strengthen ‘future markets for all countries, and future drivers of world economic growth’ 
(Obama, 2009). 
In November 2009, the World Food Security Summit took place, which included a keynote 
speech from Pope Benedict XVI and speeches from the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
and FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf. Sixty Heads of State and Government and 192 
ministers, from 182 countries and the European Community attended the Summit at FAO's 
headquarters in Rome. However, President Obama, as well as all the leaders of the G8, with 
the exception of the Italian Prime Minister, failed to attend (A. Yngve et al., 2010: p. 151). 
The Summit adopted five key principles that constitute the foundation for collective and 
global action on agricultural development and food security. Known as the Rome Principles, 
they were followed by the Obama Administration’s FtF: ‘supporting comprehensive 
strategies; investing through country-owned plans; improving stronger coordination among 
donors; leveraging effective multilateral institutions; and delivering on sustained and 
accountable commitments’ (CRS Report, 2017: p.9).  
Responding to the demand made by the leaders of the G20 at the London meeting of 2009, 




Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Trust Fund. The Program was launched on 
April 22, 2010, with commitments from the United States, Canada, South Korea, Spain, and 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among others. The fund mobilized public and private 
resources to scale up agricultural assistance to low-income countries, fostering more effective 
public and private sector investment in the agricultural and rural sectors. Financial 
commitments to the GAFSP Trust Fund on January 31, 2011, totaled 925.2 million dollars 
and by the end of 2017, its portfolio had grown to 1.4 billion dollars, with the US being its 
main contributor, giving an estimate of 653 million dollars to the fund53 (Ho and Hanrahan, 
2011: p. 3). 
In September 2010, at the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit, President Obama 
urged donor countries to maintain development assistance to poor nations out of self-interest:  
I suspect that some in wealthier countries may ask, 'With our economies 
struggling, so many people out of work, and so many families barely getting 
by, why a summit on development?' The answer is simple. In our global 
economy, progress in even the poorest countries can advance the prosperity 
and security of people far beyond their borders, including my fellow 
Americans. 
Let's put to rest the old myth that development is mere charity that does not 
serve our interests,’ he said. ‘And let's reject the cynicism that says certain 
countries are condemned to perpetual poverty. (Wilson, 2010) 
Obama also argued in favor of shifting the focus of US aid from the short to the long term: 
‘Our focus on assistance has saved lives in the short term, but it hasn't always improved those 
societies over the long term,’ the president said. ‘Consider the millions of people who have 
relied on food assistance for decades. That's not development, that's dependence, and it's a 
cycle we need to break’ (Ibid). 
At that occasion, Obama joined UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Government of 
Ireland, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and several non-profit organizations and world 
leaders to launch the 1,000 Days Initiative, a partnership to scale up action and investment 
 




towards improving women’s and children’s nutrition throughout the world54 (FAO, 2011; 
Thousand days, n.d). 
On May 18, 2012, the Remarks by the President at the Symposium on Global Agriculture 
and Food Security in Washington, exhibited elements of continuity of the US rationale for 
addressing food insecurity and giving aid. Obama called food security a moral and economic 
imperative:  
History teaches us that one of the most effective ways to pull people and 
entire nations out of poverty is to invest in their agriculture. And as we’ve 
seen from Latin America to Africa to Asia, a growing middle class also 
means growing markets, including more customers for US exports that 
support American jobs. So, we have a self-interest in this. (White House, 
2012) 
This reinforces the United States’ long-lasting justification for aid, one that was present even 
before the foundation of USAID in 1961: as boosting America’s exports and economy. The 
President also reiterated the argument of his predecessor, George W. Bush, linking food 
insecurity and poverty to international instability and the national security of the United 
States. During the event, the US President launched the New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition, which was set out to 
reaffirm continued donor commitment to reducing poverty and hunger; 
accelerate implementation of key components of the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP); leverage the potential of 
responsible private investment to support development goals; help lift 50 
million people out of poverty in Africa by 2022; achieve sustained 
inclusive, agriculture-led growth in Africa. (New Alliance, n.d.) 
 For Obama, the initiative reinforced his administration’s commitment to continue making 
substantial investments in development, even in tough fiscal times, and called the private 
sector to join governmental efforts.   
When taking office for his second mandate, Obama’s Inaugural Address of January 20, 2013, 
did not mention hunger, development or food security, and only mentioned Africa once:  
We will support democracy from Asia to Africa, from the Americas to the 
Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on 
 
54 Thousand days Org, n.d. About Our Story: Since day one, we’ve been fighting to give mothers and children 




behalf of those who long for freedom.  And we must be a source of hope to 
the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice –- not out of 
mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance 
of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and 
opportunity, human dignity and justice. 
This should not come as a surprise, since the inauguration address is mainly directed at the 
domestic audience, one that is known for caring little about foreign policy and even less about 
foreign aid.  
On June 26, 2013, Obama left for a trip to Africa, visiting three countries: Senegal, South 
Africa, and Tanzania. Among other issues, the visit focused on African economic 
development and US-African trade and investment. The president was accompanied by the 
US Trade Representative Michael Froman and several American CEOs. However, the trip 
was criticized for being ‘too little too late’, as many argued that Africa had been overlooked 
by the White House, whose top concern with bringing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an 
end overshadowed African affairs (Campbell, 2013). 
In the following year, the Obama administration displayed more willingness to prioritize 
Africa and make up for the apparent negligence during the first term. In August 2014, 
Washington hosted the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, the largest event a US president ever 
organized for African Heads of State. The Summit reaffirmed the administration’s focus on 
trade and investment (Kimenyi, 2013). Discussions centered on how to encourage progress 
in key areas for the continent’s future: engaging youth, fostering inclusive economic growth 
and sustainable development, expanding cooperation in peace and security, and how to 
secure a better future for Africa’s next generation (The White House, 2014a, 2014b).  
On July 20, 2016, President Obama organized the White House Summit on Global 
Development, in which entrepreneurs, diplomats, civil society members, public and private 
sector financing partners, and development leaders, gathered to find ways to catalyze further 
development in six key areas: ‘energy, food security, global health, governance, partnership, 
and youth’ (The White House, 2016). On the occasion, Obama signed the Global Food 
Security Act of 2016 into law, institutionalizing the Feed the Future program (Public Law 
No: 114-195). Among the goals of the bill enshrined in Section 3, it specifies that ‘it is in the 




national food security investment plans through programs and activities that: demonstrably 
meet, align with, and leverage U.S strategies and investments in trade, economic growth, 
national security, science and technology, agriculture research and extension, maternal and 
child health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene’55.  
Over the eight years of his administration, Obama helped reshape the US approach to 
development by enhancing inter-agency coordination and partnerships with corporations, 
foundations, universities, NGOs, and faith-based communities (White House, 2016). In a 
nutshell, Obama’s presidential diplomacy pushed for a foreign aid agenda focused on 
redefining development aid as a national security tool, further engaging the private sector in 
aid (‘the government cannot do it alone’). Therefore, by focusing on the long-term, it sought 
to make aid more efficient and coordinated as a whole.  
Many were the continuities between the two leaders. Both the George W. Bush and Obama 
administrations aimed at improving aid's efficiency by increasing flexibility in the use of aid 
funding, directing it towards cash-based assistance. In this sense, greater expediency, lower 
costs and attention to local food preferences when responding to international emergencies 
became integrated priorities. However, this initiative faced the opposition of US commodity 
producers and naval transportation companies that persistently advocated for keeping in-kind 
transfers as the US main aid approach (Schnepf, 2016: p. 3). 
Some changes of focus are noticeable between the two administrations. Most of Obama’s 
African programs were geared towards trade and development, while President Bush policies 
seemed to be directed more towards humanitarian assistance for the Sub-Saharan region. 
Nonetheless, their presence on the African continent was of similar intensity. While Bush 
made 48 international trips to 73 different countries - 11 of which were African, Obama made 
52 international trips to 58 different countries, visiting 9 African nations (Department of 
State, n.d.-b; n.d.-c). Bush met 25 African Heads of State in his first two years in office, 
which represented an unprecedented level of engagement with the continent by an American 
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president (Okumu et al., 2018: p. 430-436), while Obama hosted the US-Africa Leaders’ 
Summit, which welcomed 50 African leaders (White House, 2014a, 2014b; All Africa, 2014).  
2.6. The Ethiopian example  
 
Ethiopia is the second most populous African nation, only behind Nigeria. As of January 
2019, its population was comprised of approximately 109 million people (US Congress, 
2016). The average age is 18 years old, with 43 percent of the population younger than 15 
years old (CIA, n.d.) and 65% younger than 25 (WorldoMeter, 202056; African Development 
Bank Report, 2015: p. 8), comprising the largest share of young people in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is one of the fastest growing populations in the world, with an annual growth rate 
of around 2.5%, which means the population doubles every 27 years. Its diversity is 
evidenced by the more than 80 groups that make up the Ethiopian people, with the Oromo, 
Amhara, and Tigray constituting the majority (Mussa, 2010: p.2). One key fact of Ethiopia’s 
demographics is that only 21 percent of the population is urban, with 78.9 percent still living 
in rural areas, as in January 2019 (Ibid) . 
This gives an assessment of the centrality of agriculture to the livelihood of more than two-
thirds of the population. The agricultural sector employed 72% of the labor force and 
accounted for 34.8 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 201757. 
Despite significant progress during the last two decades in restoring its degraded 
lands and improving productivity (Reij, 2015), Ethiopian agriculture is still based on 
subsistence, relying on rain-fed farming and archaic techniques in small and fragmented 
landholdings. There are discussions on whether archaic techniques are inappropriate, or if 
previous interventions interfered in local ecosystems and communitarian land structure 
making rural populations more vulnerable. The argument is that, although archaic, traditional 
knowledge and technology could be more efficient in preventing rural exodus and food 
insecurity (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2; Mussa, 2010: p. 10). 
Discussions aside, as finding out the roots and causes of Ethiopia’s agricultural reality is 
beyond the scope of this Dissertation, the fact is that Ethiopian farmers are particularly 
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vulnerable to environmental phenomena, such as droughts and soil infertility. These factors, 
combined with a growing and poor population with limited employment opportunities, 
resulted in Ethiopia being one of the most chronically food-insecure countries in the world 
(Awokuse, 2014: p. 54), with about 23 million people living below the poverty line (African 
Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 7).  
In recent decades alone, Ethiopia faced five major droughts: in 1984-85, 1990-92, 1999-
2000, 2002-03, and 2009-11. The famine of 1984-85 captured great international attention 
due to its huge toll on human lives (Awokuse, 2014: p. 54). At those critical moments, the 
flow of food aid rose to address the extent of the emergencies the country was going through. 
But the engagement of the international community remained active for a long time after the 
crisis. Instead of serving as a temporary mechanism to provide relief to emergency needs, 
food aid became a chronic necessity to sustain segments of the population (Mussa, 2010: p. 
2; Humphrey, 1998: p. 1). It is estimated that 10-15% of the population is dependent upon 
humanitarian aid to survive. From 2001 to 2010, food donations to Ethiopia accounted for 
around 450 million dollars per year, which represented 91% of the humanitarian aid given to 
the country58 and 10 percent of total domestic cereal production59 (Awokuse, 2014: p. 54). 
In 2014, aid to Ethiopia reached 3.2 billion dollars (African Development Bank Report, 2015: 
p. 13). 
Notwithstanding, all the aid did not prevent Ethiopia from being among the poorest countries 
in the world, ranking 173th out of 188 countries in the UN Human Development Index 
(UNDP, 2020). One reason that contributes to the exacerbation of poverty in Ethiopia is its 
poor infrastructure. Despite increases in foreign investment over the past few years, 
Ethiopia’s infrastructure remains one of the least developed in Africa (Mussa, 2010: p. 3-5). 
On the other hand, the Ethiopian economy has one of the highest growth rates of the 
continent, with a GDP that multiplied ten-fold in 17 years, going from 8.2 billion dollars in 
2000 to 80.5 billion in 201760. All sectors of the economy took part in the economic 
expansion. From 2004 onwards, agriculture grew by 8% a year, while industry grew by 
12.9%, and services by 12.9% on average (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2). 
 
58 In 2009. 
59 From 1993 to 2003.  




Exports also rose significantly, from 0.6 billion dollars in 2004 to 3.25 billion in 2011. 
However, simultaneously, imports increased four-fold, largely driven by capital goods, 
resulting in increasing trade deficits 61 (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2).  
Unfortunately, Ethiopian economic progress has not been followed by structural 
transformation. The manufacturing sector continued to account for a minor share of GDP, 
and the private sector remained restricted by bureaucratic limitations. The high level of public 
investment crowded out the private sector and widened the investment-saving gap. All these 
limitations contributed to the economic growth having limited capacity to significantly 
reduce the parcel of the population below the poverty line, which in 2015 accounted for 
23.5%62. Moreover, the African Development Bank predicts that future sustainable growth 
will be hindered by low indexes of human capital, institutional capacity and agricultural 
productivity (African Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2). 
2.6.1. Background of Ethiopian Agricultural Policies 
The period of Emperor Haile Selassie’s autocracy was marked by human rights abuses and 
wide-spread famines, with the regime being accused of denying food to people living in 
dissident regions. The main instrument to deal with food insecurity was food hand-outs, 
which neither addressed the roots of hunger nor alleviated dependence on aid. With the fall 
of the military regime in 1991, and the creation of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia in 1995, a process of decentralization and community empowerment was initiated 
(WFP, 2011).  
In 1992, Ethiopia launched the Economic Reform Program (ERP), which implemented 
market orientated policies (e.g. devaluation of the birr, trade liberalization, prudent fiscal 
policy) to spur economic growth. The Agriculture Development Led Industrialization 
(ADLI) was the key development strategy of the ERP, bringing agriculture to the limelight 
of the Ethiopian development agenda (Mussa, 2010: p.5). While ADLI saw some success 
 
61 The overall balance of payments was not significantly affected. Its deficit was mitigated by surpluses in 
services and capital account. Private transfers, including remittances, also offset import rise (African 
Development Bank Report, 2015: p. 2). 





and fostered agricultural growth, the increase in productivity was below the population 
growth rate, which led to declining per capita rates of productivity and increasing criticism 
of the program (Mussa, 2010: p.5). 
In October 1993, the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Strategy established a 
new approach to address food insecurity aimed at changing the practice of distributing food 
hand-outs to the population. The new framework was called Food for Work (FFW) and it 
stated that no able-bodied person should receive gratuitous relief. Instead, FFW required 
participants to labor in exchange for food wages. The strategy was complemented by the 
provision of free food aid for those who could not work. The official goal was to expand 
work-based food aid to the point where it accounted for 80% of all distributions (WFP, 1995), 
but this level was never achieved63. 
The FFW aimed at being a transition between emergency relief and long-term development. 
The work was channeled to labor-intensive activities, such as road construction and 
afforestation, or income generating activities, like vegetable gardens. Therefore, besides 
addressing emergency food needs, FFW projects had a double goal: to create self-sustaining 
livelihoods tackling food supply shortenings and to improve local infrastructure, both of 
which would strengthen the community’s capacity to endure droughts and other shocks 
(Humphrey, 1998: p. 1). 
The Ethiopian government also developed an extension of the FFW approach 
consubstantiated in the concept of cash-for-work (CFW). In this variation, the project’s 
participants were paid in money rather than food (Humphrey, 1998: p. 1). Figure 2.5 presents 









Figure 2.5. Food-for-Work and related project types in Ethiopia  
 
Source: Humphrey, 1998: p. 5 
This approach has been integrated into Ethiopian programs against poverty. In the last 
decades, the government brought about several plans and strategies related to food security. 
The main initiatives in this area were the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction 
Program (SDPRP), spanning from 2002 to 2005, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), from 2005 to 2010, the Growth and Transformation 
Plan (GTP), from 2010 to 2015, and, finally, the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), 
which was launched in January 2005 and has been renewed since then (Haile, 2015: p. 13; 
Cochrane and Tamiru, 2016).  
The PSNP draws a conceptual distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity. 
Although responses to famine have been dominated by emergency food aid, in reality, a high 
proportion of families that receive food aid every year are not at risk of famine, but are 
chronically food insecure, that is, they are permanently unable to meet their food needs due 
to poverty rather than food scarcity. Thus, there are two groups of food insecure Ethiopians: 




people facing chronic food deficits, transferring their needs from emergency programs and 
alleviating the burden over humanitarian relief programs. The PSNP represented a clear 
improvement in the way the government dealt with food insecurity, as it focused on a long-
term and sustainable solution (Rahmato, Pankhurst and van Uffelen, 2013; Devereux et al., 
2006). 
Therefore, PSNP operated by providing ‘predictable transfers to meet predictable needs’. 
Instead of receiving food aid only during crises, predictably food insecure families received 
transfers on a regular basis for a period of up to five years. The aid was given until these 
families were better able to cope with shocks and were considered food sufficient, thus being 
able to graduate from the program (Devereux et al., 2008). The two main principles of the 
program were predictability and avoiding dependence. The first sought to honor the 
commitment to reliably delivering aid to the qualified households until they graduated. The 
second relates to the aforementioned FFW framework, which requires households with adult 
labor capacity to participate in public projects in return for transfers.  
Ethiopia’s PSNP is the second largest in Africa, losing only to the one implemented by South 
Africa. When it was launched in 2005, it supported approximately five million people living 
in 262 chronically food insecure woredas64; by 2015, the program reached seven million 
people and expanded its operations to 319 districts (Rahmato, Pankhurst, and van Uffelen, 
2013; Cochrane and Tamiru, 2016: p. 650).   
Assessments of PSNP’s impact have yielded positive results (Cochrane and Tamiru, 2016: 
p. 650). The program was found to have maintained or increased the assets of participating 
households and to have lifted 1.4 million people out of extreme poverty65. It was also credited 
with having enabled Ethiopia to avoid a mass famine episode during the severe 2010/11 
drought, an accomplishment reiterated by the US government, PSNP’s main international 
funder. President Obama mentioned that he took pride that no emergency relief was needed 
during the 2010-11 drought in the 2012 Symposium on Global Agriculture and Food 
 
64 Woreda is an administrative unit of the Ethiopian government which is equivalent to what would be called a 
district.  
65 USAID-Ethiopia. Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2011 – 2015: Accelerating the Transformation 




Security66. The Ethiopian government plans to expand the program to reach 10 million 
beneficiaries by 2020 and to sustainably lift half of them out of extreme poverty (OECD, 
2018: p. 62). 
PSNP integrated Ethiopia’s efforts to boost the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Besides funding from the Ethiopian government, the programs counted on the financial 
support of the international community and development partners (Haile, 2015: p. 14; Mussa, 
2010: p.5-6; Report MoFED, 2005: p.1). Unlike aid programs from the past, whose funding 
and implementation remained under the responsibility of international donors, the program’s 
approach was developed within a broader shift in Africa, with greater engagement by local 
governments. 
Despite having gone through rounds of consultations with civil society, non-government 
actors, and partners, especially PASDEP, the plans still faced criticism of being top-down 
and not allowing civil society organizations and the private sector to play an essential role in 
providing substantial comments to improve the documents (Haile, 2015: p. 14). Moreover, 
Cochrane and Tamiru (2016), found in their study that PSNP’s execution diverged from its 
formal guidelines in what concerned participatory activities, consistently excluding civil 
society. This demonstrates that, in spite of social improvements in many areas, the making 
and the implementation of social policies in Ethiopia is still a closed process dominated by 
government officials. The government remained largely coercive and intimidating in the way 
it conducted its affairs67.  
2.6.2. The US aid in Ethiopia 
Decades ago, few people would have predicted that Ethiopia, which had been for decades a 
key ally to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), would become the US’s largest 
African recipient of development assistance (OCDE, 2017: p. 76; OCDE, 2011: p. 66)68. 
 
66 ‘So we take pride in the fact that, because of smart investments in nutrition and agriculture and safety nets, 
millions of people in Kenya and Ethiopia did not need emergency aid in the recent drought.’ (White House, 
2012). 
67 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 5-057 0. House of Representatives Ninety-Ninth Congress, 
Second Session, October 16, 1985. 
68 In from 2006 to 2015, it received approximately 6.465 billion USD. Sudan was ranked as second with 6.295 




During the historical period when Ethiopia was governed by a military Marxist government, 
US engagement was reluctant at best, even when the African nation’s population showed 
signs of going through widespread food deprivation. The flow of food aid to Ethiopia 
between 1981 and 1984 was extremely low in comparison with the one sent by the US to 
other drought-affected African nations. President Ronald Reagan went so far as to saying that 
his administration was going to terminate US food aid to Ethiopia by September 30, 1983. 
Washington justified its lack of engagement by blaming the Ethiopian government (and 
indirectly its Soviet sponsors) for its incapacity to respond to the needs of its own population 
(Riley, 2017: p.432-433). 
As Jack Shepherd argued (1989), the Reagan administration deliberately delayed and 
withheld food aid from the Ethiopian government for almost 24 months, while providing aid 
to anti-government guerrillas, in an effort to undermine the Marxist regime (p. 6). But, as the 
catastrophe unfolded, the famine gained increasing international attention. The documentary 
Seeds of Despair and several BBC broadcasts (Gill, 2010: p. 38) ignited popular pressure for 
the US government to ‘do something’. In January 1985, a public opinion survey from the Los 
Angeles Times found that more Americans were following the news on the Ethiopian famine 
than on the upcoming Super Bowl (Knecht, 2010: p. 180).  
As a result, the White House gave in to domestic pressure and, in January 1985, the US 
government was spending significant amounts on relief for Ethiopia, causing it to become 
‘the largest official donor to the most doctrinaire Marxist country on the African continent’ 
(Riley, 2017: p. 442). From 8.4 million dollars and 12,390 metric tons of food in FY1983, 
US aid went to 400 million and 787,000 tons in FY1985-86 (Riley, 2017: p. 442). Therefore, 
Ethiopia served as an example not only of the use of food aid as a foreign policy instrument, 
but also of the influence of public opinion on US aid.  
In January 1989, George W. Bush reinstated the White House’s policy of not providing 
development aid to a still-Marxist Ethiopia. Such a state of affairs would remain the same 
until May 1991, when the defeat of the Mengistu government by combined Eritrean and 
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Tigrayan forces ended the 17-year-old rule of the military (Riley, 2017: p.449). That was a 
turning point for US-Ethiopia bilateral relations. 
Figure 2.6. Disbursements to Ethiopian programs made by US government in million dollars 
(2013 constant) 
 
Source: made by the author (USAID, 2019b)69.  
 
As the goal of this Dissertation is to compare horizontal and vertical cooperation approaches, 
the analysis below will focus on the initiatives under the supervision of US government 
agencies. As shown by Figure 2.6, USAID accounts for most of the aid provided to Ethiopia. 
Since its foundation and signature into law, Feed the Future (FtF) has been USAID’s flagship 
program. However, FtF is not a project per se, but a whole-of-government approach to 
coordinate and integrate all US projects regarding food security and agricultural 
development. Thus, the programs that are the main components of FtF will be considered, 
rather than the FtF program as a whole. 
 
2.6.3. USDA’s presence in Ethiopia 
USDA has a small presence in Ethiopia, with the agency having no budget to operate in the 
country during some of the years studied (FY2004, FY2006, FY2011, FY2014 and FY2015). 
Its activities in Ethiopia are concentrated in the McGovern-Dole International Food for 
 
69 Available at: https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/ETH?fiscal_year=2005&measure=Disbursements (accessed on: 
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Education and Child Nutrition (MGD) Program, implemented by a partnership with the 
Agriculture Cooperative Development International and the WFP (USAID, 2019b) 70.  
In FY2015, the MGD Program fed 263,000 students at 590 primary schools from Afar and 
Somali regions, two of the most food-insecure areas in the country, supporting nearly 20 
percent of the primary school student population in these regions. The school feeding ration 
was comprised of a fortified porridge made of a blend of corn and soy, in addition to a 
monthly take-home ration of vegetable oil for female students.  
Besides the feeding component, the program included technical assistance, by training 
teachers and school administrators to build ther capacity to increase the literacy of school-
age children. It also distributed educational materials and improved facilities, by improving 
schools’ infrastructure and increasing access to clean water and sanitation services.  
According to the WFP, the program contributed to higher enrollment rates in both regions. 
From 2011 to 2014, student enrollment in Somali climbed from 64 to nearly 100 percent and 
in Afar it went from 35 to 60 percent. Targeted schools during this timeframe demonstrated 
a high, stable attendance rate of 97 percent (GAIN Report ET1605, 2016). 
Figure 2.7. Preparation of school feeding ration 
 
 
70 Available at: 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/ETH?fiscal_year=2017&implementing_agency_id=5&measure=Obligations 
(accessed on: February 4, 2019) 
    











Source: GAIN Report N. ET1605 from February 5, 2016.  
 
Figure 2.8. Students eating ration  
 
Source: GAIN Report N. ET1605 from February 5, 2016.  
 
Another USDA program in Ethiopia is Food for Progress (FFPr), which uses the proceeds of 
monetized food aid to support agricultural, economic or infrastructure development 
programs, thus improving agricultural productivity and expanding agricultural trade. As it 
can be seen in Figure 2.9, the program’s funding for activities in Ethiopia has been limited 
and hectic, with nearly inexistent outlays in the years of 2006, 2011 and 2012.  










Source: made by the author (USAID, 2019b)  
 
During the FFPr years in Ethiopia, it provided support mainly to the livestock and dairy 
sectors. The proceeds from the monetization of US food donations, mainly of wheat, were 
used to support the Feed Enhancement for Ethiopian Development (FEED) project. The 
    






























FEED program (ACDI-VOCA, 2020; ACDI-VOCA, 2020b; ACDI-VOCA/USAID, 2017) 
was implemented by ACDI/VOCA71, a non-profit organization based in Washington and 
founded by the US cooperative community. The FEED program is currently in its second 
phase. Both FEED I and II aimed to increase the incomes of smallholder farmers by 
improving the animal feeding sector (GAIN Report Number ET1517). 
As to the positive impacts of the FFPr project, in 2015, the sale of 35 thousand metric tons 
of monetized wheat provided about 9.2 million dollars of proceeds that were given to FEED, 
which accounted for 70 percent of the 13 million dollars of FEED II 2015’s budget. 
According to the Ethiopian businessman Nuredin Abdultife Abdu, who bought wheat 
through FFPr, the monetization is very much a ‘win-win’ for all involved, since it provides 
wheat to local markets which constantly face shortages and because it finances social 
programs (GAIN Report Number ET1517). 
2.6.4. USAID programs in Ethiopia   
From 1951 to 2013, USAID and predecessor agencies provided approximately 11.7 billion 
dollars in economic assistance to Ethiopia (USAID, 2020)72, making it the largest US 
governmental entity in the country with a diverse portfolio of projects. According to the 
OECD classification, the main area where USAID acts in Ethiopia is in emergency response, 
followed by Development Food Aid. Agriculture usually ranks 5th place among such 
expenditures. The top sector varies according to the challenges the country faces. During 
periods of drought, such as the 2015-2016 one caused by El Niño, USAID’s assistance is 
almost entirely channeled towards emergency response. For instance, in FY2015, 84 percent 
of the aid budget for Ethiopia was directed to that sector (USAID, 2019b)73.  
The main program carried by USAID in Ethiopia is Food for Peace (FFP), especially its Title 
II. Usually, around 20% of Title II resources are destined to non-emergency food assistance 
activities, such as Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP). As mentioned above, 
PSNP focuses on households that regularly face seasonal food shortages and it addresses 
 
71 The acronym stands for Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance (ACDI-VOCA, 2020b). 
72 In 2013 constant dollars.  




food insecurity by strengthening household resilience to social, economic, and climate 
shocks, while simultaneously increasing access to economic opportunities. FFP non-
emergency activities supporting the PSNP are estimated to have reached around 1.6 million 
people, injecting approximately 100 million dollars in the Ethiopian economy per year (US 
International Food Assistance Report FY 2016: p. 23).  
The FFP supports the PSNP through Development Food Assistance Programs (DFAPs). 
There are four DFAPs, each one is implemented by a different NGO and is responsible for 
supporting a specific Ethiopian region: the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) acts in Dire Dawa 
and Oromia. The Food for the Hungry Ethiopia (FH/E) is in Amhara. The Relief Society of 
Tigray (REST) is in Tigray and Save the Children International (SCI) in Oromia and the 
Somali Region (Anderson, and Farmer, 2016; USAID, 2017). The DFAPs closely follow 
PSNP program implementation procedures, including the adherence to the pattern of up to 
five years of transfers of food or cash to targeted households. The transfers will be of food 
or cash depending on local conditions, such as productivity and market accessibility, but also 
on the donors, with the US donating mainly food and other international supporters, such as 
the World Bank, giving cash (USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy - Ethiopia 
2012).  
According to the Performance Evaluation report of Title II Funded Development Food 
Assistance Programs in Ethiopia of 2017, the goal of increasing short-term food security was 
reached, in the sense that households receiving transfers were more food secure than before.  
However, few of them became inherently capable of maintaining food self-sufficiency in the 
long run. Another contributing factor to the limited results of the DFAPs was the forced 
graduation from the program. Instead of being a consequence of households’ self-sufficiency, 
the large graduating rate from the DFAPs was due to externally imposed quotas (USAID, 
p.54). These factors show the limitation of assistance programs in tackling the underlying 
causes of food insufficiency and in increasing long-term household productive capacity or 
purchasing power.  
 
Traditionally, USAID emergency food assistance programs in Ethiopia have provided in-




electronic cash transfers funded by USAID’s FFP started in January 2017 in Ethiopia’s 
northwest region (USAID FY2017 EFSP Report: p. 4).  
The two main implementing partners of USAID’s emergency food assistance in Ethiopia 
were the WFP and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS). In the Ethiopian highlands, the CRS 
led an Emergency Operation Program Consortium, composed of seven national and 
international partners. By 2016, the consortium had provided general food distributions for 
more than 2.9 million beneficiaries, reaching almost a third of those in need of emergency 
relief in the country. Simultaneously, in the lowlands of the Somali region, WFP concentrated 
emergency relief actions, reaching 1.5 million people. WFP was also in charge of the overall 
logistics of emergency operations. It managed supplies and it gave technical assistance to the 
local government, as they were responsible for directly delivering aid to around seven million 
people (FY 2016 US International Food Assistance Report).  
2.7. Final Considerations  
Ethiopia’s position as one of the main receivers of food aid for decades has spurred debate 
on whether the vast amounts of international assistance sent to the country actually 
contributed to reducing the level of poverty, hunger, stunting and malnutrition (Awokuse, 
2014: p. 54). It is clear that there has been steady improvement in the country’s social 
indicators. For instance, the percentage of the Ethiopian population living below the national 
poverty line is declining, going from 38.7% in 2004 to 23.5% in 2015 (World Bank, 2019b), 
while the proportion of undernourished people fell from 75% in the early 1990s to 32% in 
2015 (WFP USA, 2020). It is difficult to attribute these improvements to the Ethiopian 
government alone, especially since almost the totality of its public policies has counted on 
the support of international donors in general and of the United States in particular.  
Evaluation reports of the programs supported by the US government in Ethiopia have 
generally yielded positive results. Since the Feed the Future initiative encompasses all 
governmental efforts in this area, an assessment of its results can serve as a basis for 
estimating the effect of US aid in Ethiopia. According to USAID’s report for FY201674, more 
 
74 Although US official reports could represent partial results, the US government has developed in the last few 




than 500 thousand local producers are using new technology and practices learned from US 
programs, which helped them to earn 35 million dollars in agricultural sales and leverage 19 
million dollars in private investments. Furthermore, the report states that FtF provided 
nutritional assistance to 6 million Ethiopian children (FtF, n.d.).    
The available data demonstrates that the US presence has contributed to alleviate 
circumstantial occurrences of hunger and poverty. However, the long-lasting effects of its 
aid are less evident. As explained before, due to the resistance of Congress to offer cash, the 
majority of the aid provided by the US government is still given as food donations. These 
large amounts of US agricultural commodities have raised concerns that they could generate 
adverse effects on Ethiopia’s own grain production. One key negative consequence attributed 
to food aid is that, despite helping people in the short run, it may create food aid dependency 
in the long run (Yamano, 2000: p.1-2). 
Another negative aspect of US aid is its exaggerated focus on humanitarian aid, rather than 
in development projects, which are designed to address the root causes of food insecurity. As 
mentioned above, only around 20% of the US main foreign aid funding, Food for Peace 
(FFP), is destined to non-emergency projects. Of this percentage, even less is directed to 
agriculture. For instance, in 2007, around 38% of all US assistance to Ethiopia went to 
emergency food relief, and 50% to HIV/AIDS related programs, but only 1.5% went to 
agriculture (Atwood, McPherson and Natsios, 2008: p. 128-131). 
Such distorted profiles of development aid are the result of many factors. The decisions 
regarding fund allocations are determined by earmarks, presidential initiatives, diplomatic 
pressure, economic interests, and congressional lobby, among others. However, this failure 
is not only caused by US domestic politics, but it is also due to mounting international needs. 
Much of FFP aid, originally meant for use in food-security-focused development programs, 
has continuously been diverted from development projects to emergency relief, due to the 
increasing number of refugees, conflict-displaced and climate-affected people. Despite 
improvements, the absolute number of food insecure and undernourished people is rising. 
According to FAO, people facing chronic food deprivation have gone from 783 million in 
 
agencies and programs. In addition, independent sources of evaluations from outside the government are scarce, 




2014, to around 820 million in 2017, receding to the levels of a decade ago (FAO, IFAD, 
UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2019). Even with high foreign aid outlays, assistance cannot keep 
up with the demand, especially considering the higher commodity prices. For instance, in 
FY2002-2004, the Title 2 program’s emergency budget of 1 billion dollars bought 1.7 million 
metric tons of food and reached 75 million beneficiaries. A decade later, the same amount of 
funding purchased about half the amount of food and aided only 26 million (Riley, 2017: p. 
472).  
Despite these shortcoming and limitations, the United States is still the main gross provider 
of international assistance and its role has been positively noted by its African counterparts. 
The multiplication of donors with emerging countries taking a more active participation on 
aid flows, as well as new directives emanated from OECD’s DAC, persuaded the US 
government to take action to reform its own system, adding yet another sense of urgency to 









Chapter 3. Brazil’s International Cooperation 
Although the recognition of Brazil as a new player in global aid flows is a recent 
phenomenon, the country’s engagement in this area is not new. The historical origins and 
basic principles of Brazilian International Development Cooperation (IDC) go back to 
different political, social and economic circumstances from the 1960s and 1970s. At 
international level, they were largely ignited by the independence of former colonies in 
Africa and Asia, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), the creation of the G-77 at the United Nations Conference for Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, among others (ABC, n.d). Internally, in this period 
more awareness emerged in realizing that Brazil could take advantage of the learning it had 
received as a beneficiary of foreign aid to provide expertise to other nations with similar 
challenges and socioeconomic conditions (Puente, 2010: p. 103).  
This incipient process started with projects focusing on Latin American and African 
countries, in particular Portuguese-speaking ones. Looking South was seen as a pragmatic 
route to universalize and diversify partnerships, thus promoting a more ‘autonomous’ 
position for Brazil in an international system dominated by a rigid Cold War’s bipolarity. 
The ‘Independent Foreign Policy’ of Joao Goulart’s civilian government (1961−1964), and 
the ‘Ecumenical and Responsible Pragmatism’ of General Ernesto Geisel’s military rule 
(1974−1979), were two well-defined historical periods marked by the expansion of Brazilian 
South-South relations (Leite, 2011).  
The 1978 United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing 
Countries in Buenos Aires boosted Brazil’s South-South engagement and by the 1980s, 
demands for technical cooperation were already numerically more significant than projects 
involving received technical cooperation. However, macroeconomic complications and 
political instability affecting its democratic transition led Brazilian foreign aid to suffer 
setbacks, slowing its path towards a more prominent role (Morais de Sá e Silva, 2009). Only 
by the end of the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, Brazilian South–South cooperation 




In the transition to the twenty-first century, several transformations in the Brazilian political-
institutional situation received increasing international recognition. These changes included 
constitutional reform, democracy consolidation, strengthening of civil society and social 
movements, social programs expansion, and overall greater economic and financial stability. 
In turn, this led the Brazilian government to receive increasing requests to share its 
experience and best practices with partner countries, especially in the area of hunger 
alleviation and poverty eradication. 
The improvements achieved in the social area were widely publicized by the diplomacy of 
former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, being cited in numerous Brazilian 
pronouncements (as it will be seen in the section on Presidential Diplomacy), contributing to 
the creation of a unique period in the prestige enjoyed by the country abroad in this specific 
area. This was demonstrated by the statement of then Executive Director of the WFP, Josette 
Sheeran, at the inauguration of the Center of Excellence against Hunger in Brasilia, in 
November, 2011:   
As a world champion in the fight against hunger, Brazil has a wealth of 
experience that can be shared with governments eager to learn how they 
achieved that success and adapt it to their own countries. 
Brazil has taken the fight against hunger and malnutrition seriously and is 
now among those defeating hunger faster than any nation on earth. We will 
partner to leverage this success to other nations seeking to end hunger and 
malnutrition. (UN News, 2011) 
3.1. Historical Background of Brazil’s Food Security Policy 
Since Brazil’s technical cooperation programs are based on its domestic policies, a brief 
historical overview of its social public policy in the field of food security will be presented. 
An initial framework in this regard was the Supply Committee of the Ministry of Labor, 
Industry and Trade (MTIC) of 1939. Similar to the case of other incipient public policies of 
the mid-twentieth century, the initiative sought to fight food shortages by expanding supply 
for the domestic market. The National School Feeding Program of the Ministry of Education 
(MEC), whose objective was to provide 15% to 30% of the nutritional needs of students 
enrolled in public elementary school system, was the most relevant strategy of this initial 




Josué de Castro exerted a major influence in contemporary mechanisms to fight hunger in 
Brazil. Among his numerous studies, the two volumes of ‘Geography of Hunger’ stand out. 
Originally published in 1946, they examine the phenomenon of collective hunger, one that 
reaches endemic or epidemically large human populations, in all its gradations, from total 
hunger, starvation, to partial and hidden hunger, which is characterized by the persistent lack 
of certain key nutrients. Castro convincingly demonstrated the primacy of socioeconomic 
factors over physical-natural factors in the causality of the phenomenon of hunger and how 
undernourishment would negatively affect the overall condition of people: 
Hunger is no more than an expression - the darkest and most tragic 
expression of economic underdevelopment. An expression that will only 
disappear when economic underdevelopment is swept away from the 
country, with the generalized pauperism that it provokes. What is necessary 
on the part of the public powers is to create conditions for development and 
direct it towards well-defined ends, of which none overlaps with that of the 
food emancipation of the people. It is to direct our economy towards the 
social well-being of the community. Only then we will enjoy a true 
economic development that emancipates us from all forms of servitude. 
From servitude to the external economic forces that for years have been 
trying to hinder our social progress and perpetuate our internal bondage to 
hunger and misery, preventing the growth of our wealth. (Castro, 1965: 
304) 
In 1951, Castro published the ‘Geopolitics of Hunger’, a book in which he applied the 
methodology used in the analysis of Brazil to study the problem of hunger in the world, in 
its biological, economic and social significance. His work was acclaimed internationally, 
being translated into nineteen languages and bestowed with several awards, such as the 
Roosevelt Prize of the Academy of Political Sciences of the United States, in 1952, and the 
International Peace Prize in 1954, a recognition that gave him leverage to become the 
Director-General of FAO between 1952 and 1956. 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, the establishment of social policies on food security was 
characterized by some advances and a few retreats. Programs to reduce hunger and poverty 
were loosely institutionalized, causing them to lack stability and be held hostage of political 
volatility (Peliano apud Andrade, 2011: 78). The creation of the National Institute of Food 
and Nutrition (Port. Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição - INAN), in 1972, and the 
Health Nutrition Program (Port. Programa de Nutrição e Saúde - PNS), in 1975, are among 




In the 1990s, the prevalence of neoliberalism in governmental decision-making bodies and 
reports of irregularities in some programs led to the interruption or reduction of most of the 
social policies then in place. A significant factor, however, was the growing mobilization of 
civil society, which had been hitherto excluded from the elaboration and planning of hunger 
alleviation initiatives. This new engagement culminated in the campaign ‘Action of 
Citizenship Against Hunger, Misery and For Life,’ led by the sociologist Herbert of Souza, 
also known as Betinho. The campaign, launched in April 1993, managed to mobilize large 
sectors of Brazilian society and was a development of the ‘Movement for Ethics in Politics’, 
which was pushing for the impeachment of then-President Fernando Collor. The campaign 
articulated the preparation of a national map of hunger, which revealed the shocking reality 
that 32 million Brazilian nationals were below the poverty line. 
In view of the tragic situation described by the hunger map, President Itamar Franco created 
the National Council for Food Security (Port. Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar - 
CONSEA), an advisory body attached to the Presidency of the Republic. The main innovative 
aspect of the Council, which was signed into law by Decree 807 of April 1993 (Annex II), 
was in its composition. Only around one-third (8 of 29) of its members were government 
officials (Ministers of State), while two-thirds (21) were comprised of civil society 
representatives designated by the President. This gave a groundbreaking and institutionalized 
channel to the participation of civil society in the formulation of public policies for food 
security. Although the body would not survive the turbulence of the following years, closing 
in 1995, it was revived in 2003, in the wake of the new impetus attributed to combating 
hunger by the Workers' Party administration. 
The 2000s brought about a more favorable context to broaden government-led social policies. 
The boom of commodity prices fostered by the rapidly expanding Chinese economy 
increased commercial revenues in agricultural exporting nations. In Brazil, this positive 
reinforcement coming from external conditions contributed to the integration of workers to 
the labor market, which in turn further improved employment rates and strongly expanded 
the lower middle class (De Negri and Cavalcanti, 2014). This combination of factors helped 
Brazil to reduce the share of its population in poverty, to overtake Italy as the seventh largest 




Internationally, these achievements enhanced Brazil’s relative status in the world scene and 
increased its perceived legitimacy as a global actor. Public policies in the field of food 
security were important not only to boost its international prestige, but also to motivate 
significant growth in the cooperation projects undertaken by the government. SSC was seen 
as benefiting Brazil in various ways: boosting its soft power (Costa Leite et al., 2014: p. 18); 
projecting power in the Southern Atlantic (Morais de Sá e Silva 2005); strengthening ties 
with developing countries, especially in regions of prime importance (Puente, 2010: p. 32); 
strengthening economic interests abroad  (Dauvergne and Farias 2012: p. 909); gathering 
additional international support for Brazil’s international ambitions, such as candidatures to 
international organizations (Barbosa, 2012: p. 123) and its bid at the United Nations for a 
permanent seat in an enlarged Security Council (Cervo 1994; Valler Filho 2007).  
However, the less known part of the commodity-boom is that it represented a lost opportunity 
for inducing real changes in Brazil’s economic infrastructure, by increasing, for instance, its 
competitiveness and productivity, which have been declining since at least the last quarter of 
the 20th century (Coelho and Inoue, 2018; De Negri and Cavalcanti, 2014). Instead of 
focusing on a status-seeking policy, President Lula could have used its high popularity and 
commercial revenue to spearhead wide-ranging structural reforms. Consequently, after his 
two terms, Brazil was very low in its capacity to overcome the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial and economic crisis. 
In the 1950s, as previously noted, Josué de Castro’s seminal work ‘The Geography of 
Hunger’ (1946) gained international recognition75. Over the following decades, however, the 
subject lost importance and remained secondary on Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. The 
reemergence of food security was a noteworthy change in a foreign policy traditionally 
known for its continuity and its aversion to sudden variations. This rise occurred through 
multiple channels: budgetary, legislative, organizational, participatory and in official 
discourse, each of them working as a transmission link through which the new domestic 
orientations were projected onto Brazil’s international action.  
 
75 Castro demonstrated the primacy of socioeconomic above physical-natural factors in the causality of the 
phenomenon of hunger and the condition of sub-nutrition of the people around the world. His work will 




In addition, the reemergence of the theme ‘hunger’ is intertwined with the rapprochement 
with Africa. Although Brazil had developed very secondary African policies in the early 
1960s and since 1975 times, the rise of President Lula resulted in a new approach to bilateral 
relations between Brazil and African nations, since it brought about an active stance to help 
tackle African challenges. This contrasts with President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
posture, evident in his statement that the responsibility for removing Africa from the sidelines 
of international relations fell exclusively upon rich countries (Júnior and Faria, 2015: p.10).  
Brazilian rapprochement with Africa was characterized by an increase in financial aid, 
political initiatives and cooperation projects (Maluf, Santareli and Prado, 2014). The 
government also fostered horizontal partnerships, without explicit pre-conditions, but 
expected in return support to the candidature of Brazil to the Security Council, to the World 
Trade Organization and other bids, as well as a favorable attitude towards major Brazilian 
companies trying to expand their business abroad.  
Another sign of Brazil’s renewed interest in Africa is the opening of 13 diplomatic 
representations in that continent76. Brazil went from 18 to 30 embassies (and from 1 to 2 
general consulates). The number of African ambassadors in Brasília also rose, increasing 
from 16 to 25 between January 2003 and December 2006. Finally, the intensification of 
Brazilian presence in Africa is attested by trade. Between 2003 and 2006, exports to Africa 
increased by 315% and imports from that continent increased 307%, which represented a 
growth of 9 billion dollars – from 6 billion to 15 billion dollars (Ribeiro, 2007: p. 172).  
3.2. Measuring resources 
Analyzing Brazilian cooperation initiatives in food security is not a simple task, not only 
because of their relative opacity, but also because of the difficulty in defining a perspective 
that is intersectoral and multidimensional (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p. 30). In this 
sense, it is challenging to estimate the exact proportion of Brazilian international cooperation 
that strictly relates to food security, since data on foreign aid usually refers to agriculture in 
general. Distinguishing initiatives related to hunger alleviation from those directed to large-
 
76 The Embassies opened were in Addis Abea (Ethiopia), Khartum (Sudan), Cotonou (Benin), Dar Es-Salaam 
(Tanzania), Yaounde (Cameroon), Lomé (Togo), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), San Tomé and Principe), 
Conacri (Guinea). Gaborone (Botswana), Lusaka (Zambia), and a General Consulate in Lagos (Nigeria). In 




scale agribusiness is important if one aims to assess the effects of international assistance on 
reducing food insecurity.  
One of the best ways to understand Brazilian cooperation initiatives in food security is by 
analyzing how their resources are allocated. When president Lula’s administration started, 
the theme of food security was almost absent in Brazil’s foreign policy. By the end of his 
second term, it had a significant presence. This was reflected in the increase in the budget for 
technical cooperation projects: it went from 1.9 million reais in 2003 to 5.3 million by the 
end of Lula’s first term (2006), and to 37.8 million in 201077. Likewise, the organ responsible 
for providing technical cooperation, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Port. Agência 
Brasileira de Cooperação – ABC), was engaged in a total of only 37 projects in 2003, while 
in 2006 they had increased to 179, and in 2010 to 737 projects, a historical record (ABC, 
n.d.-b).  














2003 4,500,000 - 151,200 - 3.25%  0.43 
2004 7,999,914 + 3,499,914 77.78%  0.62 
2005 37,729,900 +29,729,985 371.63%  2.40 
2006 28,022,187 - 9,707,713 - 25.73%  1.77 
Source: Puente, 2010: p. 293. Translated by the author. 
 
The expansion of Brazil’s cooperation was not a straightforward accomplishment. As Table 
3.1 shows, there was some oscillation in the increase of ABC’s budget during Lula’s first 
government. The annual resources allocated to international assistance initiatives decreased 
between 2003 and 2004, but then rose by nearly 30% in 2005, and quintupled from 2005 to 
2006 (ABC, n.d.-c). It may be argued that budget fluctuations during the initial years of the 
administration of the Workers’ Party (PT) were primarily due to a period of adjustment of 
 
77 The annual amounts are the financial sums of the execution of the ABC budget, transfers to International 
Organizations and transfers of resources from Brazilian governmental bodies and institutions to be executed in 
actions of technical cooperation by ABC. Available at: http://www.abc.gov.br/Gestao/EvolucaoFinanceira 




governmental policies and structures, thus leading Lula’s cooperation initiatives to only reach 
their peak during his second term.  
This also helps to understand why data from this initial period is rather scarce. As an 
illustration, one can mention the case of the General-Coordination for Humanitarian 
Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger (CGFOME), which, despite being established in 
2003, functioned without proper funding until 2007, when a budgetary heading for 
humanitarian operations was approved in the Annual Budget Law (LOA).78  
Therefore, Lula’s second term brought about new momentum to international aid, with 
further allocation of financial and human resources. Brazil spent around 3.5 billion reais (in 
current values)79 between 2007 and 2010 with international development cooperation (IDC) 
(Port. Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento Internacional), which includes humanitarian 
assistance, scholarships to foreign nationals to study in Brazil, technical cooperation and 
voluntary contributions to international organizations (Ipea, 2012: p. 7). During that period, 
ABC conducted projects with transfer of technology for agricultural activities in 30 countries, 
with a special focus on Portuguese-speaking nations (Goulet and Sabourin, 2012). Food 
security was made a central tenet within the Brazilian portfolio, especially in activities in 
Africa, where agriculture accounts for 20% of all technical cooperation (Ipea, 2012). 
In 2013, Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) mapped initiatives of South-South 
cooperation that followed the guidelines of Brazil’s National Food and Nutrition Security 
Plan (PANSAN), providing an overview of its foreign aid initiatives. The mapping revealed 
that 85% of Brazilian cooperation actions related to food security were carried out in Africa. 
Around 30 African countries were involved in cooperation projects, among which 
Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia stood out as the main receivers in that region. 
Regarding modalities, there is a predominance of technical cooperation initiatives, 
accounting for 87 projects, compared to 12 humanitarian actions. The vast majority (72) of 
Brazilian projects were bilateral, while 28 were multilateral and only three of a trilateral 
nature (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p. 31). 
 
78 Interview with Bianca Fadel, ex-employee at the CGFOME, conceded to the author on the November 31, 
2016.    




Figure 3.1. Quantitative of Cooperation Projects and Activities per Year 
  
Source: Made by the author.80  
 
 
3.3. Legal Framework  
The first initiative to implement an International Technical Cooperation System in Brazil 
took place in 1950, when the Brazilian government created the National Technical Assistance 
Commission (Port. Comissão Nacional de Assistência Técnica - CNAT), comprised of 
governmental representatives from the Secretariat of Planning, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and other agencies. Its main attribution was to set priorities in the requests from 
Brazilian institutions to receive technical assistance from abroad. Aid was provided by 
developed countries with which Brazil had specific agreements for the transfer of technology 
in the form of cooperation (ABC, n.d.-a). 
In these first decades of exchange, the focus of cooperation was to support the structuring of 
federal public institutions and national entities specialized in areas then considered strategic 
for the national economy (Abreu, 2013: p. 4). Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation) was one of the main beneficiaries of these initiatives and, in the 1970s, it 
 
80 The annual amounts are the financial sums of the execution of the ABC budget, transfers to International 
Organizations and transfers of resources from Brazilian governmental bodies and institutions to be executed in 
actions of technical cooperation by ABC. (ABC, n.d.-b; n.d.-c) For the year of 2003, the information was 
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received financial support from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for 
the development of soybean in the Cerrado (Brazilian savanna). This Japanese–Brazilian 
Cooperation Program for Cerrados’ Development (Port. Programa de Cooperação Nipo-
Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento dos Cerrados - Prodecer) would be decades later the 
cornerstone of Embrapa’s flagship development program with African countries, the 
Triangular Co-operation Program for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savanna in 
Mozambique (ProSavana) being a case in point (Abreu, 2013: p. 13; Barrios Diaz, 2017: p. 
240).  
In 1969, the Brazilian cooperation system went through a broad institutional reform. A decree 
centralized the foreign assistance procedures in the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of 
the Republic (Port. Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da 
República - SEPLAN/PR81) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Port. Ministério das 
Relações Exteriores - MRE), both chosen as the bodies responsible for aid management. 
What mostly motivated the reform was the need to strengthen the system, enabling it to direct 
the high volume of external resources available to the guidelines and priorities defined in the 
National Development Plans. In 1984, another reform followed to provide the system with 
greater managerial effectiveness by terminating the Sub-Secretariat for International 
Economic and Technical Cooperation (SUBIN) and transferring its responsibilities to the 
Technical Cooperation Division (Id.).  
In 1987, Decree 94,973 created the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), formally linked to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). Although this new structural milestone represented 
a step forward in providing the country with a specialized organ in international technical 
cooperation, the need to find a definitive structuring persisted, as it will be further explained 
in the following sections. 
 
81 SEPLAN/PR was extinguished by the Law No. 8,028 of 12.04.1990, but it reemerged in 1995 as the Ministry 
of Planning and Budget (MPO). On July 30, 1999, under Provisional Measure No. 1,911-8, MOG was renamed 
the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG), which was amended on May 12, 2016 to the 
Ministry of Planning, Development and Management with Provisional Measure No. 726. Available at: 
http://www.planejamento.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/o-ministerio/historia; 
http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/base-legal-de-governo/orgaos-extintos/secretaria-de-planejamento-




As a developing country whose foreign assistance only recently became more prominent, 
Brazil’s legal framework for providing international assistance is in its infancy. For instance, 
up until today the government does not have a comprehensive legislative model to guide its 
aid provision and implementation. In 2007, the bill PL 737/200782 attempted to regulate 
humanitarian actions undertaken by the Executive Branch, but the draft is still waiting for 
deliberation in Congress, more precisely in the Chamber of Representatives. This law, if or 
when passed, would authorize the government to employ ‘the necessary and sufficient means 
to implement international humanitarian actions’, thus granting permission to use and donate 
movable property, including food from public stocks, as well as financial resources (Annex 
III). 
This draft bill was a proposition from the Inter-ministerial Working Group on International 
Humanitarian Assistance, created in 2006, under the coordination of Itamaraty. According to 
the justification sent by the then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (Annex IV), the bill would 
enable Brazil to act with alacrity in cases of emergency, since the current system delays or 
even renders aid virtually unfeasible.  
Whenever a humanitarian assistance operation is going to be carried out abroad, it is 
necessary to previously approve a temporary bill, called Provisional Measure (Port. Medida 
Provisória; abbreviated as MP), authorizing shipments on a case by case basis. In 2011, the 
MP 519/2010 authorizing the provision of food assistance to 14 countries and those from the 
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Port. Comunidade dos Países de Língua 
Portuguesa - CPLP), was signed into law.  
In the following year, Law 12.429/2011 authorized the MRE to allocate the remaining stocks 
to other countries affected by adverse socioeconomic events or acute food insecurity (Annex 
V). In the face of the legislative gap and considering the absence of a more comprehensive 
framework, this law has been providing the criteria and procedures for the donation of public 
stocks of food for international humanitarian assistance. According to this law, it is under the 
MRE’s responsibility to define the quantitative and respective recipients of the agricultural 
 
82 Annex VII. Also available at: 





products sent, which are restricted to those mentioned in the law’s annexed table, periodically 
updated. The last update was in 2014 and since then rice, beans, corn, powder and vegetable 
seed were also included. Although this law made it possible to send humanitarian assistance 
more quickly, it did not solve the problem entirely, since it reinstated reliance on the World 
Food Program (WFP) to cover freight and other transportation expenses. Moreover, the law 
only addresses in-kind donations, thus not authorizing the Executive Branch to fund local 
procurement projects. 
As the main focus of Brazilian international assistance is technical cooperation and, in turn, 
technical cooperation programs are virtually a replica of Brazil’s most successful social 
programs, the legal framework supporting the public policies exported by Brazil’s aid 
programs shall be analyzed.  
The first legal landmark for social policy under the PT presidency was Law 10.683 of May 
28, 200383, which founded the Extraordinary Ministry of Food Security and the Fight against 
Hunger (MESA)84. The Ministry would be made the central organ for the Zero Hunger 
Program and Professor José Graziano da Silva was chosen to lead it. Graziano was one of 
those responsible for the elaboration of the Workers’ Party food security strategy and 
eventually became Director-General of FAO in 2012.  
The Law also reestablished the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (Port. 
Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - CONSEA) as an advisory body 
of the Presidency of the Republic. The Council is composed by two-thirds of civil society 
representatives and one-third of governmental delegates. The presidency of the organ is held 
by a member of civil society (Machado, 2017). Originally created in 1993, the Council was 
the first governmental agency exclusively designed to address domestic food security issues. 
It derived from civil society’s mobilization known as the ‘Betinho Campaign’, in reference 
to sociologist Herbert de Souza, who championed the initiative (Takagi, 2006).  
 
83 Originally, the Law was approved as the Temporary Measure N.103, of January 1st, 2003. 
84 The MESA would be terminated the following year, by law 10.869 of  March 13th, 2004, and replaced by the 





The re-creation of CONSEA represents a milestone in the participation of civil society in the 
making of public policies. Numerous legal and institutional mechanisms that casted Brazil in 
the world’s avant-garde regarding hunger alleviation were propositions that arose from the 
Council. For instance, the Food Acquisition Program (Port. Programa de Aquisição de 
Alimentos – PAA), the National School Feeding Program (Port. Programa Nacional de 
Alimentação Escolar - PNAE), and Article 14 of Law 11.947 (2009) – which states that 30% 
of the resources of the PNAE must come from smallholder agriculture – were all directly 
influenced by the Council. Moreover, CONSEA had an important role in the formation of 
transnational networks of social movements in the agricultural field. This is exemplified by 
CONSEA’s involvement in the mobilization of farmers and NGOs against the ProSavana 
program in Mozambique, as it will be seen in the case study.  
Launched on October 16, 2001 (World Food Day), by the Citizenship Institute, the Zero 
Hunger Program consisted of three types of policies: i) structural, aimed to tackle the 
fundamental causes of hunger and poverty; ii) target-specific, directed to social groups in 
food scarcity situations; and iii) local, implemented directly by municipalities. Profiting from 
the experience of many previous social programs, Zero Hunger brought the issue of food 
security to the limelight. One of the program’s key structural policies that earned Brazil broad 
international recognition was the PAA. It constituted one of the 17 engagements of the 
National Program for Strengthening Family Agriculture (Port. Programa Nacional de 
Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar - PRONAF), in which the government purchases 
food from family farming,85, a model that was going to be diffused to many nations. 
In July 2008, PRONAF launched another mechanism that would increase international 
interest and be disseminated through Brazil’s international cooperation projects. The More 
Food Program (Port. Programa Mais Alimentos) aimed to establish a credit line for 
investment in productive infrastructure for family agriculture, such as the purchase of 
machinery and equipment, soil repair, irrigation, agroforestry systems and genetic 
improvement. An agreement with the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers 
(Port. Associação Nacional dos. Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores - ANFAVEA) and the 
 
85 PAA was instituted by Law 10,696 of July 2, 2003. Available at: 
http://www.conab.gov.br/OlalaCMS/uploads/arquivos/12_07_23_11_43_47_sumario_paa_2003.pdf 




Brazilian Machinery Builders’ Association (Port. Associação Brasileira da Indústria de 
Máquinas e Equipamentos - ABIMAQ) ensured a reduction of up to 17.5% in the prices of 
agricultural capital. In addition, the MFP extended the services of technical assistance and 
agricultural extension (Port. Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural – ATER), increasing its 
budget from 168 million to 397 million reais and its staff on the ground from 20 thousand to 
30 thousand technicians (BRASIL, 2017; CUT, 2008). 
Law 11.346 of September 15, 2006 is also another important legal landmark. Known as the 
Law for Food and Nutritional Security (LOSAN), it included Brazil’s definition of food 
security: ‘the right of everyone to regular and permanent access to quality food in sufficient 
quantity, without compromising access to other essential needs, based on eating habits that 
promote health, respect cultural diversity, and are environmentally, culturally, economically 
and socially sustainable’. It also stipulated policies, plans, programs, and actions with the 
objective of guaranteeing the human right to adequate nutrition. Furthermore, the law 
contributed to the international diffusion of social policies to combat hunger by stating that 
Brazil ‘should engage the promotion of technical cooperation with foreign countries, thereby 
contributing to the promotion of human rights and adequate nutrition at the international 
level’ (BRASIL, 2006).  
Law 11.947 of June 16, 2009, established new guidelines for the National School Feeding 
Program (PNAE), expanding it for all kindergarten, elementary education, high school and 
youth and adult education (MDS, 2014b). The law also determined that the National Fund 
for Educational Development (Port. Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação - 
FNDE) would coordinate financial resources allocated for PNAE. Yet, the major innovation 
of this law (and one of the key factors for the success of Brazilian social policies) was defined 
in Article 14, which states that 30% of the resources of the National Program for School 
Feeding must come from smallholder agriculture. This is the legislative innovation that most 
awakened interest of foreign governments and the key aspect that the UN Center of 
Excellence against Hunger in Brazil of the World Food Program (WFP) diffuses 
internationally. 
Launched in 2011, the Center of Excellence is a joint initiative of Brazil and the WPF, as a 




experience to share knowledge and policy innovations primarily focused on linking school 
meal systems to local agriculture. In partnership with ABC, it provides technical assistance 
to national governments to design, improve, expand, and eventually run their own school 
feeding programs (WFP, n.d)86. Finally, Decree 7.272, of August 25, 2010, established the 
National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (Port. Política Nacional de Segurança 
Alimentar e Nutricional - PNSAN), with the parameters for the elaboration of the National 
Plan of Food and Nutritional Security. 
3.4. Organizational Dimension    
Until recently, Brazil’s agricultural cooperation was characterized by sporadic technical 
assistance involving short training courses and peer-to-peer sharing of tropical agriculture 
science and technology — activities that were conducted mainly by the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation (Port. Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária – Embrapa). 
Brazilian cooperation took on greater diversity when an additional set of actors outside the 
agricultural research domain joined the programs, bringing a focus on the diffusion of public 
policies, rather than just technical exchange based on agronomic expertise (Cabral, et al., 
2016: p. 49). 
Both within the domestic and external environments, institutional structures were created 
with the goal of exporting Brazil’s social policies. This section focuses on the mechanisms 
responsible for the inclusion of food security in Brazilian foreign policy. Six main structures 
can be listed as being key for policy diffusion: The General-Coordination for Humanitarian 
Cooperation and the Fight Against Hunger (Port.  Coordenação-Geral de Cooperação 
Humanitária e Combate à Fome - CGFOME), the International Policy Center for Inclusive 
Growth (IPC-IG), the IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Hunger and Poverty, the Inter-
Ministerial Working Group for Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI), the Brazilian 
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
(ABC).87  
 
86 WFP, n.d. Centre of Excellence Against Hunger. Available at: http://www1.wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-
against-hunger (accessed August 10, 2017).  
87 The Center of Excellence in the Fight Against Hunger of the WFP and the FAO-Embrapa Fund were created 




3.4.1. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) 
The creation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency occurred at a time of great changes in the 
flow of international cooperation for development, when national governments were 
increasingly taking responsibility for the management of cooperation programs implemented 
by international organizations. The foundation of ABC allowed Brazil to expand the 
cooperation it received and gave, especially the incipient modality of South-South technical 
cooperation.  
While ABC’s operational structure, human resources and management systems were in the 
process of consolidation, Brazil’s overseas cooperation engagements also grew larger, 
expanding geometrically in terms of partner countries and projects implemented. As 
established in MRE’s regulations (2012), the Agency functions are:  
to plan, coordinate, negotiate, approve, execute, monitor and evaluate, at 
the national level, development cooperation programs, projects and 
activities in all the areas of knowledge received from other countries and 
international organizations and that between Brazil and developing 
countries, including related actions in the field of training for the 
management of technical cooperation and dissemination of information. 
(ABC, n.d) 
As seen above, ABC was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and while it was 
granted technical and executive powers, the political formulation of cooperation remained in 
the hands of Itamaraty. Since its early beginnings, the Agency has acted in close cooperation 
with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which provides human resources, 
techno-managerial qualifications, and expertise in the way international cooperation projects 
are carried out (Id.) 
Until the present moment, ABC continues to rely upon technicians hired by UNDP and 
diplomatic staff from Itamaraty to perform cooperation initiatives. Although ABC argues that 
this lack of enough civil servants allows it to save with personnel, thus enabling it to spend 
more on its projects, to many this unending reliance on temporary arrangements shows the 
suboptimal conditions in which ABC operates (Puente, 2010), further weakening Brazil’s 
capacity to fully exert its soft power through cooperation. ABC’s structural deficiencies 




a new one. Some proposed that ABC should no longer be part of the MRE and instead be 
linked to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) (Paraguassu, 
2013). Others argued in favor of ABC remaining attached to the MRE, but with its status 
elevated to an autarchy and, as a result, with its own staff and financial autonomy (Barbosa, 
2013). Finally, there were propositions for the agency to be subordinated directly to the 
Presidency’s Chief of Staff Ministry (Casa Civil) (Costa Leite et al., 2014: p. 46).  
In May 2013, during the celebration of the African Union’s fiftieth anniversary in Ethiopia, 
President Dilma Rousseff announced her plan to create a new agency of cooperation, trade 
and investments: 
We have an agency, called ABC, but this agency is a department of the 
Foreign Ministry, in fact. All major countries have international trade 
agencies. We will create an international trading agency for Africa and 
Latin America. It is a funding agency, but also a commercial agency, it is 
also an agency to enable investments. In short, it is an agency that has a 
very large scope. This agency aims to create a mechanism through which 
the initiatives that Brazil takes do not have to go through other multilateral 
bodies. You can even do in partnership with the UN, but often our actions 
in Africa are performed by one of these international agencies, and not by 
us directly, even though they are our resources. Hence the reason for this 
agency cooperation, trade and investment with African countries88.  
A subsequent note from Casa Civil stated that the establishment of the new agency was part 
of ‘measures aimed at intensifying Brazil’s relations with the African continent relying on 
reciprocal cooperation and mutual development’ (Rossi, 2013). In July 2013, during the 
National Conference on Brazilian foreign policy, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio 
Patriota mentioned ABC’s reform, saying it would have more financial resources and it 
would be renamed the Brazilian Agency for Development Cooperation (ABCD) (Costa Leite 
et al., 2014: p. 46).  
However, these propositions lost momentum with the political turmoil Brazil went through 
during the impeachment and downfall of Rousseff’s administration in August 2016. There 
have not been further discussions regarding ABC’s remodeling since then.  But there is an 
 
88 Announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma at Addis Ababa, 25 May 2013 (Costa Leite et al., 2014: 
p. 88). The full transcript is found on Annex VI of this thesis. The video with the presidential statement is 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=d7tPg39k2XE (accessed on: 




overall consensus that either ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency should be created, 
as a fundamental step to underpin and expand Brazil’s international development cooperation 
initiatives (Costa Leite et al., 2014: p. 62).  
The changes that ABC did go through were minimal. In August 2016, the Agency 
incorporated most of the responsibilities of CGFOME, which comprised the coordination of 
the emergency humanitarian response actions, through donations of food, medicines and 
other essential items to serve countries in situations of socio-environmental disaster, public 
calamity, armed conflict, food and nutritional insecurity, or other situations posing serious 
threat to the life, health and humanitarian rights of its population. In the following year, 
ABC's General Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation (CGCH) was officialized by 
Decree 9,110 of July 27, 2017. 
Ambassador Lauro Moreira, ABC’s Director from 2003 to 2006, described Brazil’s 
Technical Cooperation with Developing Countries (TCDC) as being without any economic, 
commercial or lucrative goals, and with ‘no strings attached’. His statement reflected the 
administration’s critical posture regarding traditional approaches to cooperation, which tie 
assistance to donors’ economic and political aims. In spite of this typically South-South 
solidarity rhetoric, Brazil’s TCDC promoted, directly and indirectly, an increase of Brazilian 
economic presence in receiving states, opening many African countries to state-owned 
companies like the energy giant Petrobras and private companies, such as Camargo Corrêa, 
Andrade Gutierrez, Odebrecht, Braskem and others.89 Evidence that in practice cooperation 
and business usually go hand in hand is supported by the presence in Mozambique of Brazil’s 
mining company Vale, the main recipient of Brazilian technical cooperation in the African 
continent (Rodrigues, 2015; Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013).  
As it was later disclosed, the operations of Brazilian company giants in Africa were tarnished 
by huge corruption scandals on both sides: the African governments and the Brazilian 
corporations and politicians. According to investigations led by the US Department of Justice 
(DoJ), from 2001 to 2015, Odebrecht and Braskem paid around 788 million dollars in bribes 
to officials and political parties in Brazil and in 11 other countries. In Africa, Angola and 
 
89 For more information on the participation of Brazilian companies in foreign policy, see the report available 




Mozambique were the two main receivers, with 262 million and 900 thousand dollars, 
respectively90. 
3.4.2 The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) 
Embrapa was founded in 1973 as part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply 
(MAPA), with the stated mission of finding technical solutions to sustainable agricultural 
development. Throughout its existence, it became a locus for excellence in problems related 
to agriculture in tropical climates. This was mainly due to its participation in the process of 
agricultural modernization, which helped Brazil to overcome natural limitations to farming 
in its territory (Embrapa, n.d.).  
Embrapa gained international recognition due to its role in the transformation of the infertile 
lands of the Cerrado into one of the world’s biggest soy producers. The lands incorporated 
into the national production system account for more than half of all Brazilian grain 
production. This achievement, called by The Economist ‘the Cerrado miracle’ (Economist, 
2010), attracted many countries’ interest in agricultural technical assistance from Brazil. The 
likeness between Cerrado’s soil and climate with the African savannas rendered the Brazilian 
experience a development model for many countries in Africa, a proposition endorsed by the 
World Bank (Cabral and Shankland, 2013).  
Embrapa's institutional arrangement changed several times since its foundation. A snapshot 
of the organ’s technical cooperation in 2014 shows it took place on four fronts: i) structuring 
projects which involve longer-term commitments and resources above 1 million dollars; ii) 
smaller size and short duration projects; iii) training in tropical agriculture; iv) agrilivestock 
innovation platforms, more specifically the Agricultural Innovation Market Place project. 
Regarding its structuring projects, Embrapa has three technical cooperation initiatives in its 
portfolio. The first of them is Cotton-4, a project with technology transfer to increase cotton 
productivity in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Togo. The second is ProSavana, a 
 
90 ‘The payoffs brought Odebrecht and Braskem contracts for around 100 projects, many of them to build public 
infrastructure. Often, governments paid more for the work than they needed to. The DoJ alleges that Odebrecht 
set up a ‘Division of Structured Operations’, which ‘effectively functioned as a stand-alone bribe department’. 
The American investigators say that the companies’ top brass, including Marcelo Odebrecht, the 
conglomerate’s former boss and grandson of its founder, not only knew all about the scheme but authorized it. 




trilateral cooperation initiative with the Mozambican government and the Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The third and most recent project is a partnership 
with FAO to strengthen agricultural research institutions in Angola (Maluf, Santarelli and 
Prado, 2014: p. 34). 
President Lula was an advocate of the internationalization of Embrapa and the transfer of 
technology to African countries. The agency opened its first Regional Office in Ghana in 
July, 2006, and its presence in loco allowed to deepen cooperation initiatives, especially in 
Portuguese-speaking countries (Lopes apud. Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 124). In addition, the 
establishment of Embrapa’s virtual laboratories abroad (LABEX) further facilitated the 
intensification of the exchange of experiences and information on agricultural research91 
(Brasil, 2013: p. 97).  
Launched in May 2010, during the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food security, Hunger 
Alleviation and Rural Development, in Brasilia, the Agriculture Innovation Marketplace for 
Africa represents one of Embrapa’s most significant initiatives in the African continent. It is 
a partnership aiming at linking Brazilian, African and Latin American and Caribbean experts 
and institutions, from the public and private sectors, to develop research projects to benefit 
smallholder farming by increasing productivity, improving natural resource management, 
and strengthening institutional infrastructure. Through Innovation Marketplace, Embrapa 
established a continent-wide agricultural research network in Africa, including regional, sub-
regional and national agricultural research organizations, with more than 30 projects being 
implemented (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 126).92  
Due to Embrapa’s focus and specialization, the company was able to participate in 95% of 
all agricultural cooperation projects (Magalhães, 2008 apud. Fingermann, 2014: p. 57). 
Nevertheless, despite its positive results as a platform for the dissemination of Brazilian 
policies in food security, the Workers’ Party (PT) brought new actors to join the efforts in 
 
91 The first LABEX was implemented in the US in 1998. In 2002 the second LABEX was opened, with its seat 
in Montpellier, in France, anteceding the Lula government. The third was created in South Korea in 2009. In 
2012, two additional representations were opened in China and Japan.  
92 For more on Embrapa’s role in Brazil’s foreign policy for food security see: 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2651:seminario-cooperacao-
tecnica-brasileira-agricultura-seguranca-alimentar-e-politicas-sociais&catid=42&lang=pt-BR&Itemid=280 




agricultural cooperation, ending Embrapa's long-lasting quasi-monopoly on the matter. This 
meant that its focus on market-oriented agribusinesses began to suffer competition from 
smallholder agriculture supported by other agencies with pro-social agendas. In this process, 
increasingly antagonistic interests emerged in Brazil's food security international cooperation 
initiatives (Cabral and Shankland, 2013).   
However, it is important to stress that this dualistic approach in relation to agriculture 
(agribusiness vs. smallholder) precedes Lula’s administration, and for decades it has been the 
cause of intense domestic debate. The novelty which arose with PT’s administration was the 
inclusion of the smallholder interests in the international cooperation agenda, in opposition 
to the uncontested hegemony of agribusiness until then. The dichotomist domestic agrarian 
dynamic thereby was reproduced in the technical cooperation in which Brazil engaged. Even 
if this fragmentation may have had negative effects, it also amplified the scope of Brazilian 
cooperation by launching projects that were better tuned to all the pillars of food security, 
not only gains in productivity.  
2.4.3. The General-Coordination for Humanitarian Cooperation and the Fight Against 
Hunger (CGFOME) 
Upon taking charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lula’s Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim launched an institutional reform which founded the CGFOME.93 Milton Rondó 
Filho, a career diplomat and former advisor of CONSEA and the Ministry of Social 
Development (MDS), was designated its General-Coordinator on September 10, 2004.94 
According to Rondó, CGFOME served as the international interface of the Zero Hunger 
strategy, and it ‘institutionalized the political will of establishing the fight against hunger as 
a new line of international action’ (Brazil, 2013: p.89). The creation of an institutional 
structure dedicated exclusively to food security symbolized adjustments of Itamaraty to the 
new priority pioneered by Lula (Castro and Castro, 2009)95 and represented a new course of 
 
93 Decree 4.759, on the 21st of June, 2003. 
94 Source: Service Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 175, 2004. 
95 According to Article 40 of the Foreign Service Internal Regime, CGFOME was in charge of issues, such as 
the human right to nutrition, agrarian development, agrarian reform, smallholder agriculture, dialogue with civil 
society and humanitarian assistance. Available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/RISE.pdf (accessed 




action within Brazilian diplomacy, diminishing the Ministry’s traditional autonomy in 
establishing and conducting the diplomatic agenda. 
Rondó revised the concepts used by Itamaraty to refer to its partnerships. The term 
‘assistance’ was replaced by ‘cooperation’; ‘natural’ disasters became ‘socio-environmental’ 
(since they were no longer seen only as the result of isolated factors, but also as a byproduct 
of a series of elements combined); ‘South-South’ cooperation became ‘horizontal’ (referring 
to the manner in which cooperation occurs, not its geographical-hemispheric location); and 
last but not least Brazil would no longer be called a ‘donor’, but a ‘partner’. Although Rondó 
claimed96 that these changes of nomenclature have been officially adopted during his time 
ahead of CGFOME, internationally these terms had commonly been used since 1978, when 
the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries replaced the 
concept of ‘assistance’ for ‘cooperation’ and coined the term ‘horizontal cooperation’97. 
According to Rondó, CGFOME acted on two different tracks. The first one dealt with socio-
environmental emergencies and the second addressed structural deficiencies. It was within 
the field of long-term structural actions that Brazil went on to export its expertise in methods 
for eradication of hunger and extreme poverty. However, there is some level of controversy 
on the actual role of CGFOME.98 The director of the UN Center of Excellence Against 
Hunger in Brazil, Daniel Balaban, stated that Rondó refused to be the focal point of the 
Center, as he did not believe in the effectiveness of structural actions and preferred instead 
to focus exclusively on emergency humanitarian aid. It is emblematic in this regard that the 
task of providing support for the cooperation given jointly by Brazil and the WFP was given 
to ABC, although CGFOME was, institutionally, the organ designated to provide this kind 
 
96Interview given to the author on the 19th October, 2016. 
97Although Milton Rondó stated, in an interview given to the author (on the 19th October, 2016), that these 
changes of nomenclature have been officially adopted during his time ahead CGFOME, internationally these 
terms were commonly used since 1978, when the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation between 
Developing Countries replaced the concept of ‘assistance’ for ‘cooperation’ and coined the term ‘horizontal 
cooperation’. Available at: http://www.abc.gov.br/CooperacaoTecnica/Histórico (accessed November 18, 
2016). 
98 Opinion given by colleagues, governmental counterparts and former employees in interviews and informal 




of assistance.99 Later, on June 21st, 2016, CGFOME was abolished by Decree 8.817, and its 
responsibilities were absorbed by ABC.  
2.4.4. The International Center for Policies of Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG).  
Another important mechanism in the international promotion of food-security-related 
policies was the International Center for Policies of Inclusive Growth. Founded in 2004, the 
Center was the result of a partnership between the Brazilian government and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) to collect data, promote research and disseminate 
studies about public policies and foster exchange of best practices through international 
cooperation (ONU Brasil, n.d.). The IPC-IG is essentially theoretical in nature, since it does 
not focus on cooperation implementation. It is a partner of the Institute for Applied Economic 
Research (IPEA), a governmental think-tank often engaged in economic surveys and research 
about poverty and social inequality (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 110).  
At the outset, the government did not use the Center as a tool to bolster official discourse. 
Indeed, it only did so when IPC-IG became sought out by several African and Latin-
American countries. By virtue of its function as a platform for knowledge-sharing of robust 
academic research on social protection schemes and cash-transfer programs, the Center was 
able to reach out to people who otherwise would not be easily persuaded by the official line 
(Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 113). 
Therefore, IPC-IG’s broad array of publications contributed to increase Brazil’s international 
visibility in this area. For instance, the work of its researchers on empirical evidence of the 
success of Bolsa Família (a household cash-transfer program) in reducing hunger drew 
attention from various international organizations, including the World Bank, which 
modified its initial critical position in relation to the Brazilian social program and geared 
towards a more positive evaluation (Fraundorfer, 2015: p. 110). Over time, the Center 
became an important element in Brazil’s strategy to broaden demand from other countries 
for Brazilian technical assistance. 
 
99 Source: Interview with the Director of the Center of Excellence WFP-UN, Daniel Balaban, conceded to the 




3.4.5. The IBSA Fund 
Created in March 2004, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Fund was another mechanism 
which reinforced President Lula’s call to establish new sources of international financing for 
the fight against hunger and poverty. It was agreed that it would receive annual donations of 
a million dollars from each of its members, and resources would be managed by the Special 
Unit for South-South Cooperation of the UNDP (Brazil, 2013). The project selection 
prioritized financing activities in the least developed countries, and although the Fund acted 
in many different areas, such as infrastructure and health care, its main focus was to tackle 
hunger and extreme poverty.  
While government officials hailed the Fund as a centerpiece of the IBSA grouping, its modest 
budget severally limited its scope of action. The amounts available for projects are extremely 
insignificant when compared to other development institutions in which IBSA members 
themselves participate (Stuenkel, 2014). Yet, despite its small size, the Fund gained 
considerable international recognition when it won the UN South-South Partnership Award 
in 2006, and the ‘Millennium Development Goals Award’ in 2010.100 Even if its capacity of 
implementing projects remained limited, and its true importance was inflated by 
governmental propaganda, the Fund was another channel for Brazil to share its knowledge 
and further advance its soft power capabilities in faraway regions. 
3.4.6. The Inter-Ministerial Working Group for Humanitarian Assistance (GTI-AHI) 
On June 21, 2006, a presidential decree established the GTI-AHI, coordinated by Itamaraty 
and with the participation of fifteen ministries. The group sought to render the processing of 
the petitions for humanitarian assistance received by the Brazilian government more 
efficient. It thereby became an important instrument to organize the governmental agencies 
involved in Brazilian cooperation initiatives. In this respect, the GTI guided the elaboration 
of a legal framework (which is yet to become law) to regulate Brazil’s foreign aid. Currently, 
governmental donations require the approval of the Brazilian equivalent to Executive Orders 
(Port. Medidas Provisórias) authorizing its concession. These bureaucratic hurdles still 
 





prevent the government from responding quickly to emergency humanitarian aid requests.101 
102  
3.5. Diplomacy and Discourse 
This section aims to scrutinize food security diplomatic rhetoric of Brazilian authorities, as 
well as to map out Brazil’s participation in international fora in the same area. Although there 
were too many events and discussions to be mentioned one-by-one, the most important 
initiatives are presented here103. Our intention is to trace the evolution of this theme on the 
foreign policy agenda, from an almost inexistent issue to one overwhelmingly present and 
then, again, a disappearing feature in statements by Brazilian officials104. 
Although Brazilian society had a long historical engagement in fighting hunger, the 
mobilization of social actors was not always reflected at the level of Brazilian international 
relations. The process of re-democratization paved the way for the reincorporation of social 
issues within the Brazilian political agenda. The Workers’ Party spearheaded efforts to 
combat hunger at the political level. Hence, extreme poverty and hunger were issues present 
in the electoral campaigns undertaken by Lula as presidential candidate in 1989, 1994, 1998 
and 2002, even though concerns about hunger were not explicitly present in the PT’s party 
 
101 Amorim, Celso. Memorandum No. 32. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Presidency of the 
Republic, Brasilia, February 6, 2007.  
102 According to Minister Milton Rondó, the law-draft is presently ‘forgotten’ at the Presidency of the Republic, 
with no timeline to be submitted for voting in the Brazilian National Congress. Its dispositions authorize the 
Executive to ‘proceed towards international humanitarian action with the goal of preventing, protecting, 
preparing, avoiding, reducing, and mitigating suffering and assisting other countries or regions which find 
themselves, momentarily or not, in situations of emergency’ and to, ‘employ the necessary and sufficient means 
in order to implement international humanitarian action’ amongst other measures. A minute of the law draft 
about International Cooperation was made available to the author by Milton Rondó. Interview in-person 
conducted in October 2016. 
103 The most important of these forums were: the Committee on World Food Security (CFA) of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO); the Meeting of Ministers and Authorities for Social Development of the 
Mercosur (RMADS); the Specialized Meeting about Family Agriculture of Mercosur (REAF); the Meeting of 
High Functionaries regarding Smallholder Agriculture of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC); the South American Council for Social Development of the UNASUL; the Council for Food 
and Nutritional Security of the Community of Lusophone Countries (CONSAN-CPLP), and the Working Group 
for Social and Productive Integration of the Latin American Association for Integration (ALADI). Available at: 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/politica-externa/cooperacao/11937-cooperacao-humanitaria-brasileira 
(accessed on: October 10, 2016). 
104 It should be underlined that the discourse level merely serves as a subsidiary mean in relation to other 
instances through which a foreign policy is evaluated. It is necessary to keep in mind the inherent limitations 
of analysis at the purely rhetoric level, which in itself is insufficient in order to outline a precise evaluation of 




program (1979), nor in its founding manifesto (PT, 1980). During his candidature to the 
presidency in 2002, Lula repeatedly referred to the fight against hunger as a priority of his 
government. His inaugural speeches in Congress and at the Planalto Palace, made on the 1st 
and the 2nd of January 2003, respectively, confirmed the high degree of importance attributed 
to this goal, which was referred to as a ‘national cause’ (Tomazini and Leite, 2016: p.19). It 
is interesting to observe that, while this objective was elevated to the status of a ‘mission’ 
(Lula da Silva, 2003: p. 2; Lula da Silva, 2003a), the issue was practically absent from the 
speech given by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim in his address upon taking office, on 
January 2nd, 2003. The Minister limited himself to vaguely declaring that foreign policy 
would contribute to ‘eliminating poverty’ (Amorim, 2003). 
In a nutshell, hunger was not one of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ initial concerns. Rather, 
Lula’s election was perhaps the most relevant motivation for the incorporation of this issue 
into the diplomatic agenda. Milton Rondó, the former head of CGFOME, also corroborated 
this hypothesis by declaring that besides Minister Amorim, Marco Aurélio Garcia, the 
International Advisor of the Presidency of the Republic, also did not display any particular 
interest on the matter.105  
Four months after the Foreign Minister’s inauguration speech, in which the social dimension 
was practically absent, his fine-tuning to the priority determined by the President was 
noticeable. In the magna class for the Rio Branco Institute (Brazil’s diplomatic academy), 
Amorim stated that the priority conferred to the fight against hunger demanded a 
corresponding action in foreign policy, to spread Lula’s message globally (Amorim, 2003). 
From this moment on, food security would be a relatively frequent topic in the Foreign 
Minister’s diplomatic discourse and on his international agenda. 
A key event of this diplomatic agenda was the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Extreme 
Poverty, founded on January 30, 2004. Championed by the Brazilian Head of State, the 
Geneva Declaration resulting from that meeting established a Technical Group on Innovative 
Financing Mechanisms to create a Fund for the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty. As the 
 
105 Rondó also affirmed that Amorim complained about Brazil adopting the concept of food security, which 
would be considered as an ‘European invention’ in order to create barriers for Brazilian exports. Interview to 




French President Jacques Chirac stated in a press conference, Lula was considered the person 
responsible for the increased attention towards these issues globally (UN apud. Fraundorfer, 
2015: p.95). 
On September 20 that year, once again Brazil, along with the ‘quintet against hunger’106, 
coordinated a summit with more than 50 states, which resulted in the New York Declaration 
on Action against Hunger and Poverty. Among the measures it proposed were the taxation 
of arms trade, the collection of funds for social projects through credit cards, and the 
reduction of taxes on foreign remittances, among others.107 In spite of the positive 
international repercussions, the New York Summit ended without major concrete outcomes.  
The Initiative for Latin America and the Caribbean without Hunger is also noteworthy. It 
was jointly launched by the Brazilian and Guatemalan governments, in 2005, in association 
with the Regional Office of FAO. The region had been the only one to reach the Millennium 
Development Goals on food security. The Global Summit on Nutrition became the first to 
uphold the commitment of eradicating hunger and extreme poverty (FAO, n.d). The 
campaign was endorsed by 29 countries and gave rise to an intense interchange of public 
policies between participant states. Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
and Mexico became receivers of bilateral technical cooperation from Brazil and adopted 
social policies inspired by Zero Hunger (FAO apud. Brazil, 2013: p. 114). Much of the 
regional progress in food security can be traced back to Brazil (FAO, n.d) and it served as a 
platform for the diffusion of Brazilian social strategies and the provision of technical 
cooperation (Maluf, Santareli and Prado, 2014: p. 20).    
The Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development 
(2010), in Brasilia, played an important part in promoting Brazil’s expertise on tropical 
agriculture for Africa. The initiative of President Lula was well received abroad and 
 
106 Consisting of Jaques Chirac (President of France), José Luiz Rodriguez Zapatero (Prime Minister of Spain), 
Ricardo Lagos (President of Chile), and Kofi Annan (UN General-Secretary). 
107 New York Declaration on action against hunger and poverty New York, September 20, 2004. Available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Declaration_de_New_York_sur_l_action_contre_la_faim_et_la_p
auvrete_20_septembre_2004.pdf; http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/lula040920.doc.htm; 





representatives of 45 African countries, FAO and WFP, as well as civil society entities from 
Brazil and Africa, attended the meeting (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 10). 
Lula’s opening speech singled out the More Food Program (Programa Mais Alimentos – 
PMA) and the Food Acquisition Program (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos – PAA) as 
two public policies in agriculture which had helped Brazil to reduce food insecurity and could 
do the same to impoverished countries in Africa. The event was followed by a surge in 
demand for Brazilian technical cooperation projects. At the time of the event, 26 African 
countries hosted Brazilian technical cooperation projects, in either a design or 
implementation stage, and, in the following year, the number of partner-countries had 
increased to 38 (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 10-11). In this regard, the Brazil-Africa 
Dialogue fostered new triangular cooperation initiatives among UN agencies, Brazil and 
Africa.  
According to professor Antônio Carlos Lessa, presidential travels are another indication of 
the value attributed to foreign policy by a country’s leader (Schreiber, 2015). Throughout 
Lula’s first mandate, he spent 216 days outside the country - an increase of 30% in relation 
to the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and 50% more than Dilma Rousseff. 
Between 2003 and 2006, Lula made four tours in Africa, during which he visited 17 African 
countries.108 109 His predecessor, Cardoso, only visited three African countries - Angola, 
South Africa, and Mozambique - during his eight years as President. Furthermore, during 
this period Brazil received more than 20 visits from African Heads of State (Leite, 2011).  
In regard to FAO activities, Brazil was an energetic player in the reform of the Committee 
on World Food Security (CFS), considered by the former UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-
moon, the ‘most inclusive international and intergovernmental platform’ on food security 
and nutrition. This active role of the Brazilian diplomacy as well as the expansion of its 
technical cooperation resulted in the support of the great majority of African countries to the 
Brazilian candidacy for the FAO leadership in 2011 (Maluf, Santarelli and Prado, 2014: p.27; 
 
108 ‘In 2003 on his first visit, he was in San Tomé and Principe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South 
Africa. In 2004, he visited San Tomé and Principe, Gabon, and Cap Verde. in 2005, he visited Cameroon, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Senegal. In 2006, he visited Algiers, Benin, Botswana, and South Africa.’ 
(Leite, 2011: p. 180).   
109 The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lula government accompanied the president´s activism, having visited 




Brazil, 2013: p. 103; Fraundorfer, 2015: p.104-107; FAO, 2017c) and the subsequent re-
election of José Graziano da Silva.  
Another sign of the successful instrumentalization of international assistance in favor of 
foreign policy goals is found in the backing African nations also gave to the bid of the 
Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Azevedo to become the Director of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In May 2013, President Rousseff declared her gratitude to African 
countries for having supported Ambassador Azevedo to become the WTO Director (Costa 
Leite et al., 2014: p. 88).  
Regarding the statements made to a foreign audience, in a sample of 59 speeches, 9 articles, 
and 17110 interviews given by President Lula during his first term, hunger was present in 
approximately half of all his statements: 62%, 44% and 47%, respectively. The rhetoric 
employed by Lula can be summarized in three main elements: the creation of a global fund 
for the fight against hunger, the adoption of integrated actions on two levels, including 
emergency measures as well as structural efforts, in line with those followed internally by 
the Zero Hunger Program; and the increase of financing sources (MRE, 2007a).        
As for the speeches of Foreign Minister Amorim, data from the Secretariat of Diplomatic 
Planning (MRE, 2007b), which contains 35 speeches, 6 lectures, 22 articles, and 14 
interviews, indicated that the fight against hunger was mentioned in 13 speeches (37% of the 
total), 4 lectures (66%), 7 articles (31%), and 1 interview (7%). Although the data does not 
allow us to infer how much the issue was really considered a diplomatic priority, its mere 
presence testifies to its incorporation into the foreign policy narrative, considering that, 
during his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cardoso’s government, Celso Lafer rarely 
mentioned this issue.111  
 
110 The analysis comprised of all of the pronouncements in the publication of the SPD-MRE (2007) which 
‘constitute a small and representative sample of the Presidents interventions about issues of foreign policy 
through his first mandate’ (MRE, 2007a: p. 12).  
111 According to Vilela and Neiva (2011), the references to social inequality were substantially more 
characteristic of Lula compared to his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which constituted one of the 




Regarding Lula’s successor, President Dilma Rousseff, 56 statements were studied112. The 
analysis revealed that only once the issue of hunger was mentioned, and even so in vague 
terms: “my government will remain engaged in the fight against hunger and misery in the 
world” (Rousseff, 2011), in the Constitutional Commitment to the National Congress on 
January 1st, 2011. Over the years, there was a steady decline in Brazil’s commitment to 
hunger alleviation, reflecting the presidential lack of enthusiasm and the deterioration of its 
international cooperation initiatives.  
It is important to underline that Lula reaffirmed the conclusions which Josué de Castro had 
drawn half a century earlier, according to which the persistency of hunger should be viewed 
as a question of lack of political will (Fraundorfer, 2015). However, there was a huge gap 
between discourse and reality. Lula’s many promises to African leaders waned as soon as he 
left office and even during his terms many agreements were never implemented. As it will 
be demonstrated in Mozambique’s case study, even Brazil’s flagship project ProSavana has 
had little real impact locally, leading it to be considered another Brazilian broken promise 
from a bygone era of great expectations and unfulfilled commitments (Shankland and 
Gonçalves, 2016: p 36). 
3.6. The Mozambican example  
Mozambique was selected to showcase a concrete example of Brazilian international 
cooperation towards Africa. The country belongs to the group of African Portuguese-
speaking countries (PALOP), which together accounted for 74% of the resources spent on 
technical cooperation in Africa in 2010 (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p. 5). Mozambique 
receives the largest proportion of Brazil’s overseas agricultural aid and investment, 
consistently being placed as the main recipient of Federal Government’s technical 
cooperation from 2005 to 2013113 (Ipea, 2013, Ipea, 2017; Cabral and Weinstock, 2010: p.5; 
Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013: p. 57) 
Secondly, Mozambique was chosen due to the importance of the Brazilian presence in the 
country with the ProSavana, which polarized public opinion and ended up uniting 
 
112 The speeches are in the compilation ‘Discursos Selecionados da Presidente Dilma Rousseff’ by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 




transnational networks of civil society organizations against the program (Shankland and 
Gonçalves, 2016). The international assistance given to Mozambique spurred debates on 
agricultural cooperation not only within the governments concerned but also among the 
community of experts in various countries (Cabral et al., 2016: p. 55). Although cooperation 
initiatives between Brazil and Mozambique will be analyzed here, it is not our purpose to 
exhaustively describe all the projects and their characteristics; instead, the focus shall be on 
an overview of Brazil’s approach to foreign aid in food security, its main features, and 
concrete results (whenever available).    
Regarding Mozambique’s background, the country is one of the lowest Human Development 
Index (HDI) in the world – ranking 181 out of 188 countries in 2016 (UNDP, 2016). Since 
its independence, and more than a decade of civil war, it has increasingly become dependent 
on food aid, especially of rice and wheat, with its predominantly rural population facing high 
levels of malnutrition and food insecurity (Amanor and Chichava, 2016). In 1975, influx of 
international aid accounted only for 9% of food consumption, whereas in the early 2000s it 
amounted for 86% (de Brito et al., 2015). In 2007, Western donors contributed with more 
than two-thirds of the Ministry of Agriculture’s (MINAG) budget (De Renzio and Hanlon, 
2007, p. 15). This precarious and unbalanced situation led Mozambique to create policies 
aiming to support family farming, such as the Strategic Plan for Agrarian Development 
(PEDSA) for 2008–2019. 
3.6.1. ProSavana program 
During the G-8 summit in Aquila (Italy) in 2009, Brazil and Japan decided to work together 
for agricultural development in Mozambique. The initial proposal was to adapt the 
experience acquired with the Japan-Brazil Cooperation Program for Development of the 
Cerrado Region (Prodecer) to the African savannas. This was seen as something viable by 
virtue of the similarities between the biomes that share the same latitude. Consequently, in 
September 2009, the Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation between 
Japan, Brazil and Mozambique marked the official launch of the ProSavana program. 
According to its executive summary, published in June 2011, ProSavana was intended to 
improve the competitiveness of the rural sector in northern Mozambique along the Nacala 




productivity of family farming and by generating exportable surpluses through the provision 
of technical support for agribusiness-oriented agriculture’(UNDP, 2011).  
Similarly to Prodecer, ProSavana laid out a 20-year program based on three components. The 
first was ProSavana-PI (or ProSavana-TEC, as originally called). It consisted of 
strengthening research capabilities and identifying the most appropriate agricultural 
technologies for promoting sustainable agricultural development in the region of the Nacala 
Corridor through a partnership between Embrapa and the Agricultural Research Institute of 
Mozambique (IIAM). The total budget for ProSavana-PI was set at US$14.68 million, of 
which 42.1% was financed by ABC, 43.8% by Embrapa, and the remaining 14.1% by the 
Mozambican government. The second component was ProSavana-PD, which focuses on 
creating an overall strategy (a Master Plan) for the development of local agriculture. The bulk 
of the funding for it came from Japan (US$6,254,000), followed by Brazil (US$800,000) and 
Mozambique (US$300,000). The third component was ProSavana-PE. Its goal was to 
improve access to agricultural extension services for farmers by boosting the number of 
studies for planning and implementing community-level productive projects. Since the 
implementation of this third element required inputs from the other two components, little 
information on its scope and funding has become available so far (Ekman and Macamo, 2014: 
p.8-9).   
As agreed trilaterally, ProSavana should provide the groundwork for efforts in reducing 
poverty and revitalize the local economy. Thus, its Master Plan should be coherent with pre-
existing farming plans. In this sense, ProSavana sponsored the cultivation of the same crops 
recommended by the Mozambican government’s PEDSA plan as the best way to tackle food 
insecurity. These included soy, maize, potato, cassava, and other vegetables, as well as cash 
crops (such as tobacco, cashew and cotton), and the poultry industry.  
The plantation of soybeans led to suspicions that it would supply Japanese demand (as it 
happened before with Prodecer), since the domestic demand for soybean is relatively new in 
Mozambique. However, according to field research of the Center for International Forestry 
Research, the domestic production is largely insufficient to respond to the growing local 
demand. Moreover, the Mozambican market for soybean is believed to hold great potential 




Since its foundation, ProSavana has received countless negative reviews from public opinion. 
One key risk often associated with the program is the destruction of the Miombo woodlands, 
which cover two thirds of Mozambique and supports the livelihood of local communities 
(Salomão and Matose, 2007). The forest is mainly located in the northern region, specifically 
in the provinces of Nampula and Niassa. Nonetheless, this region accounts for around 45% 
of the land along the Nacala Corridor explored by ProSavana (ProSavana-PD interim report 
apud. Ekman and Macamo, 2014: p.28).  
On the one hand, it is claimed that the development of ProSavana is not incompatible with 
forest conservation, since the program focuses on areas already used in agriculture and that 
its guidelines forbid the clearance of forest land for agricultural expansion. In addition, 
ProSavana endorses projects designed to mitigate logging by creating alternative sources of 
wood and fuel for local populations, and to strengthen monitoring and enforcing 
environmental regulations. On the other hand, some forest clearance seems inevitable, 
because some woodland areas are located on the way of required infrastructure. As details of 
projects and exact locations are yet to be determined, it is not possible to quantify the impact 
at this stage, making any overall evaluation rather imprecise. But experts estimate that the 
program will have both positive and negative impacts on the forests surrounding the project 
areas (Ekman and Macamo, 2014: p. 32).  
Brazilian and Mozambican social movements had already established initial contacts before 
they engaged in mobilization efforts directed against ProSavana. For instance, the 
International Network of People Affected by Vale, the World March of Women and Via 
Campesina have been carrying out joint social actions for years and the foundation they laid 
was politically crucial for structuring the local resistance that was later carried out (Aguiar 
and Pacheco, 2016: p.14).  
In May 2012, the People’s Summit at Rio+20 represented a turning point to the transnational 
network of social movements opposing ProSavana. On that occasion, one of the main 
organizations of family agriculture in Mozambique, the National Union of Peasants (UNAC), 
had meetings with the Brazilian Via Campesina. Other organizations joined and strengthened 
this relationship over time and this collective engagement ended up resulting in a visit of the 




the NGOs FASE and Oxfam International. Mozambican representatives visited the Cerrado 
region and Brasilia, where they held meetings with government officials and with the 
president of CONSEA. The gathering with the leader of CONSEA would bear fruit, such as 
the invitation for a representative of the UNAC to feature as a speaker in the plenary session 
of the Council, in the following year (2013). This growth in contacts between Brazilian and 
Mozambican civil society’s representatives contributed to consolidate a transnational 
network among social movements of both sides of the Atlantic.  
In May 2013, local Mozambican entities published an Open Letter to Urgently Stop and 
Reflect on the ProSavana Program, which was also endorsed by civil society organizations 
in Brazil and Japan. Although there has never been an official public answer to it, the letter 
had a significant impact within the Brazilian government, causing ProSavana’s initial plans 
to be delayed.  In August, social organizations from Mozambique, Brazil and Japan gave yet 
another demonstration of their network’s influence by calling the First People’s Triangular 
Conference (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.24). The meeting further obstructed the program’s 
political agenda.  
A reiterated point of frustration with ProSavana related to a lack of information and 
transparency, since the program has never gone through any popular consultation process. In 
an attempt to address this criticism, the Mozambican government started consultations in the 
provinces during 2013. In these meetings, government representatives conveyed only 
superficial information about the program’s benefits (Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.22). Thus, 
the consultations were accused of being merely pro forma, because government officials did 
not listen to the needs of farmers, but only followed a pre-set protocol of sharing basic 
information to give the program a ‘democratic appearance’. 
Another key complaint resulted from the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers, which 
carried the risk of polluting water resources. Moreover, entities of Brazil’s civil society 
accused the government of encouraging rural exodus and land concentration in Mozambique, 
as Prodecer had done in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, increasing the risk of 
impoverishment in rural Mozambican communities (Milani, 2017: p. 124-125). Finally, the 
well-known links of the project to the economic interests of private companies, such as the 




Some argue that the strong criticism led ProSavana to undergo reformulation. In October 
2013, Mozambique launched the Concept Note for Formulation of the Agricultural 
Development Master Plan in the Nacala Corridor. The note focused on the need to increase 
the productivity of Mozambique’s farming, based on public lands made available to small 
farmers under a concession contract. This system produces almost no surplus and generates 
low income. The note proposed to expand contract farming in order to enhance productivity 
in select areas.  
Also, the note deliberately omitted any explicit mention to exports of commodities and 
references to the Brazilian program Prodecer. Instead, the Mozambican Strategic Plan for 
Agricultural Development (PEDSA) for 2008–19 was adopted as the new base-line for 
ProSavana. All in all, it remained rather ambiguous whether the note represented an actual 
shift in the direction of the program, but some saw it as a vindication for the transnational 
network of peasants and NGOs. In any case, shortly after, the note was removed from the 
official ProSavana website following criticism by Japanese partners and financial donors 
(Aguiar and Pacheco, 2016: p.26) 114.  
In June 2014, the ‘No to ProSavana’ campaign was launched by local farmers, who claimed 
the program disproportionately benefited Brazilian and Japanese private and public sectors, 
damaging Mozambican peasantry. One month later, the Second People’s Triangular 
Conference was held, a meeting with social organizations and movements from Brazil and 
Mozambique. Opposition against ProSavana became a reference for social movements in 
Africa and all over the world. Pressure both inside and outside Mozambique for higher 
transparency, accountability and participation was relatively effective, since it managed to 
halt ProSavana’s agenda, change its narrative, and delay the schedule of its Master Plan. 
Acclaimed by some as a transformative initiative and vilified by others as an eviction of 
farmers from their lands, ProSavana is now being seen as having caused much ado about 
(almost) nothing. Even among its erstwhile backers, the project is deemed to have failed. In 
addition to the huge controversy it sparked with local civil society organizations (Gonçalves 
 
114 The text is available at http://www.farmland-grab.org/post/view/22964-japanese-experts-analysis-the-




and Shankland, 2016), ProSavana has been affected by the recent Brazilian economic crisis, 
which has led to lower investments in developing projects115. 
Its Master Plan has been limited to half-a-dozen small-scale ‘quick impact projects’ financed 
by JICA, with only tenuous Brazilian involvement (Mosca and Bruna, 2015). Consequently, 
the program has yet to establish a visible presence in northern Mozambique, beyond an 
agricultural research component (mainly focused on soybeans), whose results have reached 
very few farmers. The future of ProSavana remains uncertain and its implementation 
deserves to be further examined with close attention (Milani, 2017: p.125). 
3.6.2. More Food International  
This new feature in Brazil’s portfolio of agricultural cooperation came into existence when 
President Lula’s popularity was at its highest and the nation’s economy had not yet shown 
signs of the forthcoming crisis under Dilma Rousseff. In this sense, partnering with this South 
American emerging power and farming giant appealed to many African countries as a 
suitable alternative to traditional donors. Launched at the Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food 
Security, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development (2010), More Food International (MFI) 
drew from Brazil’s domestic experience with the More Food Program of subsidized credit 
for the acquisition of agricultural machinery to support the modernization of smallholder 
farming116 (Cabral et al., 2016: p. 49; Pinto, Belmonte, and Padua, 2015; Patriota and Pierri, 
2013).  
MFI’s offer of concessional loans tied to the purchase of agricultural machinery 
manufactured in Brazil aimed to operationalize a countercyclical industrial policy (Patriota 
and Pierri, 2013: p. 140). The loans provided a 15 to 17-year repayment period, a 3 to 5-year 
grace period and an interest rate of 2 per cent (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 12). In addition 
to hardware financing, MFI included specific activities designed to strengthen technical 
assistance and rural extension (ATER) in partner countries (Vaz, 2015). Just as it occurred 
 
115 Available at: http://app.folha.uol.com.br/site/noticia/533494  (accessed 20 August, 2016). 
116 For more information: MDA, 2015. Mais Alimentos Internacional Estimula Exportação de Empresas 
Brasileiras de Pequeno Porte. Available at: http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/noticias/mais-alimentos-
internacional-estimula-exporta%C3%A7%C3%A3o-de-empresas-brasileiras-de-pequeno-porte; 
http://www.organicsnet.com.br/2015/07/plano-nacional-de-exportacoes-ajuda-o-agricultor-a-agir-no-




in Brazil’s original program, lending facilities were complemented by post-sales support, 
such as insurance against harvest losses and provision of technical assistance. This was 
supposed to give Brazilian exports a comparative edge vis-à-vis its traditional competitors 
(Cabral et al., 2016: p. 49).  
In a joint endeavor with FAO, the MFI placed a particular focus on the Sahel, the poorest 
region of the African continent (Vaz, 2015). The initiative was well-received by the African 
delegations in early 2011 and, in the same year, credits amounting to US$ 470 million were 
made available to five participating countries: Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, and 
Zimbabwe (Cabral et al., 2016: p. 49). The first export of 340 tractors happened in August 
2014, having Zimbabwe as its destination (Vaz, 2015: p.183). A total of $640 million was 
approved by the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX) for implementation of the 
program in the 2011-12 biennium (Cabral and Shankland, 2013: p. 12). In 2015, the program 
finished its first stage: in total, 513 machines were delivered, amounting for 32 million dollars 
(about 120 million reais, in current values) (MDA, 2015). 
The MFI was created within the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA). The initiative 
exemplifies the diversification of domestic actors providing technical cooperation. Whereas 
ProSavana was the flagship project of MAPA’s and Embrapa’s duet, the MFI and the PAA 
Africa were innovations brought about by the MDA and Pronaf 117. In addition to the MDA 
as the leading institution, other actors were involved in the program’s design and 
implementation, including CAMEX, as the export credit oversight agency, and the Bank of 
Brazil (BB), as the lending institution, as well as industry associations.  
The technical cooperation agreement ‘Training and Technology Transfer for the More Food 
Program between Brazil and Mozambique’ was signed by the Brazilian Minister of Agrarian 
Development, Afonso Florence, and his Mozambican counterpart, Daniel Miguel Ângelo 
Clemente. It established that the project would last two years and would have an initial cost 
of US$ 400,000, in addition to a line of credit of 97.6 million dollars to purchase equipment. 
The agreement was part of the Mozambican PEDSA, which aims to stimulate the growth of 
 
117 The MDA was extinguished by the government of Michel Temer on May 13, 2016. It was unified with the 
Ministry of Social Development (MDS). Some secretariats dealing with agrarian reform and family agriculture 





the agricultural sector by at least 7% per year and increase in 25% of the cultivated areas. 
Actions carried out would also be added to the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP), which 
aimed to reduce the country's malnutrition rate from the current 54.7% to 45% by 2014 
(UFRGS, n.d.). The first delivery of machines in Mozambique took place in January 2015. 
In this first phase, 513 tractors and 2,500 agricultural implements were delivered among 
planters, such as plows and tools to prepare soil work and fertilization (MDA, 2015). 
The MFI was criticized for a biased selection of beneficiaries of loans and equipment, 
considered too sophisticated (thus with questionable applicability) for the farmers of its target 
group (Amanor, 2013). Yet, criticism was not restricted to the issue of suitable targeting. The 
MFI has also been accused of prioritizing the interests of the industry over those of family 
farmers (Sá, 2012). Moreover, the program contradicted, at least partially, Brazil’s South-
South cooperation rhetoric, since it provided tied-aid by sponsoring commercial gains.  
3.6.3. Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa)  
As a result of the Brazil-Africa Dialogue (2010), ten countries were chosen to partake in the 
pilot Purchase from Africans for Africa Program (PAA Africa). The initiative aimed to 
address food insecurity and strengthen local markets through food purchases to supply for 
public programs, such as school feeding, in-kind donations to food-insecure populations, and 
food stocks. Both Brazil’s PAA program and WFP’s program Purchase for Progress (P4P) 
were direct references for the PPA Africa, which was to be carried out jointly by FAO, WFP, 
the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and Brazil.  
FAO was to be responsible for the provision of seeds and fertilizer and for boosting the 
capacity of small-scale farmers to grow, process and sell their products. On the Brazilian 
side, the MDS would provide technical and coordination support, and CGFOME would act 
as its coordinating focal point. The Brazilian government committed 2.4 million dollars to 
support the program’s implementation and the United Kingdom another 2 million (Cabral 
and Shankland, 2013: p.12). Until 2014, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal 
had begun implementation of phase I, and presented a total of 5,187 participating farmers, 
with 434 primary schools recipients of food and 124,468 students (Ipea: ABC, 2017: p. 128; 




3.7. Final Considerations  
This chapter analyzed how Brazil became a provider of SSC, starting from the broadening of 
its public policies related to food security. Even though the Lula administration benefited 
from pre-existing organizations and social programs, his government expanded and unified 
them under the aegis of Zero Hunger. As such, food security entered into the foreign policy 
agenda bolstered by domestic transformations in the perception of national interests and 
foreign policy priorities. This fact corroborates the viewpoint of the two-level-game 
theoretical framework, which states that domestic dynamics are a permanent relevant feature 
in the making of diplomacy. This Dissertation also mentioned international factors which 
boosted Brazil’s aid scope abroad. These findings further confirmed Putnam's perspective 
which emphasize the complementarity between domestic and international factors in 
explaining international relations. 
Brazilian international engagement in hunger alleviation brought new domestic actors to the 
technical cooperation landscape, whose practices did not always converge. Besides 
traditional players such as Embrapa and ABC, new agents joined in, such as the MDA and 
Itamaraty’s CGFOME. This multiplication of agents and decision-making levels 
occasionally resulted in uncoordinated efforts (Maluf, Santareli and Prado, 2014; Cabral and 
Shankland, 2012), but, at the same time, it led Brazil to amplify the outreach of its foreign 
engagements.  
Another challenge regarding Brazil’s model of development cooperation in Africa resides in 
its legal framework, which is ill-equipped to deal with costs related to international aid, since 
it forbids financing activities abroad. What was supposed to be a provisory solution for hiring 
personnel through the UNDP is still in place for ABC today. On top of that, the lack of long-
term consensual goals guiding foreign assistance can also be pointed out as having weakened 
such cooperation initiatives (Burges, 2016). Consequently, Brazil still confronts considerable 
institutional fragmentation and lack of central planning and coordination in implementing its 
international development cooperation.  
Brazil’s agricultural-cooperation initiatives in Mozambique (and probably in the whole 




motivated by multiple factors, some of them (benefiting Brazilian agribusiness and large 
corporations) arguably more important than the altruistic solidarity promoted by 
governmental propaganda. Many initiatives did focus on assisting the receiving country to 
achieve food security and to strengthen its smallholder agriculture. Simultaneously, though, 
most projects also promoted, directly or indirectly, Brazilian economic interests. For 
instance, the MFI aimed of course to address food insecurity constraints, but it also served 
very specific industrial interests by providing steady demand for machinery ‘made in Brazil’. 
Likewise, ProSavana had a technical cooperation component, but it also provided a platform 
for private investment in the Nacala Corridor (Patriota and Pierri 2013: p.28). 
Therefore, while official rhetoric justified expansion of the programs on the basis of ‘South-
South solidarity’, Brazil surely benefited economically. Looking beyond Mozambique, this 
is illustrated by the fact that Odebrecht became the biggest private employer in Angola, with 
commercial activities in biofuels, diamonds, supermarkets, and many other areas (Stolte, 
2015; Fellet 2012a; Fellet, 2012b; Vilas-Bôas, 2011: p.5–6).   Later, huge amounts of bribery 
were revealed in a multidimensional corruption network, which had among its most 
important beneficiaries the PT and Lula’s government. In addition to Odebrecht and other 
firms, Brazil’s Development Bank (BNDES) was also involved in corruption scandals in 
Africa.  
If economic interests played an important role in guiding decisions on the allocation of 
cooperation projects, they do not explain all the government’s decisions though. Brazil’s 
development aid in Africa also served political purposes. They allowed Brazil to present itself 
globally as being capable of technology-sharing and fostering development beyond its 
neighborhood region; thereby, it has also underlined Brazil’s ability to become a global 
player and to pursue more influence in key international institutions (Maluf, Santareli and 
Prado, 2014: p. 22). In this sense, strengthening partnerships with Africa was instrumental to 
acquire broader support to Brazil’s diplomatic goals (Stolte, 2015).  
However, Brazil’s foreign policy ambitions were not grounded on sustainable and structural 
pillars and they would suffer major setbacks after Lula’s era. The end of the commodity-
boom represented a lost opportunity for inducing necessary socioeconomic and infrastructure 




received during the first decade of the 2000s could have been employed to implement long-
overdue labor, pension and political reforms. On the contrary, Brazil has had low capacity to 
overcome the global financial and economic crises, whose deleterious effects persist up until 
today. 
Moreover, Lula’s successor, President Dilma Rousseff, did not share his enthusiasm for 
international affairs, and significantly reduced the scope of Brazil’s presidential diplomacy. 
Thus, not only did Brazil’s domestic situation deteriorate, but also its new leader did not care 
enough to maintain previous foreign policy engagements. Rather, Rousseff focused on 
internal issues, particularly the sluggish economy, the growing political crisis, corruption 
scandals, and her decreasing popularity (Scooner et al., 2016: p.6). Brazil’s political turmoil 
lead to Rousseff’s impeachment, which further damaged Brazil’s status-seeking policy and 
reduced the scope of cooperation it provided to other countries.  
In 2013, Embrapa announced a reduction of its presence in Africa, significantly decreasing 
the number of partner countries in that continent (Fellet, 2013). In 2017, ABC marked its 30-
year anniversary, but with little to celebrate, since it has been operating under severe 
budgetary restrictions, and with only a minimum of its operations being carried out on the 
ground. In reality, many of the much-hyped Brazilian investments in Africa have not 
materialized and remained on paper.  
In addition to Brazil’s domestic problems, Africa has shown to be difficult in terms of 
partnerships. According to a project analyst of the ABC’s General Coordination of South-
South Cooperation, even when technical cooperation projects achieve the approval of high-
ranked government officials, such as Ministers, they end up not being fully implemented. 
More often than not, the initial political support fades away, plagued by lack of enthusiasm 
and proper follow-up. In addition, African countries in general, and Mozambique in 
particular, are so used to receiving foreign aid that their own capacity to deliver is limited. 
They rely on international organizations and NGOs to execute a significant part of their 
public policies. And since there is a plethora of NGOs and IOs acting simultaneously in the 
same country, sometimes without coordinating their efforts, it can be quite tricky for the 
government to make its guidelines be respected. For example, even the WFP, a major IO 




in Brazil prioritizes programs which buy food locally (P4P), its headquarters still mostly 
assist nations with agricultural surpluses of donating countries, such as corn and soy coming 
from the United States, its main patron118.  
Furthermore, rhetoric in favor of cooperation initiatives used to exaggerate the similarities 
between Brazil and African countries. Despite historical bonds and agroecological 
resemblances, the economic, political and sociological realities of these nations are very 
diverse (Cabral, Vaz and Shankland, 2013). First of all, Brazil has a long history of social 
mobilization in the field of agricultural policy, which led civil society to be a part in all the 
phases of public-policy formulation. This was an essential factor to the sustainability and 
success of its family farming programs.  
Early stages of this engagement were noticeable in Mozambican society’s response to 
ProSavana. Perhaps, the program’s main achievement has been to boost social mobilization, 
by bringing together a transnational network of farmers, civil society representatives, and 
NGOs presenting an opposition to ProSavana. In this sense, much of the success of the 
Brazilian development cooperation model to Africa may rely on the continent’s ability to 
replicate of Brazil’s domestic best-practices (Souza, 2014). 
Even if cooperation initiatives did not lead to the expected outcomes, they certainly 
contributed to diffuse Brazil’s public policies abroad. This process of internationalization 
also brought unintended results. Together with its policies, Brazil’s contradictions in the 
agricultural field – with two conflicting sectors: agribusiness versus family farming –also 
crossed the Atlantic.  
As it was suggested, although South-South (horizontal) cooperation promises to be 
intrinsically distinctive from the archetypical North-South (vertical) model, most technology 
transfers, financial influx and other foreign interventions promote some kind of market 
penetration and usually lead to the integration of smallholder farmers into existing forms of 
market accumulation. Therefore, this Dissertation reinforces the argument of other authors 
(Amanor and Chichava, 2016: p.21) that despite framing its diplomatic initiatives as being 
horizontal and giving room to family farming, the underlying processes of Brazilian 
 




engagements in Africa followed dominant frameworks of global agribusiness, similarly to 
the ones originating in the geopolitical North. 
Finally, this study argued that social gains on food security were used to boost Brazil’s soft 
power. It is worth mentioning, however, that using a nation’s assets to increase its relative 
power in the global arena does not imply any wrong-doing and is a widespread practice. The 
spillover effect of foreign aid into the economic field is also a common byproduct of such 
policies, and it should not invalidate eventual gains obtained by cooperation. The Brazilian 
discourse of solidarity may have in a way played a role in bringing countries of the global 
South closer together. But believing in purely altruistic action is not only naïve but also ill-
conceived, since it takes rhetoric as a sign of deceit, when in fact it is a misconception of the 









Chapter 4. Comparing Aid: the Brazilian and US Approaches 
 
The database from USAID is the most comprehensive source available on US foreign aid. It 
includes reporting from 30 agencies, stretching back to 1946 and with information on 
individual sectors and programs from 2001 onwards. This USAID database adopts a broad 
definition of foreign aid, which, contrary to the ODA concept, includes military aid. The 
table below shows the five strategic objectives of US aid and their respective sectors and 
budgets, as presented in a framework developed by the State Department.  
Table 4.1. US Aid Objectives and Program Areas (planned allocations in millions of current 
dollars) 
 
Source: Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p. 5. 
 
US foreign aid is also classified according to the types of activities they are expected to 
support, using broad categories such as military, bilateral development, multilateral 
development, non-military security, humanitarian, and political/strategic activities (Tarnoff 
and Lawson, 2018: p.6). In the Brazilian case, aid focuses on eight modalities: technical, 
Aid Objectives and Program Areas FY2015 Aid Objectives and Program Areas FY2015 
Peace and Security 9,070.00 Investing in People 9,870.00 
Counter-Terrorism 1,260.00 Health 8,700.00 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 288.95 Education 783.88 
Stabilization/Security Sector Reform 6,560.00 Social Services/Protection of Vulnerable 386.12 
Counter-narcotics 555.33   
Transnational Crime 91.24 Governing Justly & Democratically 2,430.80 
Conflict Mitigation 311.60 Rule of Law & Human Rights 644.28 
  Good Governance 1,050.00 
Promoting Economic Growth 3,795.65 Political Competition 233.43 
Macroeconomic Growth 284.80 Civil Society 501.72 
Trade & Investment 170.25   
Financial Sector 104.72 Humanitarian Assistance 4,680.00 
Infrastructure 550.85 Protection, Assistance & Solutions 4,500.00 
Agriculture 1,180.00 Disaster Readiness 149.78 
Private Sector Competitiveness 522.32 Migration Management 30.50 
Economic Opportunity 271.30   




educational, scientific/technological and humanitarian cooperation, as well as refugee 
support, peacekeeping operations, and expenditures with international organizations.  
Table 4.2. Brazilian government expenditures with international development cooperation 
(IDC) 2005-2013 (USD) 
 
Note: From 2005 to 2009, the data on scientific and technological cooperation were inserted into the 
technical cooperation modality. 
Source: IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 15. 
 
Even though the foreign aid budgets of Brazil and the US are classified in distinctive ways, 
it is possible to establish parallels between them. The charts below demonstrate the greater 
importance of bilateral aid for the US when compared with Brazil, which spent around 9% 
of its aid outlays in this modality. Brazilian initiatives in this case are concentrated on only 
five countries, which represent 52% of bilateral expenditures in the 2014-2016 period. These 
were Mozambique, United States, Haiti, Cuba and Guatemala (IPEA and ABC, 2018).  
As shown in Figure 4.1 below, Brazil spent 5% of its aid budget with trilateral assistance. 
This modality of triangular cooperation is carried out in association with another country or 
an international organization. Partnerships with third countries mobilize fewer resources than 
those with international organizations (6 million reais in comparison to 178 million reais) but 
are considered particularly relevant for the practical operationalization of Brazilian 
cooperation. The low budget of this type of triangular cooperation is mainly related to the 
costs of aid being paid by the developed nation partnering with Brazil. In the period of 2014-
2016, Japan was the largest triangular cooperation partner, accounting for 54% of expenses 
with trilateral cooperation towards third countries (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 275).  
Modality 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Technical cooperation 11,422,103 15,046,399 18,256,037 32,097,330 48,872,380 57,770,553 45,617,071 33,970,749 31,846,055 294,898,677 
Educational cooperation 23,088,150 25,896,724 28,911,102 38,615,610 22,236,954 35,544,099 20,689,408 22,251,006 23,809,864 241,042,917 
Scientific and technological 
cooperation  










Humanitarian cooperation 487,994 2,534,110 16310158 16,253,978 43,521,166 161,469,749 72,418,476 109,828,325 21,667,913 444,491,870 
Refugee support and protection      590,469 4,710,229 4,122,857 1,819,718 11,243,273 
Peacekeeping operations 60,820,165 37,022,477 67,575,897 69,901,093 62,704,500 332,422,426 40,167,190 20,654,923 10,330,872 701,599,543 


























Concerning Brazilian triangular cooperation with international organizations, 80% of the 
resources were concentrated on initiatives with five international agencies: the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the World Food Program (WFP), the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). FAO was the main 
partner, totaling 60 million reais, equivalent to 34% of these resources (IPEA and ABC, 2018: 
p. 275). 
Figure 4.1. Composition of US and Brazilian foreign aid by laterality 
 
Note 1: the US data is according to OECD’s ODA metric, thus excluding military expenses. 
Note 2: As seen in the chapter on the US foreign aid, the multi-bi terminology refers to outlays given bilaterally 
but implemented with the support of a multilateral agency.  
Note 3: Plurilateral cooperation in COBRADI reports is referred as cooperation with ‘groups of countries’. 
Source: made by the author (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 270; OECD, 2018: p. 403).  
 
 
Figure 4.1 also shows that more than 80% of Brazilian aid was in multilateral form. For 
someone familiar with Brazil’s foreign policy, the focus on multilateralism in the distribution 
of aid should not come as a surprise, since the country has a history of 
supporting/highlighting multilateralism as a flagship guideline of its diplomacy. Of the 
resources used by the multilateral modality, 780 million reais were allocated to contributions 
to the United Nations, representing 24% in the period 2014-2016. The 15 largest financial 
contributions to regional and international organizations accounted for 87% of resources, 
underscoring the importance given to some agencies by the Brazilian government (IPEA and 















In the case of the US, most aid was given bilaterally (67%). But this does not mean the 
American government did not prioritize multilateralism. The US has historically been the 
largest donor to the UN system, covering roughly one fifth of the UN budget 
(Hillard and  Shendruk, 2019). The discrepancy between the weight of multilateral aid in the 
US and Brazil is more related to the scarcity of funds Brazil has to engage in SSC, in contrast 
to the more abundant flow of US outlays. Thus, the financial contribution Brazil does to IOs 
accounts for significantly more than its remaining SSC resources. 
Since most national contributions to international organizations are not used separately 
according to the donor but are rather used indistinctively to promote development, the 
assessment of the differences between the horizontal and vertical cooperation approaches 
cannot be a ascertained by studying multilateral aid and shall focus on aid given bilaterally.   
Figure 4.2. Composition of US and Brazilian foreign aid according to respective official 
government categories 
    
Source: made by the author (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p. 6; IPEA and ABC, 2017: 17). 
 
The majority of US development aid is project-based assistance (75% in FY2016), in which 
aid is channeled through an implementing partner to complete a project. Aid is also provided 
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technical assistance, and direct budget support (cash transfer) to governments. A portion of 
aid money is also spent on administrative costs. 
Figure 4.3. US Aid by Type, 2016 Disbursements  
 
Source: Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p.26 
As far as technical cooperation is concerned, although both countries declare it as a 
significant part of their aid portfolio, in relation to the total aid budget, it has never reached 
10% of this total. The number of Brazilian programs in this aid modality is greater than the 
US’s. As seen on Chapter 2, there are only two US programs regarding food security which 
have technical cooperation in their scope. These are the Farmer-to-Farmer program and the 
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. The former 
has limited scope and depends on expertise and knowledge provided on a voluntary basis. 
The latter is not a technical assistance program per se, but it has a provision for technical 
assistance in its many components.  
In the Brazilian case, even if not reflected in budgetary terms, technical assistance is by all 
accounts its flagship modality. Between 2011 and 2013, 88 federal government agencies 
operated technical cooperation activities in 128 countries, with Mozambique being the main 
beneficiary (IPEA, 2017: 23, 28). ABC is the primary agency in charge of this modality and, 
from 2005 to 2014, its portfolio expanded from 87 to 385 projects. The peak of the agency’s 
international engagement occurred in 2010, when 472 new projects were initiated, thus 
leading to a total of 737 projects under its direct administration (ABC, n.d.-b). From this 
universe, 19% were in agriculture.  
Even though ABC’s performance is a key element in any attempt to assess Brazilian technical 




coordinated by ABC. Indeed, technical cooperation managed by other federal government 
institutions accounted for 28.4 percent of aid expenditures (IPEA and ABC, 2017: p. 25). At 
the same time, initiatives are increasingly combining different modalities of assistance. For 
instance, the Food Acquisition Program includes both humanitarian assistance and technical 
cooperation, while the More Food Africa program combines technical and financial 
cooperation (Leite et al., 2014: p. 23).  
Brazil’s focus on technical assistance has several motivations. In its plainest form, this 
modality of cooperation consists in the exchange of people who, in turn, share knowledge 
and expertise. In the Brazilian case, most participants are civil servants from governmental 
agencies, including ABC. They travel and support local governments in the planning and 
execution of development-oriented activities. The extra cost for the federal budget comes 
chiefly from travel arrangements and daily rates paid to the staff. It makes it, therefore, 
considerably less costly than other types of foreign aid.  
Another reason is the increased popularity and international recognition that Brazil’s social 
policies on hunger alleviation enjoyed during the 2000s. This renewed interest led to requests 
from innumerous countries to receive technical guidance from Brazil. Furthermore, a 
perception of shared identity among developing countries has been brought forward as 
another propelling reason for this kind of assistance, on the grounds that similar geographical 
contexts, historical experiences (e.g. colonialism) and analogous socioeconomic realities 
would render the provision of technical expertise among them more effective (Milani et al., 
2013: p. 5). 
Technical assistance also advances Brazil’s identity as a ‘middle-power’ and as an advocate 
for developing nations, reaffirming its ‘diplomacy for development’. As discussed in Chapter 
II, it helped Brazil to pursue its soft power and its implicit aspiration to be a ‘system-affecting 
state’ (Costa Leite et al., 2014: p. 8). 
Although, like the United States, Brazil is also a major agricultural exporter, it does not 
provide significant amounts of in-kind food donations. The donation of food has been a 
practice of the US government for decades to dispose of production surpluses. But a similar 




is that Brazil does not have a strong maritime transportation sector to lobby and put pressure 
on the government. As mentioned before, there are legislative impediments for public 
resources to be used to provide aid, even if it is to pay for transportation fees. In situations 
when Brazil does provide humanitarian aid in the form of in-kind donations, a UN agency 
(usually the UNDP or the WFP) will assist with delivery.  
A secondary argument can be made on the kind of agricultural products of which Brazil has 
a surplus and could use for in-kind donations. Brazil’s coffee production, for instance, 
experienced many episodes of overproduction during the first part of the 20th century. 
However, even if coffee could provide any hunger relief, the government decided to burn the 
excess production and never donated it internationally. However, this may change. If the Law 
Project 737 (Annex III) is approved, the Brazilian government will be allowed to provide in-
kind donations to assist countries facing humanitarian emergencies.   
If technical cooperation is Brazil’s modality of choice, in-kind donations are the US’s most 
important aid category. This is the result of a historical process in which the US Congress 
and the federal government sought to enhance the domestic benefits of foreign aid by 
requiring that most of it should be used to procure US goods and services. This practice has 
increasingly been discarded by the international community due to its reduced effectiveness 
in comparison to other modalities of foreign assistance119. In March 2005, the US signed the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, joining other donors in committing to reduce tied 
aid. Since then, the portion of tied aid from all donor countries fell from 70% in 1985 to 16% 
of bilateral development assistance in 2013. However, despite reiterated efforts of both 
presidents Bush and Obama, the United States still provided 37% of its 2013 bilateral 
development assistance in the form of tied aid (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p.18). 
Concerning the geographic distribution of aid, both countries have a substantial portion of 
their foreign assistance directed to Africa. For the 2014-2016 period, Brazilian expenditures 
on cooperation with African countries accounted for 25% of the total, while projects with 
 
119 ‘Studies have shown that tying aid increases the costs of goods and services by 15%-30% on average, and 
up to 40% for food aid’. Overseas Development Institute, The Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid. 




Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Asia accounted for 26%, 7% and 10% of total 
resources, respectively (IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 276). 
In terms of US aid outlays, for the 2012-2016 period, 7% of bilateral ODA went to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 34% to Sub-Saharan Africa, 12% to the Middle East and North 
Africa (which includes Morocco, West Sahara, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt), 11% to 
South and Central Asia, 4% to other Asian nations and Oceania, and 2% to Europe. Finally, 
28% of bilateral ODA was unspecified by region (OECD, 2017, 2016, 2015b, 2014, 2013). 
Figure 4.4. US bilateral ODA and Brazil IDC by region (2014-16) 
 
Source: made by the author with data from IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 276; OECD, 2017: p. 282. 
Inasmuch as the geographical categories are not the same, two main differences between 
Brazilian and US aid are especially noticeable. They relate to the regions of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the Middle East. The United States granted only 7% of its bilateral 
aid to the former and 11% to the latter from 2014 to 2016. By contrast, Brazilian aid focused 
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not even appear as a separate category. Even if one considers Brazilian expenditures in the 
context of their flagship modality, technical cooperation, the focus of Brazil’s actions 
remains Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, which together accounted for 80% of 
the funds from 2005 to 2016 (see Table 4.3).   
Table 4.3. Brazilian government expenditures with international technical cooperation by 
region (2005-2016) in current reais 
Regions 2005-2009* 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014-2016 Total Share  
(per 
cent) 




90.236.764 54.193.400 25.079.064 21.020.528 15.420.578 29.400.000 235.350.335 41% 
Oceania 11.309.926 7.117.332 2.196.603 1.755.113 1.118.071 na 23.497.045 20% 
Europe 2.899.327 203.352 1.195.047 1.184.626 1.277.571 na 6.759.923 
 Asia & 
Middle East 
1.494.738 na 506.220 753.503 361.537 na 3.115.998 
 North 
America¹ 
2.200.963 na 244.924 252.481 105.021 na 2.803.389 
Total  172.990.825 101.676.173 51.281.411 44.843.530 39.179.061 157.600.000 567.571.001 100% 
Source: IPEA and ABC, 2010: p. 57; IPEA and ABC, 2013: p. 29; IPEA and ABC, 2018: p. 285-286; 
IPEA and ABC, 2017: p.35. 
na = information not available  
* = the data on this period encompasses technical, scientific and technological cooperation, since the 
methodology of the 2010 COBRADI report did not account these funds separately.  
  
Another key distinction in the foreign assistance portfolios of the US and Brazil is found in 
the growing importance of Asia for US aid, an increasingly important feature which is not 
present in Brazilian initiatives. Figure 4.5 shows the trend in the distribution of US aid. While 
Europe and Latin America have been losing ground, with the graduation of many Eastern 
European aid recipients, South and Central Asia are receiving more funds. Such evidence 
demonstrates the strategic importance attributed to Latin America by Brazil, which is not 
shared at the same level by the United States, normally more concerned with other regions 




Figure 4.5. Regional Distribution of US Aid in 1995, 2005 and 2015 
EAP = East Asian/Pacific    EE = Europe/Eurasia  
SCA = South/Central Asia     LAC = Latin American/Caribbean 
Near East = Middle East and North Africa  
Source: Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p. 14. 
4.1. Comparing Aid Outlays  
Brazilian cooperation is present in 159 countries in every continent, totaling an overall 
disbursement of 2.8 billion reais (the equivalent of 1.5 billion dollars) from 2011 to 2013, in 
which expenditures regarding international organizations are predominant (53%) 
(COBRADI Report 2017). 
In absolute terms, the United States leads efforts to improve global food security, providing 














Figure 4.6. US ODA and Brazil IDC in million dollars 
 
Source: made by the author.  
Note: US ODA is 2015 constant prices. The Brazilian IDC is in current reais converted to dollars by the PTAX 
rate, which is the average rate practiced by the interbank market collected by the Central Bank.  
 





















Table note: the aid funding is in obligations. 
Source: adapted from Tarnoff and Lawson, 2018: p. 34 and World Bank, 2019c   
 
Table 4.5. Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and International Development 
Cooperation (IDC) in current reais 
Fiscal Year GDP in million IDC in million  Aid share of GDP 
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United States Official Development Assistance
Brazil  International Development Cooperation
Fiscal Year GDP in trillion Aid in million Aid share of GDP 
2005 13.094 35.460 0,27% 
2006 13.856 37.254 0,26% 
2007 14.478 39.726 0,27% 
2008 14.719 46.746 0,31% 
2009 14.419 46.629 0,32% 
2010 14.964 48.397 0,32% 
2011 15.518 48.945 0,31% 
2012 16.155 50.079 0,30% 
2013 16.692 45.659 0,27% 
2014 17.428 43.086 0,24% 
2015 18.121 49.190 0,27% 
2016 18.624 49.470 0,26% 




2006 2.409.450 685 0,03% 
2007 2.720.263 700 0,03% 
2008 3.109.803 744 0,02% 
2009 3.333.039 849 0,03% 
2010 3.885.847 1.625 0,04% 
2011 4.376.382 985 0,02% 
2012 4.814.760 1.004 0,02% 
2013 5.331.619 857 0,02% 
2014 5.778.953 449 0,01% 
2015 6.000.570 366 0,01% 
2016 6.266.895 3.177 0,05% 
Average IDC share of  GPD in percentage 0,02% 
Source: made by the author (FGV/IBGE, 2017; IPEA/ABC, 2018). 
 
Comparing absolute values can be unfair and misleading, when dealing with nations of very 
different realities and economies. For this reason, auxiliary elements need to be considered. 
For instance, aid as a percentage of GDP is a relevant index. As displayed in Tables 4.4 and 
4.5, for the period from 2006 to 2016, the average percentage of Brazil’s IDC in relation to 
its GNI was 0.02%, while the assistance given by the United States remained around 0.28% 
of its GNI, so it is around 10 times larger than the Southern nation. 
Figure 4.7. Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in million reais (current values) and IDC 
in percentage of GDP% 
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The country’s per capita income and exports of agricultural goods are other key factors that 
influence the amount of foreign aid a nation is capable and willing to offer. Brazil, as other 
emerging economies, has increased its participation in global agricultural markets, as well as 
its income per capita during the period studied (from 2000 until 2015). Growing income and 
reduced poverty boosted food consumption and imports, while increases in agricultural 
productivity led to growing exports (FAO, 2018: p. 5). 
Table 4.6. Ten Major Exporters of Agricultural Products: Share of Total Export Value, 2016 
and 2000 
Rank Ranking in 2016 Share in 2016 Ranking in 2000 Share in 2000 
1 European Union 41.1 European Union 46.9 
2 United States of America 11 United States of America 14 
3 Brazil 5.7 Canada 3.9 
4 China 4.2 Australia 3.7 
5 Canada 3.4 Brazil 3.2 
6 Argentina 2.8 China 3.0 
7 Australia 2.5 Argentina 2.7 
8 Indonesia 2.4 Mexico 1.9 
9 Mexico 2.3 New Zealand 1.6 
10 India 2.2 Thailand 1.5 
Source: FAO, 2018: p. 6. 
By contrast, in both periods (2000 and 2016), the United States was the second largest food 
importer, behind the European Union with around 10% of the market share, while Brazil is 
not even on the list of the 10 major importers (FAO, 2018). Over 44 percent of US 
agricultural imports are horticultural products such as fruits and vegetables. In addition, sugar 
and tropical products such as coffee, cocoa, and rubber accounted for just over 20 percent of 
agricultural imports in 2015. Indeed, imports of vegetable oils, processed grain products, red 
meat, and dairy products have grown significantly in recent years (USDA, 2019). 
In relation to income per capita, according to the World Bank, the difference between the 
two countries is significant. In 2000, US per capita GDP was 36 thousand dollars, while 
Brazil’s was 3.9 thousand dollars. In 2016, the former was 56.8 thousand dollars, and the 
latter was 8.85 thousand (World Bank, 2019). Thus, Brazilian per capita income grew from 




Another relevant aspect to notice is that the US leading role in the modern global aid system 
has been in place for a much longer time period. As seen above, the United States became a 
top donor after the Second World War, while Brazil, up until the 1990s, was still a net 
receiver of aid and only in the 2000s did it start to play a relatively more prominent role in 
the system, relatively speaking, losing its prominence once again in the mid-2010s.  
4.2. Comparing Institutions 
Both countries have recently gone through a process of pluralization of agencies and other 
players involved in their foreign aid initiatives. As previously noted, several authors 
highlighted this process in their studies.  
In Brazil, civil society took on a greater role not only through the revitalization of CONSEA, 
but also by means of the creation of new governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Agrarian Development (Port. Ministério do Desenvolviento Agrário - MDA), and the greater 
input of other public institutions in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy and South-
South cooperation (SSC) (Bry, 2017; Leite et al., 2014). IPEA’s 2017 report on foreign aid 
projects carried out from 2011 to 2013 listed 27 agencies which took part in SSC. However, 
as shown in the table below, ABC remained responsible for 71.6 percent of the aid’s budget.  
 Table 4.7. Federal government expenditures with international technical cooperation by 
federal agency (2011-2013) in BRL 
 
Source: IPEA, 2017: p. 26. 
Federal Agencies 2011 2012 2013 Total Share (per cent) 
ABC 59,857,297 45,683,440 45,914,223 151,454,961 71.6 
Embrapa 3,474,823 4,761,012 3,408,398 11,644,233 5.5 
Aisa/MS 2,544,997 3,862,190 3,132,525 9,539,712 4.5 
Anvisa 1,847,279 22,27,076 1,754,220 5,828,575 2.8 
MDS 378,651 883,074 3,908,804 5,170,529 2.4 
CPRM 1,172,933 1,610,606 1,122,451 3,905,990 1.8 
Ipea 924,808 1,166,722 911,448 3,002,978 1.4 
All others 6,189,559 935,953 1,627,193 2,624,901 8.8 





In the United States, the pluralization occurred through multiple channels, first because of 
the relative loss of prestige and autonomy of USAID, which was semi-integrated into the 
State Department, and, second, following the creation of competing entities, such as the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). In 1998, USAID managed 64% of all US ODA; 
eight years later, this share was reduced to less than 45% (OXFAM, 2008: p.12).  
Finally, due to the increased roles played by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
USDA. It is interesting to note that, from 1998 to 2008, the aid-share of the Department of 
Defense increased from 3.5% to 18% of total US ODA (Milani et al, 2013: p.8). In 2001, the 
DoD’s foreign assistance funding was 4.4 billion dollars, but, in 2015, it had increased nearly 
fourfold, reaching 15.5 billion. This amount was still smaller than USAID’s budget for that 
year, which was of 18.2 billion dollars (USAID, 2019a). This demonstrates that the US 
development agency remained the central player, but not by such a great margin, as in 
Brazil’s case, where ABC’s aid outlays are more than ten times greater than the one from the 
second main agency.  
Some key distinctions between these agencies (USAID and ABC) are that USAID is much 
bigger, having more than a hundred offices globally, and, even after the semi-merge with the 
State Department, it still has its own staff. That is not the case of ABC, which has always 
been under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and does not have a staff of its 
own, since its personnel is comprised of diplomats and technicians from the Ministry and UN 
agencies, especially the UNDP. As a result, ABC has no foreign offices, since cooperation 
projects remain under the supervision of Itamaraty’s diplomatic missions. This leads to the 
number of employees of the ABC being considerably smaller than the one of its US 
counterparts.  
The smaller size of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency is to be expected, considering that the 
United States has been a major aid provider since 1945.Also important, ABC was founded 
mainly to take care of projects in which Brazil was on the opposite side of the spectrum, that 




number of staff, or projects. That year, the agency had 56 employees from the MRE120, 
supplemented by experts and technicians from the UN, mostly from UNDP. Although ABC’ 
personnel coordinates technical cooperation programs, activities abroad are usually executed 
by civil servants who perform similar duties back home. If, on the one hand, this can make it 
easier for them to establish relations with local counterparts, who tend to consider them as 
‘foreign colleagues’, on the other hand, even when they do not lack the development-specific 
expertise needed, they do not have an understanding of broader questions about promoting 
development in other geographical, historical and cultural contexts (Russo, Cabral and 
Ferrinho, 2013: p. 6).  
Thus, this is another distinction in relation to the profile of the assistance managed by 
USAID. The US Agency’s personnel are well-versed in development strategies. But the 
budgetary restrictions it faces have led it to rarely employ its own staff to carry out the 
programs. Instead, the tasks are given to contractors, whether from NGOs, PVOs, IOs or the 
private sector.  
Another contrasting feature between the aid-related institutions of both countries is the role 
of the Armed Forces in aid programs. Brazil does have international cooperation provided 
by the military, but it is mainly related to taking part in UN peacekeeping operations. 
Simultaneously to its rise as an aid-donor, Brazil sought to increase the participation of its 
Armed Forces in UN missions. As part of this effort, in 2010, it created the Brazilian Joint 
Centre for Peacekeeping (CCOPAB), located in Rio de Janeiro, to prepare military and 
civilian personnel to participate in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and mine 
clearance missions. 55% of the 2010 budget of Brazilian cooperation with Latin America and 
the Caribbean, for instance, was destined to military troops in Haiti (Costa Leite et al., 2014: 
p. 29).  
Spearheading these efforts was the experience gathered with the Brazilian Force Command 
of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 to 2017. Although Brazil 
had taken part in many peacekeeping operations before, MINUSTAH was the first time when 
Brazil managed to keep a general as Force Commander during the whole duration of the 
 
120 Information acquired through Itamaraty’s internal system for employees, Intratec (accessed on: March 12, 




mission. Such accomplishment was important to Brazil’s foreign policy goals, including 
projecting the country as a relevant player in international peace and security, capable of 
having a role in other important multilateral operations as well (Hamann and Teixeira, 2017: 
p. 2).  
Beyond contributions to UN missions, Armed Forces initiatives are not included in Brazil’s 
international development cooperation (IDC). That is very far from US practice, where the 
Department of Defense’s role in foreign aid grew more substantial and varied since the mid-
1990s with the multi-billion-dollar projects. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is 
the primary DoD body responsible for aid-funded military assistance programs. These 
include state-building, humanitarian relief, and health activities, which once were under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of civilian aid agencies (Tarnoff and Lawson, 2016: p. 2; 21-22). 
The discrepancy in the military role in foreign aid is somewhat expected. The Armed Forces 
have long played a major role in US foreign policy and in US global power status. Brazil, on 
the contrary, has consistently tried to project an image of being a peace-loving/peaceful 
nation. The pacific resolution of international disputes is said to be one of key principles of 
Brazilian diplomatic tradition. Even Brazil’s bid to a permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council (which could be seen as ambiguous/contradictory) was not based on the country’s 
military might, but first and foremost it was justified on Brazil’s alleged capacity to be a 
mediator, a consensus-builder willing to promote constructive values in the world order, such 
as the fight against poverty and hunger (Costa Leite et al., 2014: p. 40). 
  
4.3. Comparing Legislations 
Comparing both legal frameworks in relation to aid provision, it should be stressed from the 
outset that those in the United States are much older and a lot more developed. If one takes 
into consideration only food aid programs signed into law, there are thirteen different 
normative guidelines in the United States, while Brazil’s initiatives are under the single 
umbrella of ABC. Besides not having specific laws for individual initiatives, Brazil also does 
not have a comprehensive legal framework for its international assistance. The closest the 
country came to achieve that is Law 12.429/2011, which disciplined the delivery of in-kind 




federal government to act on its own (it conditioned the distribution of aid to support provided 
by the World Food Program), nor did it allow the provision of other modalities of aid, such 
as cash-transfers.  
Law12.429 also restricted the Brazilian government’s action by establishing that food aid 
can only be given inasmuch as it does not compromise food availability to nationals who are 
victims of adverse socio-economic events in Brazil’s territory. This condition reflected 
concerns shared by legislators and public opinion alike that the country’s resources should 
be employed domestically as a matter of priority instead of shipped abroad.  
By contrast, restrictions imposed by US legislation are of a different nature. Although the US 
government is authorized to provide aid as cash-transfers or local procurement, the US legal 
system aims to ensure that a minimum percentage of aid funds are directed to pay for US 
agricultural commodities and shipping costs.  
Another dissimilarity is that Brazilian foreign aid initiatives are much closer to its domestic 
policies. The emergence of Brazil as an international assistance provider is in a way related 
to relative positive results the country had achieved regarding some social indicators. 
Moreover, as a donor from the Global South, Brazil’s cooperation purportedly aims to help 
countries facing similar domestic problems. US aid programs do not reflect domestic 
programs though. Since its inception, the US aid system was created to address foreign 
realities that are considered to be quite different from those prevailing in the United States. 
Whether to help rebuild war-torn Europe, with the Marshall Plan, or contain communism in 
Latin American, or to combat terrorism in the Middle East and Northern Africa, the US 
government dealt with regional and local circumstances that are very distinct from what it 
faced at home.  
This leads to another distinction in legislative terms. US laws normally state the explicit goals 
of US aid, whether they are to boost US exports, create potential markets for US 
commodities, enhance national security, or created jobs, among others. By contrast, Brazilian 
legislation never mentions the role self-interest plays in providing aid. Programs are 
presented and justified based rather on ‘solidarity’ and other noble goals, in a language which 




4.4. Comparing Presidential Diplomacy and Discourse 
First and foremost, it is necessary to acknowledge the asymmetrical disparities of 
international roles played by the United States and Brazil and all the ensuing consequences 
for their leaders’ political engagements and diplomatic rhetoric. The former is a developed 
global power and the world’s biggest economy, holding the lion’s share of the international 
aid system, while the latter is a developing nation and a regional power with limited resources 
to project power globally. However, Brazil’s discourse sustains that it does not want it to be 
seen merely as a ‘developing country’. It wishes recognition for its distinctive position vis-
à-vis Southern countries in general, vide its historical bid to occupy a permanent seat at the 
UN Security Council. Claims of Brazil being a ‘middle-power’, an ‘emerging middle power’, 
a ‘middle global power’, or ‘system-affecting state’ are abundant in IR literature (Bry, 2017; 
Costa Leite et al., 2014; Malamud, 2011; Patience, 2014; Alexandroff and Cooper, 2010; 
Hurrell, 2009). 
Regardless of Brazil’s aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs being 
recognized as legitimate or debatable, the complex dimension of its global engagement is 
very different from that of the United States. The plethora of issues and crises which demand 
the White House’s direct involvement is significantly wider than the one demanded of the 
Planalto Palace121. This clear disparity makes it more difficult for US presidents to devote 
overwhelming attention to just a few themes in most of their speeches. Thus, even when food 
aid received unprecedented attention by the US presidency, the overall presence of this theme 
in US official discourse was significantly scarcer than their occurrence in statements by the 
Brazilian leader.  
A hasty conclusion could well point out that the higher incidence of hunger-related issues in 
Brazilian presidential diplomacy stems strictly from the fact that the country is a developing 
nation. On the one hand, it is undeniable that hunger and malnutrition are still a main concern 
of Brazil’s domestic policies. The Latin American country has been a frequent member in 
FAO’s map of hunger, having left in 2014 but in risk of going back to it in. It still had around 
12 million people, or 5.7 percent of its population, facing hunger in 2018 (Araújo 2018). On 
 




the other hand, despite the fact that food insecurity has long been a domestic issue, it was 
seldomly the focus of Brazilian presidents’ international attention. Thus, the relevance the 
theme gained in the years 2000 cannot be explained or justified solely on the basis of Brazil’s 
internal development problems, as it is arguably more connected to a political shift in its 
leadership.  
In Brazil, official speeches mentioning food security went from missing altogether to 
omnisciently present. Yet, following the country’s political turmoil and economic recession 
from the 2012 onwards122, the theme lost steam and returned to the former pattern of barely 
being mentioned at all. 
In the case of US presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama did give attention to the 
issue, but it remained a less prominent focus within their international priorities. If the 
importance attributed by the Republican administration of President Bush to US efforts in 
hunger alleviation came as a surprise, Obama’s presidency created expectations that it would 
prioritize this area more than it actually did. The Democratic Party has historically held a 
more favorable position in regard to international assistance than its adversary. However, as 
described in Chapter I, these differences were no obstacle for the Republican-led Congress’s 
approval of significant food aid, which withstood the global financial crisis of 2008.  
Another major difference in the diplomatic discourse of these two countries’ foreign aid is 
the importance attributed to ‘solidarity’. This element gained centrality during the Lula 
administration, linked to the idea of ‘non-indifference’, although this was not a new concept 
in Brazil nor in the rest of the developing world. This principle was even present, to a lesser 
extent, in the diplomatic discourse of the preceding administration led by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (Dauvergne and Farias 2012; De Faria and Paradis 2011; Costa Leite et al., 2014: 
p. 20). 
By contrast, the concept of ‘solidarity’ is almost inexistent in US presidential diplomacy and 
rhetoric, or in official reports of governmental aid agencies. In all speeches analyzed of both 
Presidents Bush and Obama, only once was this term vaguely mentioned when talking about 
 
122 According to the World Bank, after reaching a peak of 2.6 trillion dollars in 2011, Brazil’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) declined consecutively in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, when it amounted for 1.7 trillion 




the Pope in a Catholic University123. The ideology behind US foreign aid engagement seems 
to be closer to ideas related to US culture of philanthropism and a Christian moral obligation 
to help others in line with the Bible precept ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’. 
Beyond historical and sociological reasons for each country’s discourse particularities, this 
difference in behavior confirms the expected stances of Southern and Northern nations. As 
discussed, the argument of solidarity as a reason for promoting international cooperation is 
neither new nor created by Brazil. The concept was brought forward in the High-Level United 
Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation in Buenos Aires (BAPA) in 1979, and it 
has been widely used by developing nations to justify their humanitarian or development-led 
actions abroad. As an OECD DAC traditional aid donor, this rhetoric is unfamiliar to US 
diplomatic reasoning, which bases its ideological foundation on other principles. 
Another distinction between the diplomatic rhetoric of both countries is found in Brazil’s 
claims to promote more horizontal forms of cooperation in opposition to the vertical aid 
provided by the United States. In reality, absolute horizontality is unachievable. The country 
with the highest level of relative development necessarily has the upper hand on setting 
priorities, as it is the one sharing knowledge. In this sense, the use of the term ‘partners’ 
instead of the terms ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ would apply much more as a  sign of  political 
goodwill, that is, they show a willingness to act in a respectful manner but are not sufficient 
to ensure that there is a balanced relationship when  aid practices are actually implemented 
(Costa Leite et al., 2014: p. 20). 
4.5. Comparing Results and Impacts 
In order to better assess the results achieved by each donor, it is important to lay down the 
foundation of the main issues when evaluating foreign aid and briefly review the literature 
and key points of the debate on aid effectiveness. After a downfall of aid flows in the 1990s, 
a series of High-Level Forums (HLF) were convened by the OECD to tackle issues related 
to aid effectiveness. The first of such meetings occurred in Rome, in 2003, and it focused on 
 






aid harmonization, that is, getting donor agencies committed to work with developing 
countries to better coordinate and streamline their activities at country level.  
It was also at that Forum that the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was 
launched. The initiative set rules for delivering information on development and 
humanitarian aid (IATI, 2018), increasing the transparency of aid resources flowing into 
developing countries. In 2011, IATI members agreed on the first version of the IATI 
Standard124 in order to improve coordination, accountability and effectiveness. So far, three 
countries125 have adopted the standard and introduced mandatory rules for organizations 
receiving their aid to report their spending to IATI.  
In 2005, France hosted the second High-Level Forum on aid effectiveness. The meeting 
resulted in the Paris Declaration, which was signed by 137 countries, the United States and 
Brazil included126. The declaration adopted five principles to guide foreign aid efforts:  
• Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty 
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption; 
• Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local 
systems; 
• Harmonization: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share 
information to avoid duplication; 
• Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development 
results and results get measured; 
• Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for 
development results. (OECD, 2019b).   
Three years later, in 2008, the Third High-Level Forum in Ghana took stock of progress made 
by noting improvements in untying aid and coordinating technical cooperation. Less positive 
results were attained in aid predictability and reliability. To address these shortcomings and 
further improve aid impact, participants agreed upon the Accra Agenda for Action, which 
had a focus on improving ownership, promoting inclusive partnerships, delivering 
 
124 Since then IATI’s standard has been updated twice. The change to version 2.01 occurred in October 2014 
and aimed at making improving the data quality by making it more rigorous. On December 2015,   
IATI Standard version 2.02 released with new features focusing on improving data on humanitarian financing 
and reporting on the SDGs.  
125 Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands. 




measurable impacts on development and building aid receivers’ capacity to foster 
development (OECD, 2019b).   
The implementation of these goals was monitored through a series of surveys, such as the 
OECD’s ‘Better Aid’ series. Aid Effectiveness reports (OECD, 2011; 2012) showed that, 
despite some progress, only one out of the 13 targets established for 2010 was met127. 
Recipient countries appeared to have gone further in implementing their commitments than 
donors, though this measurement varied considerably across nations and donor organizations 
(OECD, 2012). 
A major reason why the Paris Agenda did not achieve its goals was its failure to grasp the 
political nature of foreign aid. The agenda was presented as a consensus, as a plan grounded 
on technical basis, in which state representatives shared a common vision on goals and the 
ways to achieve them. In reality, narrow and particular interests of states, sectors and 
institutions, within and between donor and recipient countries, led to disagreements over the 
nature of development and the means to attain it. Although these political disputes were rarely 
acknowledged in official documentation and statements, they influenced the level of 
engagement governments had with the resolutions agreed on the forum (Mawdsley, Savage 
and Kim, 2013: p. 3)  
In 2011, the next High-Level Forum (HLF 4) occurred in Busan, South Korea. For the first 
time, non-traditional donors sat alongside traditional ones to establish common principles to 
guide their practices as providers of development cooperation. Busan seemed to represent a 
fresh start in the pursuit of what was called ‘development effectiveness’. It is not a 
coincidence that this shift occurred when South-South cooperation providers, such as China, 
India and Brazil, took part in the forum. Integrating emerging donors’ perspectives played a 
major role in efforts to create a new framework for measuring foreign assistance’s 
effectiveness. Even the term ‘aid’ was seemingly to become a pejorative word in public 
discourse, a fact reinforced by the statements given by Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, 
and Brian Atwood, Chair of the OECD-DAC, who respectively said “this is the first time that 
 





we can see the end of aid within a generation” and “mercifully, even the word ‘aid’ will bite 
the dust” (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: p. 4).  
The Busan Forum resulted in the Global Development Partnership, a multi-stakeholder 
platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts in order to deliver long-lasting 
results that can ideally foster the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation, n.d.). The initiative, which has the support of 161 
countries and 56 international organizations, reaffirmed principles agreed upon during 
previous high-level forums, such as ownership, transparency and accountability, while it 
marked the inclusion of a more diverse set of development policies and actors. As Atwood, 
the DAC chairman, declared, the international development community was no longer 
comprised of donors and recipients but ‘partners’ (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 4). 
The Global Development Partnership established mechanisms to track the implementation 
of its goals through a monitoring framework comprised of ten indicators. These indicators 
focused on strengthening developing countries’ institutions, increasing the transparency and 
predictability of development cooperation, enhancing gender equality, as well as supporting 
greater involvement by civil society, parliaments and private sector in development efforts 
(Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: p. 10). The year 2015 was set as the target for achieving 
almost all goals.  
In 2016, the Partnership announced the results of its monitoring. These had confirmed that 
progress was made towards achieving more effectiveness, especially on issues such as result-
led focus for partnerships, strengthened national budgetary systems that better capture 
development cooperation flows and gender equality. By contrast, the evaluation report 
revealed specific areas where efforts were still required to overcome existing bottlenecks, 
such as the need for more inclusiveness and transparency by national governments (OECD 
and UNDP, 2016).  
After this brief review of milestones of the aid effectiveness debate, it is clear that the rapidly 
changing development landscape has been leaving behind the old dichotomy between 
traditional and emerging donors. The current system of international cooperation seems to 




chosen rather than to the question of being vertical or horizontal. For instance, one criterion 
that has a major impact on aid effectiveness is targeting. 
Targeting addresses questions of with whom, when, what and how aid exchanges are made. 
Most causes of aid inefficiency are in some degree associated with targeting. In order to set 
targets efficiently, there needs to be sound evaluation and monitoring systems of the 
assistance being provided. In turn, these systems will help indicate what should be the 
appropriate measures and resources for any particular situation and thereby avoid many of 
the targeting errors that afflict contemporary aid flows, such as ‘displaced international trade, 
depressed producer prices in recipient countries, labor supply disincentives, or delivery 
delays’ (Barret, 2002: p. 1-2; 25).  
After assessing the concerns of aid effectiveness in general, this Dissertation will discuss 
how US and Brazilian aid performed in tackling these issues. The aid provided by the US 
government goes through a complex system of evaluation and monitoring, which are an 
integral part of aid programs. Impact and outcome reports are submitted to Congress 
indicating if targets are being met, if changes should be made and detailing budget expenses. 
The Food for Peace Act (FFP), in its Section 207(f), authorizes funds to cover costs 
associated with monitoring, impact evaluations and early warning assessments. In 2016, 
these funds amounted to 17 million dollars (USAID and USDA, 2016: p. 49-51).  
The FFP also has the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Capacity metric, which aims to 
improve the effectiveness and quality of aid programs by providing more active oversight to 
guarantee their impact, in addition to training for FFP partners and development of guidelines 
for FFP staff and partners. In 2016, there were four M&E Advisors based in USAID regional 
offices in Africa, and four more based in Washington, DC. In addition to the FFP M&E team, 
USAID has around 115 additional field staff monitoring and evaluating FFP projects, as well 
as third party monitoring (TPM) systems to ensure food and other resources are reaching 
intended beneficiaries in countries where it is difficult for USAID staff to monitor safely 
(USAID and USDA, 2016: p. 49-51). 
Similarly, the USDA has a program of result-oriented management (ROM) to ensure that 




performance of its programs. The agency also reports on the results to external stakeholders, 
including Congress. All food assistance projects supported by the USDA, therefore, are made 
to adopt a range of monitoring processes and structures, which include performance 
indicators and detailed evaluation plans. Finally, the USDA’s grantees are required to 
conduct independent, third party, program evaluations at baseline, interim, and final stages 
of their projects (USDA, 2013). 
Regarding transparency, the US government has worked to increase the level of 
accountability of its foreign assistance through a variety of efforts. In 2011, it joined the 
IATI, in a process of rendering more data public, unlocking information on foreign aid 
programs’ spending, strategy, implementation, and progress (Publish What you Fund, 2018). 
In the same year, as part of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 
the United States announced a commitment to make its development aid finances and project 
information open and accessible to all by December 2015.  
According to the Aid Transparency Index, aid given by US agencies displayed continued 
improvement, although at different rates. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
was the top-rated agency, falling under the ‘very good’ category in the 2018 index. USAID’s 
transparency was categorized as ‘fair’ in the 2016 Index, but in 2018 it jumped to the ‘good’ 
category. The programs led by the State Department and the Department of Defense (DOD) 
are the least transparent, being placed on the ‘fair’ category (Paxton, n.d.). 
All in all, the available data suggests that US aid provision methods and strategies have not 
been uniform. While the United States has well-established planning, monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms to assess its aid initiatives, efforts to implement transparency are not 
consistent throughout the government.  As a result, they should be cultivated, strengthened 
and extended to other aid and development programs.  
By contrast, in Brazil, even monitoring and evaluation systems are still at their initial stages. 
Far from an isolated characteristic of Brazilian international cooperation, the lack of 
assessment reflects the existing deficit in public accountability at all state-levels and actions. 
Even Brazil’s foreign policy, traditionally seen as one of government’s most qualified 




Brazil’s governmental reports on its cooperation initiatives tend to focus more on 
administrative issues than on project results. Publications that do exist on the issue rarely 
mention accountability and transparency and fall short of meeting international standards on 
publicity of information, especially concerning the financing of their programs. At local 
level, there is no overall system to track information on projects and data is gathered on a 
need-case basis. Embassies often have limited information on projects they do not manage 
directly, and peer review of Brazilian cooperation is utterly deficient (Russo, Cabral and 
Ferrinho, 2013). 
Moreover, the fragmentation of Brazilian cooperation projects is also a factor making it 
difficult to evaluate results. Currently, there is no comprehensive plan connecting sectoral 
actions, which is essential to ensure any degree of success of all the country’s aid-related 
actions. Adding to this bleak scenario, many of Brazil’s bilateral aid programs take shape as 
a byproduct of presidential diplomacy, that is, they were agreed amid much fanfare during 
presidential visits and do not always comply with sound strategic planning procedures nor 
receive the appropriate bureaucratic follow-up by the government’s agencies (Costa Leite et 
al., 2014; Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013).  
In 2013, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ABC published a handbook (Port. 
Manual de Gestão da Cooperação Técnica Sul-Sul) providing standardized guidelines for 
the design, negotiation, approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of South-South 
technical cooperation initiatives. However, the degree to which its guidelines were followed 
is uncertain, since there is no mechanism to verify its actual execution. Thus, despite taking 
a step in the right direction, Brazil still has a long way to go until it can duly implement 
effective evaluation procedures.  
In terms of transparency, ABC has evolved through the launching of an open database on the 
actions it coordinates, although the specific resources invested in each one of them are not 
specified. Complaints by think-tanks and researchers unable to access comprehensive 
information on specific projects, including on evaluation, are very common128. Converging 
 
128 I contacted the Agency many times and was never granted access to research files in person. I was allowed 
to interview two diplomats in 2018, but they were not well informed on former aid programs, as they had just 
started their positions. Moreover, the files from CGFOME, the department responsible for humanitarian 




with this perception, the 2012 Aid Transparency Index classified ABC as having poor 
transparency practices, with a below-average score, ranking in 49th place of 72 agencies129. 
The index analyses 41 indicators on information collection and publication. ABC regularly 
collects information about 24 of them, sporadically publishes data on 17 of them, and does 
not assess three of them (Costa Leite et al., 2014; Transparency International, 2012). 
In the 2012 index, Brazil was ahead of China, which ranked in seventy-first. They were the 
only emerging donors that took part in the assessment. Although Brazil appeared again the 
2013 index, lowering its position to the 56th place, the country was not included in the index’s 
2016 and 2018 updates. In addition to these structural deficits of accountability, the flagship 
modality of the Brazilian government is precisely the most difficult to have its effectiveness 
assessed. Of all aid modalities, the results of technical cooperation are probably the most 
challenging to analyze, since they involve knowhow and intangible knowledge exchanges, 
which are hard to quantify. For instance, one of Brazil’s main cooperation programs is the 
Network of Human Milk Banks, which provides technical support for the installation and 
training of milk banks around the world, through bilateral or multilateral agreements. The 
network was recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the initiatives 
that ‘most contributed to the improvement of children’s and adolescents’ health in the world, 
collaborating effectively to reduce mortality and morbidity’ (Campos, 2017).  
However, unlike the United States, which assesses achievements derived from the adoption 
of the recommendations of its technical assistance (mentioned in Chapter 1), Brazil does not 
evaluate these gains, whether due to the intangibility of the results, like Bezerra Lima 
mentioned, or owing to the country’s arguably lower expertise in impact evaluation. It is 
worth remembering that the first Cobradi report was released only in 2010 and refers to the 
aid given from 2005 onwards. Before Cobradi there was very little to report in this regard. 
To conclude the discussion on aid effectiveness, a last aspect worth considering is the 
distinctive impact that tied and untied aid might have. For the last few decades, the results of 
 
Embrapa, another key aid provider, was also contacted several times with no success. Even when I made a 
request following the procedures determined by the Access to Information Law (2.527/2011), which makes it 
mandatory for public organs to timely respond to inquiries, the answer I got was that the information was not 
available or nonexistent. 





innumerous studies have demonstrated that local purchases and regionally sourced imports 
tend to be the most efficient approach to promote food security and poverty alleviation. 
Likewise, it has become widely accepted in the development community that in-kind 
donations are usually a less efficient way to provide aid, since they carry out substantial 
efficiency costs, conservatively estimated at least 30% on average (OECD, 2006).  
Besides greater costs, giving in-kind aid as food (food aid) can have negative impacts on 
local food production. Chronically-food-insecure countries, whose governments are used to 
receiving food aid from foreign donors for many consecutive years, end up including food 
aid in in their annual food-need assessments, thus reducing the need to invest more resources 
in local food production. Eventually, this leads to even greater food aid dependency.  
4.6. Comparing Perceptions  
The survey undertaken for this Dissertation gathered information about three donor-countries 
(United States, Brazil and China) in two receiving nations (Mozambique and Ethiopia). 
Although not present in the other parts of the comparison, China was included in the survey 
to allow more cross-reference comparisons between the countries studied, adding another 
useful element by incorporating views on Chinese cooperation. Many of these possibilities 
of comparative analyses will be developed, however, the main goal here is to compare the 
perception of the United States’ aid by Ethiopians with the Brazilian one by Mozambicans. 
This may well be considered the soundest comparison, since it scrutinizes the main African 
beneficiary of each one of the two cases studied.  
Before proceeding to the survey analyses, it is relevant to briefly present an overview of 
China’s foreign aid background, in order to better understand the context of the perception 
retrieved.  
4.6.1. Brief Background of Chinese Foreign Aid 
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in 1949, its international 
engagement went from a more isolationist posture and a challenger of the status quo, to a 
proactive role, during the 1970s, with the PRC joining the UN in 1971, and the economic 
opening up process started by Deng Xiaoping. China’s fast trajectory from 




somewhat dialectic: on the one hand, it sees itself as being a major power, but on the other, 
it identifies itself still developing nation (Shambaugh, 2013: p. 112).  
China’s path of increasing international prominence encompasses its rising share in foreign 
aid flows. There has been a somewhat consistent effort of Chinese government to increase 
its financing for development assistance, especially to African countries. However, Chinese 
initiatives in Africa vary immensely according to their origins, business associations, forms 
of financing, and interests involved. For instance, while some of the flagship programs of the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) on cooperation for 
agricultural development fostered the establishment of Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centers (ATDCs) bolstering highly modernized and mechanized agriculture, 
others supported peasant smallholder farming. Therefore, similarly to what this research has 
found on Brazil’s case, there are several forms of Chinese engagement in agriculture. The 
diversity of players and interests lead sometimes to conflicted and ambiguous policies 
(Scoones et al, 2016: p. 4). 
Up until recently, China provided no official figures for the amounts of its aid, as it was 
considered a strategic matter and treated as a state secret (Brautigam, 2009: p. 2). This lack 
of transparency made that not much was known about the foreign aid given by China. This 
began to change in April 2011, when the Chinese government released its first official report, 
the White Paper on Foreign Aid. In 2014, another report with the same title was released. 
More recently, a laboratory at the College of William & Mary in Virginia announced the 
most extensive effort yet to measure official financing by China (AidData), covering 
investments between 2000-2014, to 140 countries, in 4300 projects, and with a budget of 350 
billion dollars (AIDDATA, n.d). 
With the establishment of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China 
and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macau) in 2003, China has expanded assistance 
cooperation with Portuguese-speaking developing countries, including Angola, Cape Verde, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and East Timor, in the fields like culture, education, health, 
capacity building and agriculture. From 2010 to 2012, China offered 1.6 billion yuan of 
concessional loans to the above five countries and trained over 2,000 personnel for them (2nd 




In 2005, President Hu Jintao’s speech at the UN Millennium Summit started a string of bold 
aid announcements which signaled Beijing’s intentions to dramatically enhance its profile as 
an aid provider. In 2006, during the Third Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC), 
President Hu reaffirmed this intention with the promise to double grant assistance in Africa 
(AIDDATA, n.d ), which would exceed World Bank lending to that continent (Chin, 2012: 
584).  
Despite being criticized for being neo-colonial or extractive, Chinese economic intervention 
in Africa goes well beyond resource extraction. China has a more balanced trade relationship 
and a broader investment portfolio with the continent than the United States. Moreover, 
China has no history of military interventions in Africa and it is also helping increase the 
technology access to Africans. To some, Chinese aid represents an alternative to traditional 
western sources of external financing by offering African ‘the right to self-determination’, 
which has so often been denied to them (Cook, 2012: p. 92). 
4.6.2. Survey Results 
The result of this comparison for the first pillar can the visualized below (Figure 4.8). Both 
donor countries got a generally positive evaluation, but the United States received an even 
greater affirmative feedback, as 87% of the interviewees showed a positive view of US 
efforts, in comparison to the 57% approval rating of Brazilian actions. The figure also shows 
how, even for Brazil’s main cooperation partner, there still is a significant percentage (31%) 
of uninformed views about its aid presence in Mozambique. Finally, the United States did 
















Figure 4.8 Perception on Food Availability Cross-Countries 
   
  
Source: made by the author130 
 
When comparing the Perception Indexes (PI) on Food Availability (Table 4.8), it becomes 
clear that US aid is better evaluated than Brazil’s and China’s independently of the 
beneficiary country. The two non-traditional South-South partners have the same Food 
Availability PI in Mozambique (+0.53), which is surprising, considering the strong economic 
and political ties China has with that country. The Food Availability Perception Index (PI) 
of the US aid in Ethiopia is significatively more positive than China’s, despite Ethiopia being 
the third main receiver of Chinese ODA, totaling 3.7 billion dollars from 2000 to 2014 
(AIDDATA, n.d.). It was also unexpected that China’s Food Availability PI was only slightly 
higher in Ethiopia than in Mozambique, considering that the former receives far more ODA 
and other official flows (OOF) from China. While total official commitments to Ethiopia 
amount to USD 14.8 billion, the ones to Mozambique account for only 2.8 billion for the 
same period (2000-2014) (Id.). 
Table 4.8. Perception Index on Food Availability by country 
 Ethiopia Mozambique 
USA +1.13 +0.56 
 











BRAZILIAN PERCEPTION IN 
MOZAMBIQUE
Projects greatly increase the availability of food.
Some projects increase the availability of food.
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.
Some projects hamper the availability of food.




Brazil +0.10 +0.53 
China +0.32 +0.22 
Source: Made by the author 
When asking about the second pillar, food stocks (Figure 4.9), results indicate similar 
opinions. The US-Ethiopia chart is exactly the same as the previous one, while the Brazil-
Mozambique one changes slightly, with 3% of the respondents shifting from a moderately 
negative view to a neutral one. 
Figure 4.9. Perception on Food Stocks Cross-Countries 
  
 
Source: made by the author. 
 
Brazil’s Food Stock PI (Table 4.9) in Ethiopia is close to China’s, despite the massive 
presence of Chinese funding relatively to the absence of Brazilian ones. 
Table 4.9. Perception Index on Food Stocks by country 
 Ethiopia Mozambique 
USA +1.13 +0.53 










BRAZILIAN PERCEPTION IN 
MOZAMBIQUE
Projects help to greatly increase food supplies.
Some projects help to increase food supplies.
No opinion about it. Not significant.
Some projects hamper the formation of food stocks.




China +0.30 +0.30 
Source: Made by the author. 
 
 
Regarding the third pillar of food security, nutritional value, Brazil’s evaluation in 
Mozambique did not change significantly from previous pillars (Figure 4.10). However, an 
increase in respondents who are unaware of this issue is noticeable both in the perception of 
the United States in Ethiopia and of Brazil in Mozambique. This is reminiscent of the low 
importance attributed to this matter in foreign aid programs of the past. Whether for the US 
model of donating food surpluses or for the Brazilian one of promoting the agribusiness 
production, securing the nutritional value of food aid was, for a long time, not a great concern.  
Intertwined with the emergence of the concept of food security itself, nutrition became a 
matter of increasing attention in aid initiatives. As stated by the Ethiopian Minister of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dr. Eyasu Abraha Alle, the usual criticism received by 
food aid that it had low nutritional value is not true anymore. International ODA donors have 
pushed for increasing nutritional value of aid projects. Not only did this reflect the decrease 
of stunt rates, but it also pushed the government to change the way it was thinking about 
nutrition, which has shifted from a medical concern to one where agriculture plays a major 
role, as illustrated by the foundation of a Department of Nutrition inside the Ethiopian 
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources.  


















Source: Made by the author. 
 
Therefore, the survey seems to suggest that donations that foster access to nutrient-rich food 
have not yet been fully recognized by public opinion, which explains the decrease of the US 
Nutritional Value PI in Ethiopia (Table 4.10) when compared to the perception indexes of 
previous pillars.  
Table 4.10. Perception Index on Nutritional Value by country 
 Ethiopia Mozambique 
USA +0.67 +0.68 
Brazil +0.27 +0.59 
China +0.17 +0.29 
 
Lastly, correlations observed in general perception (Figure 4.11) show that both the United 
States and Brazil enjoy a generally positive view in their respective main beneficiaries. The 
central distinction between their evaluations was found in the higher degree to which Brazil’s 
cooperation is still unknown (34% in comparison to 6% from the United States). Considering 
the most recent nature of Brazil’s role as an aid provider, the results confirm what should be 













Foods produced with foreign aid are rich in nutrients, with nutritional value, and do very well for
health.
Foods produced with foreign aid have nutritional value, even if they are not very healthy.




Figure 4.11. Overall Perception Cross-Countries 
  
  
Source: Made by the author. 
 
The PI on the overall perception (Table 4.11) shows that the United States has a higher score 
in Ethiopia (+0.9) than Brazil has in Mozambique (0.84), but the difference is very small. 
Two conclusions may be inferred from that. First, that traditional donors such as the United 
States might no longer carry the stigma of using aid as simply a neocolonialist exploitation 
tool to open markets and create dependence on their products. Second, that despite having a 
slightly worse evaluation than the United States, South-South approaches do work in a 
relative satisfactory fashion and some of them even produce the same results in terms of soft-
power. The amount of resources (whether financial or human) the United States spends in its 
aid initiatives is exponentially greater than the one Brazil does. But, interestingly enough, 
the evaluations both of them receive from beneficiaries are only marginally different.   
Table 4.11. Overall Perception Index by country 
 Ethiopia Mozambique 
USA +0.90 +0.93 
Brazil +0.26 +0.84 
China +0.19 +0.45 














It is very positive.
It is predominantly positive, but it has flaws.
I have no opinion about it. It is not significant.
It is predominantly negative, but it has qualities.




After analyzing and comparing the bilateral perception regarding each donor and its main 
beneficiary, other results found need to be discussed, as well as other correlations arising out 
of the survey. For instance, running the database in Stata, it was possible to ascertain that the 
level of knowledge from Ethiopian citizens about Brazilian and Chinese aid is fairly 
correlated [0.7242]. The correlation shows that those respondents who are more experienced 
with agriculture and food security know relatively well the role of the United States in 
Ethiopia but are not well aware of the role of Brazil and China. As the vast majority of 
participants in the survey (around 80%) have some level of knowledge and experience in the 
field, this finding suggests that Brazil and China have lower weight in foreign aid from a 
local perspective.  
Moreover, China ranked last in the general Perception Index in both countries, with a lower 
index in Ethiopia than in Mozambique, despite greater financial flows to Ethiopia. Although 
discussing Chinese aid is not the goal of this Dissertation, these findings suggest that the 
massive outlays made by the Chinese government in its process of deepening its presence in 
the African continent have not always been translated into automatically generating a 
positive image to China’s foreign aid in general.  
Analyzing the Overall Perception Index (Table 4.11) and previous PIs, it is noticeable that, 
with the exception of the American PI on Food Availability and Food Stocks, all other PIs 
were below 1. Two reasons induce these results to be close to zero: either many respondents 
were unaware of the aid of a particular donor, or they had polarized opinions, thus the 
negatives nulled the positives. In most cases, the first option better explains the findings. For 
instance, Brazil’s Overall PI in Ethiopia of 0.26 is explained solely by the first cause, as it 
did not receive negative opinions and most respondents (77%) were unaware of its aid to 
Ethiopia, which was expected as Brazil’s aid to that country is almost non-existent. On the 
other hand, the Chinese Overall PI in Ethiopia, which is even lower than Brazil’s, is caused 
by both negative ratings (10%) and ignorance of its aid initiatives (55%), as seen in Figure 
4.11.  
Another information that can bring additional insights stems from the perception of US aid 
in Mozambique, especially when compared to the Brazilian and Chinese ones in the same 




cooperation from the United States, since the early 2000s the country has gained importance 
in the distribution of US assistance. It received more than a billion dollars each year from 
2008 to 2018 (USAID, 2017b)131.  
Figure 4.12. Mozambique’s Overall Perception by Donor 
 
Source: made by the author with the assistance of Rodolpho Vasconcellos. 
  
Figure 4.12 provides suitable data to consolidate a few conclusions. First, the positive 
perception of US aid surpasses the ones of the two emerging donors. Second, among the 
three countries, China was the only one which had extremely negative perceptions. Third, 
Brazil’s aid is the least known one, even though Mozambique is its main cooperation partner 
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Figure 4.13. Ethiopia’s Overall Perception by Donor 
 
 
Source: made by the author with the assistance of Rodolpho Vasconcellos.  
 
The comparison of the three donors’ evaluations in Ethiopia (Figure 4.13) shows a very 
different picture. Brazilian ‘invisible’ cooperation seems not to have a presence relevant 
enough to support the inception of any opinion by most Ethiopians contacted132. This is 
clearly shown by the large number of ‘c’ answers, which are valued at zero, and it is also a 
logical explanation of why Brazil has a higher general Perception Index (0.26) than China 
(0.19) in Ethiopia133. A striking 77% of respondents stated to have no opinion about it or 
believe it is ‘not significant’. On the flip side, this shows that the perception is in tune with 
the real world: the Ethiopian nationals who took part in the survey were aware of what 
happens in practice, which means that there is a good knowledge about local realities on the 
 
132 In an interview with First Secretary Adriana Telles, in charge of international cooperation at the Brazilian 
Embassy in Addis Ababa, she explained that cooperation partnerships between the two countries are still in 
their early development. In 2018, for instance, a small delegation of experts from Embrapa had paid a visit to 
explore future aid prospects. 
133 Although a higher percentage of participants were neutral or unaware of Brazil’s aid, there were no answers 
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part of the respondents. If that is the case, the study might serve rather as an additional 
incentive to donors, as it suggests that the population is sensitive to aid initiatives taking 
place, even in countries with a culture of secrecy and opacity such as Ethiopia. 
Another element confirmed by Figure 4.13 is that China’s performance is much lower than 
the United States’ suggests. Despite the well-known growth of Chinese economic presence 
in Africa, there is still a long road to catch up in the area of foreign aid if Beijing is to become 
ever closer to the current view Ethiopians have of the United States. 
Although to be generalizable the number of US cooperation recipient countries would need 
to be larger, the comparison of the different perceptions seemed to demonstrate that the 
United States, a traditional DAC member donor, enjoyed a more positive image than the 
emerging donors, a conclusion somewhat unexpected but even more revealing of the 
combined power of massive resources, long-established connections and two-way networks. 
Brazil’s intermediary position suggests that its SSC rhetoric has helped the country to 
achieve at least a moderately positive view of its cooperation projects, which is perhaps a net 
benefit accrued from its efforts in view of existing limited capabilities and shortage of funds. 
Finally, perceptions on China, even if still mildly positive, did not seem to be proportional 






As seen in throughout this Dissertation, both countries have a plethora of players from 
governmental agencies and other institutions involved in the formulation and implementation 
of their international assistance. As noted in the theoretical references, several authors 
(Milner, 1997; Putnam, Evans and Jacobson, 1993) highlighted this process in their studies 
on ‘two level game’, which that states are not unitary actors, but rather composed of several 
actors with distinct preferences, which share power for themselves by means of decision-
making processes. 
Contradicting Milner's premise that the chances of cooperation become more remote the 
more divided a government is, the process of pluralization of agencies and other players 
involved in foreign aid initiatives that the US and Brazil witnessed did not lead to a decline 
of foreign aid in the period studied, quite the opposite. The 2000s were a period of significant 
increase in both countries’ participation in international aid flows. 
The analyses of the US’s and Brazil’s international cooperation confirm Milner’s (1997) 
argument on the power of domestic politics in influencing foreign aid initiatives. The 
domestic distributional consequences of cooperative endeavors described by the author 
(Milner, 1997: p. 9) as a key driver for international cooperation are found in both countries. 
As seen, providing aid opens the possibility of bringing gains and fostering opportunities to 
the players involved. On the other hand, international factors also exerted influence in the 
design of foreign aid. For instance, the rhetoric of solidarity as a justification for SSC, widely 
used by the Brazilian government, was brought forward by the UN Buenos Aires’ Plan 
(BAPA) in 1979. Therefore, as stated Putnam, Jacobson and Evans (1993: p. 436) both games 
– domestic and international – influence decision makers. 
Throughout the decades, US foreign aid served a myriad of political, diplomatic, economic 
and national security purposes. Whether to halt communism, terrorism or international 
criticism, to promote exports or give an outflow for agricultural surpluses, to open new 
markets or promote development, to build political alliances or shore up national security, 
aid has been a key tool in the period studied, both for the George W. Bush and Barack Obama 




interests of the lobby of big agricultural producers and shippers, with their representatives in 
Congress, which help explain why this country focused its aid efforts on in-kind donations 
and resisted for so long adopting the DACs recommendation regarding local procurement. 
Regarding Brazilian aid, its South-South cooperation programs aimed to offer a framework 
of mutual learning and joint benefits, which had as a key feature the emphasis on being 
horizontal exchanges between equal partners, respecting beneficiary countries’ sovereignty, 
and non-conditional. In practice, programs were top-down initiatives operated within the 
dominant agenda of global agribusinesses. In this sense, Brazilian aid rarely supported 
sustainable agriculture or equitable development, nor did it promote potential avenues for 
collaboration or forms of participatory development or wide access to information by (and 
from) civil society groups. In this way, although there are examples of transnational networks 
(Risse-Kappen, 1995) in the case studied, as seen in the cooperation with Mozambique, their 
impact was limited.  
The study of Brazil’s SSC also showed how it was used for the international diffusion 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) of public policies, especially those destined to combat 
hunger. Rather than a mere technical exchange of agronomic expertise, Brazil’s government 
encouraged the adoption of laws and programs inspired by their own. This phenomenon was 
not notably found in the foreign aid given by the US, which was to be expected in a North-
South cooperation, characterized by reduced similarities between donor and beneficiary 
countries. 
However, there was a substantial difference in the stages of policy diffusion described by 
Finnemore and Sikkink in International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998) and 
the one lead by Brazil. The authors argue that the diffusion occurs even without domestic 
pressure for such change, but in the Brazilian case, the diffusion was actively promoted by 
Brazil’s internal players involved in the cooperation.  
Despite efforts by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and other domestic actors, 
most projects reflected the dominant trends in contemporary agricultural development, 




accumulation imperatives of agribusiness elsewhere, be it as a South-South or North-South 
orientation (Amanor e Chichava, 2016; Ekman and Macamo, 2014). 
Brazil’s foreign aid efforts (or international cooperation initiatives) were crafted and led 
almost exclusively by governmental agencies, especially ABC, relying on technical 
assistance and technological transfers carried out by experts and civil servants (Russo, Cabral 
and Ferrinho, 2013). Although agribusiness took part in these activities, it did not have a 
direct interest in using aid donations as a way to secure domestic prices, like what happened 
in the United States. As a governmental effort from a developing country, Brazil’s foreign 
aid policies were shaped by the lack of financial resources, in tandem with a desire to play a 
more prominent political and diplomatic role than its scarce aid outlays would allow, hence 
the reason for its focus on technical cooperation as its flagship foreign aid modality, mainly 
undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Brazil’s aim to play a bigger role worked partially, since its technical cooperation yielded 
considerable visibility and political significance during the studied timeframe, being a major 
instrument of its foreign policy, despite its relatively small budget. During the 2005-2015 
decade, South-South relations played an important part in Brazil’s strategy of diversification 
of diplomatic and economic relations, providing an expedient way for moving such an agenda 
forward (Russo, Cabral, and Ferrinho, 2013). Brazil’s contribution to international 
development was also in line with the country’s long-lasting disregard of hard power as a 
foreign policy tool and its search for legitimacy as a collaborative actor, capable of promoting 
alliances with other countries to foster peace and security, among other goals (Bry, 2017: p. 
298). 
For the most part, tangible results from Brazilian cooperation projects are still to be fully 
demonstrated, partly because they are too recent or too small to have produced any significant 
impact on the ground, but also because of the Brazilian government’s apparent inability to 
tackle the complexities associated with evaluating projects’ concrete impacts and net results 
(Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 7). Brazilian international cooperation has been 
criticized for lacking an overall agenda or clearly stated objectives, leading many to consider 
it a model ‘in the making’. This is evidenced by the contradictory models of agricultural 




diplomatic leadership depending on the government concerned. As promising the initiatives 
might have seemed, most projects stalled, affected by the country’s political turmoil and 
economic recession in the period 2013-2016.  
Final Considerations on Aid 
The world has made great progress in reducing hunger on a global scale. In 2018, there were 
216 million fewer hungry people than in 1990, even with a 1.9 billion increase in the world’s 
population (WFP, n.d.-b). However, despite such important achievement, the world still has 
roughly 821 million undernourished people (HLPE, 2017). The 2018 edition of ‘The State of 
Food Security and Nutrition in the World’ (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2018) 
reported that the share of undernourished people in the world population has been growing 
since 2016, reaching 10.9% in 2017. Even though from a historical perspective this 
percentage may seem negligible, taking into account continuing population growth, it implies 
that the number of people who suffer from hunger has been growing, thus threatening a return 
to levels from almost a decade ago (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2018: p. 2).  
The end of the decade-long decline in undernourishment in the world is a sign that the 
challenge to efficiently tackle the multiple causes of food insecurity is far from over. The 
intensification of climate-related disasters, which include but are not limited to extreme heat, 
droughts, floods and storms, has doubled since the 1990s. The rise in food demand, projected 
to grow by at least 20% in the next 15 years (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 
2019)134, will further challenge the international community’s capacity to address hunger 
efficiently and can intensify food insecurity for millions of people. 
In recent years, notwithstanding improvements in the implementation and assessment of aid, 
progress toward reducing the number of people in the world suffering from food insecurity 
has slowed. One explanation for this is that aid is increasingly channeled to deal with 
humanitarian crises, thus only temporarily alleviating hunger, instead of addressing the root 
causes of the problem. According to OECD surveys, the percentage of bilateral aid (ODA) 
 




given by DAC members allocated for humanitarian crises and influxes of refugees has risen 
from 16 to 28 from 2010-14 to 2015-18 (OECD, 2018: p. 272). 
As seen in Chapter 2, US aid is no exception, with an increasing share of its relief assistance 
being directed to cope with emergency situations. In this context, instead of US food 
assistance being a tool to help prevent hunger, it has given way to feeding people who are 
already hungry. This trend was aggravated by the lower amounts of food US donations are 
able to buy. Prices of agricultural commodities and shipping fees have led to smaller 
purchasing power even in the face of higher outlays. By 2018, US food was not much more 
than a modest contribution in the global struggle against chronic food insecurity (Riley, 2017: 
p. 475).  
If this is the case for the greatest world donor, one can assume that the impact of aid initiatives 
by developing countries, such as Brazil, is slim in halting world hunger and malnutrition. Not 
only has Brazilian cooperation significantly declined in the last few years, but also its own 
social indicators have faced setbacks, with the country threatening to return to FAO’s hunger 
map. This is not to say, however, that international assistance is not an important mechanism 
in hunger alleviation. But its long-term effects and sustainability relies more on fostering 
local governments’ active engagement, institutional strengthening and structural changes 
than in the donor’s capacity to provide aid. Therefore, research undertaken for this 
Dissertation reinforces the view that the beneficiary’s ownership and inclusivity in aid 
programs are of uttermost importance.  
In this sense, although SSC has limited direct impact in reducing hunger and malnutrition, 
one of its key achievements might be in the conceptual dimension, by bringing to light in a 
critical manner how traditional aid was given in the past, and by fostering discussion on new 
and more inclusive models for the future. Today, even DAC donors avoid the terminology 
used decades ago. US governmental websites, documents, reports and speeches increasingly 
refer to beneficiaries as ‘partners’ and not as passive receivers. These changes in 
nomenclature in turn were translated into concrete transformations, by reforming old 




As traditional donors increasingly adopt concepts and methods typical of South-South 
cooperation, the classification of aid into horizontal or vertical does not serve as a precise 
indicator of the practice of a country’s foreign assistance. Beyond this categorization, each 
country develops its own way of providing aid according to the particularities of its executive 
and legislative branches of government, as well as the role of its public opinion, lobbies, 
agricultural producers and other stakeholders. If in the United States, for decades, aid was 
used as a channel to get rid of food surpluses, in Brazil it has been used by the agribusiness 
sector as a way to diffuse its monoculture, export-led model135.  
Historically, nonetheless, the vertical vs. horizontal divide did contribute to make different 
perspectives on foreign assistance explicit, which ultimately influenced and transformed the 
global development system as a whole. This is demonstrated by the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (2012), which is considered a turning point in the 
international development system. The new equilibrium set in Busan attributed a greater role 
to non-traditional players, a welcomed approach that contributed to move forward the debate 
from aid to development cooperation, hence representing a synthesis of how South and North 
development paradigms can be able to converge (Russo, Cabral and Ferrinho, 2013: p. 6).  
In sum, distinctive perspectives and approaches brought forth by developing countries were 
a key element in the transformation of the aid system that gained momentum in the years 
2000s, with the high-level forums on aid effectiveness (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013: 
p. 4). Consequently, Brazil’s main contribution hitherto is mostly related to its role promoting 
much-needed diversity in the debate on how development cooperation should be framed and 
on the modalities of its delivery, as well as on offering recipient countries a richer array of 
solutions from which to choose.  
Policy Recommendations 
 
135 Although this study did not focus on scrutinizing the influence of agribusiness in Brazil’s international 
cooperation, it is widely recognizable its capacity to have an effect on the design, development and 
implementation of governmental policies and programs. Whether as a direct influence as members of the 
government itself or as an indirect through lobbying, the ruralists are a main power group in Brazil’s politics, 
influencing its domestic and international relations. For instance, 207 federal deputies, which corresponds to 






Although not a common practice in the Brazilian academic tradition, taking advantage of the 
knowledge acquired during the PhD exchange program at The Johns Hopkins University in 
Washington, DC, it seems appropriate that this Dissertation should put forward a few 
recommendations on policies and changes which may render Brazilian and US aid more 
efficient.  
In the Brazilian case, its foreign assistance would largely benefit from granting more 
autonomy and power to ABC. Current legal obstacles for the agency to directly finance 
projects abroad, as well as budget constraints and staff reductions, have left the agency 
relatively weak. But even during ABC’s years of bonanza, when funds were flowing in and 
projects were exponentially multiplied, structural problems plaguing its staffing remained. 
Unlike what occurs in its US counterpart, the Brazilian agency does not have a workforce of 
its own. Its leadership and personnel are comprised mostly of diplomatic staff temporarily 
occupying positions there and of experts and technicians borrowed from UNDP who also do 
not have permanent status. As a result, ABC’s employees do not have the long-term 
institutional memory of the agency’s development programs and are often contaminated by 
Itamaraty’s mindset and focus on short-term political goals.   
Accordingly, an initial policy recommendation would be to create a career of public 
employees and supporting staff exclusively dedicated to Brazil’s foreign cooperation 
initiatives. This new category of civil servants would receive specific training and ensure the 
continuity, coherence and high quality of the programs, thus building up the institutional 
memory of ABC. Although not conceived to have monopoly over foreign assistance 
programs, this career would coordinate the participation of technicians, experts, farmers and 
public officials from other agencies. In turn, this would strengthen the impact of Brazil’s 
initiatives and its overall role as aid-provider.  
This is not a new idea though. Many scholars and government officials advocate for both 
granting ABC autonomy from Itamaraty and for the establishment of another foreign service 
career to occupy workstations in Brazil and abroad (Costa Leite et al., 2014; Milani et al., 
2013). In 2013, during the Dilma Rousseff administration, a proposal to separate ABC from 
MRE circulated in governmental circles. In an interview with a diplomat who served at a 




had the support of the head of ABC, but faced resistance from Itamaraty, which would lose 
control over it. Unsurprisingly, it was under Rousseff that the proposal gained traction. The 
former President had a notorious disdain for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and her 
administration represented one of the lowest points in the domestic prestige of that diplomatic 
institution.  
Representatives of civil society and scholars shared concerns by then over the possibility of 
putting Brazil’s development cooperation under the same umbrella as trade and investment. 
However, there is an overall consensus that ABC should be strengthened, or a new agency 
be created, in order to overcome obstacles hampering Brazilian development cooperation. 
There are divergences regarding where the best locus for the new agency would be, but most 
experts emphasize the need for planning and coordination under one single institution 
responsible for data collection and accountability for all modalities. 
In the US case, this Dissertation shares the points of view put forward by former USAID 
administrators Brian Atwood and Peter McPherson, who argue that the merge with the State 
Department has not contributed to foster US aid initiatives. The proliferation of agencies 
leads to duplicated efforts and confusion with regard to whom is the correct spokesperson 
for US aid initiatives. The expansion of the military role in foreign assistance is also seen as 
detrimental to the US long-term goals, as well as to food security and development 
cooperation in general. In addition to risking tarnishing US image, aid given by the Armed 
Forces reduces the chances of achieving sustainable results, since military staff can be well 
equipped to give or support delivery of humanitarian aid, but they otherwise lack specific 
training or expertise to actually foster international development in a comprehensive manner.  
Consequently, one particular policy recommendation would be to strengthen USAID in terms 
of human and financial resources, while gradually decreasing funds and projects granted to 
the agency’s civilian and military competitors in the bureaucratic landscape of the US 
government, bringing them to USAID’s scope. 
Historically, traditional donors have been criticized for tying their aid to political and 
economic conditionalities. The rise of South-South cooperation encouraged a discourse 




sovereignty. This Dissertation argues that there should be a balance through which aid will 
not simply promote donors’ interests, but, at the same time, it could be used to leverage the 
beneficiary’s compliance with fundamental international norms, such as transparency or 
human rights. The US assistance to Ethiopia faced the criticism of neglecting the Meles 
Zenawi regime’s human rights violations and strengthening its power136. Brazil’s assistance 
to African countries was criticized for similar reasons. Brazilian projects in Angola were seen 
as supporting Angola’s former leader José Eduardo dos Santos in his almost four-decade-
long monopoly of power. In this sense, no matter if it is horizontal or vertical cooperation, a 
standard set of norms and codes of conduct would prevent negative externalities caused by 
governmental and private actions from tarnishing aid’s image and results.  
Another difference supposed to exist between North- and South-led aid initiatives is that, 
while DAC donors choose beneficiary nations according to diplomatic and foreign policy 
goals, SSC is demand driven and solidarity based, providing untied aid. As seen in Chapter 
II, this claim does not hold water, since Brazil did prioritize its international assistance 
following a logic of market-access to its big companies and the private sector. Moreover, 
considering that even the wealthiest donors face limitations of human and capital resources, 
as well as pressure from Congress, lobbyists, civil society and others, a purely demand driven 
approach would not be plausible, as usually demands surpass resources.  
Therefore, a reasonable recommendation for the Brazilian government would be to clearly 
define its thematic and geographical priorities, as well as the overall strategic goal of its aid 
system. Beyond establishing priorities and objectives, international cooperation should be 
treated as a public policy and a regulatory framework should be legally created as the result 
of inclusive dialogue between various stakeholders, in which aid’s definition, scope, budget, 
aims, evaluation, accountability and purpose would be discussed. The fact that Brazil has 
only recently emerged as an international cooperation partner, along with the renewed 
participation of its civil society, should encourage the country to build a system that is both 
 
136 According to the BBC: ‘For two decades, the West has been feeding Zenawi's regime with billions of dollars 
of development and humanitarian aid while filling the stomachs of starving Ethiopians with empty words and 
emptier promises. Western donors continue to lay out an all-you-can-eat aid buffet for Zenawi's regime while 
turning a blind eye, a deaf ear and muted lips to the misuse, abuse and disuse of their taxpayers' dollars.’ Article: 





coherent in its guiding principles and realistic regarding its real capacity to carry out 
programs in an efficient and purposeful way (Costa Leite et al., 2014).  
This would not only consolidate and give coherence to Brazilian SSC, but also make its 
programs more transparent. As previously examined, the lack of transparency caused a major 
backlash from domestic public opinion when corruption schemes emerged. A general 
guideline and pre-established goals for Brazil’s SSC policy would not imply abandoning the 
demand-led dimension, but rather direct the demand of states towards a range of possibilities 
for programs and projects, whose contents would be systematized and evaluated periodically 
(Milani et al., 2013: p. 42). 
The United States already does this, as evidenced by the fact that, on most of its official 
websites and documents, the foreign policy goals and national interests boosted by its aid 
initiatives are unmistakably set. For instance, the report ‘Shared Interest: How USAID 
enhances US economic growth’ (2018) states that the primary objective of US foreign 
assistance is to promote the security of the United States (presumably first) and 
internationally. It goes even further by saying that, besides being ‘vital to US national 
security’, USAID’s foreign assistance ‘also benefits the US economy and workers’ (p.1).  
Moreover, it is recommended that the US government deepens its efforts in untying its aid. 
This is endorsed by innumerous studies that show that, in most circumstances, local and 
regional practices are preferable approaches to development assistance, inasmuch as they 
avoid the costs and risks associated with in-kind donations. 
In a nutshell, it is suggested that aid evaluation and monitoring systems be strengthened and 
perfectioned, particularly in Brazil’ case, so as to improve targeting and allow the 
achievement of better results. The usage of good evaluation and monitoring systems will help 
to demonstrate what is the appropriate response and approach for each particular situation, 
thereby halting the limitations and criticism faced by the current food aid system. 
Lastly, the extent to foreign aid will be able to benefit the populations of receiving countries 
depend on the ability of beneficiary governments to overcome structural obstacles – such as 
endemic corruption, poor management and weak institutions – and increase civil society 




recommendation would be that international cooperation initiatives help receiving 
governments to advance in their domestic reforms. Part of this process of supporting local 
governments could be achieved by providing the technical assistance and technology transfer 
needed for them to acquire more resilience and self-sufficiency. 
In a nutshell, this Dissertation argued that, although different, vertical and horizontal 
approaches are part of a larger set: a changing development cooperation system, in which 
food aid has a declining role, and local production and participation is on the rise. Perhaps 
the most important contribution of emerging cooperation partners was to spur more inclusive 
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Annex II. Decree nº 807 of April 22nd, 1993 
 
Institui o Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar CONSEA e dá outras providências.  
  
O PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA, no uso da atribuição que lhe confere o art. 84, inciso VI, 
da Constituição, e considerando a prioridade absoluta conferida à política de segurança 
alimentar, em especial às medidas que visem à redução dos problemas da fome e do 
desemprego; 
 
Considerando a complexidade e o inter-relacionamento dos fatores que determinam o quadro 
carencial das pessoas e comunidades menos favorecidas; 
 
Considerando a multiplicidade de instituições governamentais e não-governamentais 
envolvidas nas atividades de atendimento às necessidades alimentares da população; 
 
Considerando a necessidade de serem estabelecidos mecanismos eficazes de coordenação 
intersetorial e interinstitucional para assegurar coerência e consistência à programação; 
 
Considerando a imprescindibilidade de uma instância capaz de propor estratégias de 
mobilização, programação e articulação das ações a serem implementadas pelos setores 
governamentais e não-governamentais, DECRETA: 
 
Art. 1º Fica instituído o Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar CONSEA, de caráter 
consultivo, vinculado à Presidência da República.   
 
Art. 2º Compete ao CONSEA propor e opinar sobre:  
 
I - ações voltadas para o combate à fome e o atingimento de condições plenas de segurança 
alimentar no Brasil, no âmbito do setor governamental e não-governamental;  
  
II - medidas capazes de incentivar a parceria e integração entre os órgãos públicos e privados, 
nacionais e internacionais, visando a garantir a mobilização e racionalização do uso dos 
recursos, bem como a complementariedade das ações desenvolvidas;  
  
III - campanhas de conscientização da opinião pública para o combate à fome e à miséria, 
com vistas à conjugação de esforços do governo e da sociedade;  
  
IV iniciativas de estímulo e apoio à criação de comitês estaduais e municipais de combate à 
fome e à miséria, bem como para a unificação e articulação de ações governamentais 
conjuntas entre órgãos e pessoas da Administração Pública Federal direta e indireta e de 
entidades representativas da sociedade civil, no âmbito das matérias arroladas nos incisos 
anteriores.  
  
Art. 3º O regimento interno do CONSEA, a ser adotado pela maioria absoluta dos seus 
membros e aprovado pelo Presidente da República, disciplinará o funcionamento do 
conselho.  
  





I - pelo Ministro-Chefe da Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República;  
  
II - pelo Ministro de Estado da Fazenda;  
  
III - pelo Ministro de Estado Chefe da Secretaria de Planejamento, Orçamento e Coordenação 
da Presidência da República;  
  
IV - pelo Ministro de Estado da Saúde;  
  
V - pelo Ministro de Estado da Educação e do Desporto;  
  
VI - pelo Ministro de Estado do Trabalho;  
  
VII - pelo Ministro de Estado do Bem-Estar Social;  
  
VIII - pelo Ministro de Estado da Agricultura;  
  
IX - por 21 representantes de entidades ou personalidades da sociedade civil, designados pelo 
Presidente da República.  
  
Parágrafo único. Os trabalhos do conselho serão considerados relevantes e o exercício da 
função de Conselheiro não será remunerado, vedada a percepção de vantagens pecuniárias 
de qualquer natureza.  
  
Art. 5º A Secretaria de Planejamento, Orçamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República 
assegurará o apoio técnico e administrativo indispensável ao funcionamento do CONSEA.  
  
Art. 6º Este Decreto entra em vigor na data de sua publicação.   
 




Yeda Rorato Crusius 
 






Annex III. Law Project 737/2007             
PROJETO DE LEI 737/2007 de 17/04/2007 
Dispõe sobre ações humanitárias 
internacionais empreendidas pelo 
Poder Executivo com a finalidade 
de prevenir, proteger, preparar, 
evitar, reduzir, mitigar sofrimento e 
auxiliar outros países ou regiões que 
se encontrem, momentaneamente 
ou não, em situações de emergência, 
de calamidade pública, de risco 
iminente ou grave ameaça à vida, à 
saúde, à garantia dos direitos 
humanos ou humanitários de sua 
população.  
O CONGRESSO NACIONAL decreta:  
Art. 1
o 
Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a proceder a ações humanitárias internacionais com 
a finalidade de prevenir, proteger, preparar, evitar, reduzir, mitigar sofrimento e auxiliar 
outros países ou regiões que se encontrem, momentaneamente ou não, em situações de 
emergência, de calamidade pública, de risco iminente ou grave ameaça à vida, à saúde, à 
garantia dos direitos humanos ou humanitários de sua população.  
§1
o 
Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a empregar os meios necessários e suficientes que 
visem a implementar as ações humanitárias internacionais previstas no caput.  
§2
o 
Entre as ações previstas no § 1
o
, incluem-se a permissão de uso e doação de bens móveis, 
inclusive alimentos do estoque público do Governo Federal, bem como aqueles que integram 
o patrimônio dos órgãos ou entidades da administração publica federal, acompanhados de 




As doações em espécie, realizadas a título de ações humanitárias internacionais, bem 
assim as despesas decorrentes da aplicação desta Lei, correrão à conta das dotações 
orçamentárias constantes em programação específica.  
§4
o 
Fica o Poder Executivo autorizado a proceder a convênios, ajustes ou acordos com o 
Distrito Federal, os Estados, os Municípios, com as fundações, privadas ou públicas, com 
organizações não-governamentais, com organismos internacionais ou outros países para os 
fins do disposto no caput.  
Art. 2
o 





Annex IV. Memorandum No. 32. from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Presidency of the Republic, Brasilia, February 6, 2007.  
EM No 00032 CGFOME/AFEPA/DNU/ABC/DTS/DPB/COF - MRE-PEMU- AAPS  
Brasília, 06 de fevereiro de 2007.  
Excelentíssimo Senhor Presidente da República,  
Em decreto, publicado em 21 de junho de 2006, foi criado o Grupo de Trabalho 
Interministerial (GTI) sobre Assistência Humanitária Internacional. Sob a coordenação do 
Itamaraty, o GTI tem buscado tornar possível o envio de assistência humanitária brasileira 
para os países mais necessitados - de forma rápida e eficiente - , sobretudo na América Latina 
e Caribe. Nesse sentido, o GTI elaborou o anteprojeto-de-lei, em anexo, que supre importante 
lacuna legislativa, visto que não há, atualmente, lei que permita a doação de alimentos, 
medicamentos e outros bens procedentes de estoques públicos brasileiros a terceiros países.  
2. Sempre que realizada operação de assistência humanitária ao exterior,é necessária a prévia 
publicação de Medida Provisória que autorize o envio. Esta situação impede que se atue com 
a agilidade necessária em casos de emergência, atrasando e atémesmo inviabilizando o envio 
das doações.  
3. O GTI analisou as necessidades de todos os Ministérios envolvidos em operações de 
assistência humanitária, contemplando suas necessidades na proposta em anexo. O presente 
anteprojeto-de-lei incorpora, portanto, as formalidades legais necessárias para que o Brasil 










Annex V. Law N. 12.429 of June 20th, 2011 
 
CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS Centro de Documentação e Informação 
LEI No 12.429, DE 20 DE JUNHO DE 2011 
Autoriza o Poder Executivo a 
doar estoques públicos de 
alimentos, para assistência 
humanitária internacional.  
A PRESIDENTA DA REPÚBLICA  
Faço saber que o Congresso Nacional decreta e eu sanciono a seguinte Lei:  
Art. 1º A União é autorizada a doar, por intermédio do Programa Mundial de Alimentos das 
Nações Unidas (PMA), ao Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia, à República de El Salvador, à 
República da Guatemala, à República do Haiti, à República da Nicarágua, à República do 
Zimbábue, à República de Cuba, aos países da Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa, 
à Autoridade Nacional Palestina, à República do Sudão, à República Democrática Federal da 
Etiópia, à República Centro-Africana, à República Democrática do Congo, à República 
Democrática Somali, à República do Níger e à República Democrática Popular da Coreia os 
produtos nos respectivos limites identificados no Anexo desta Lei, desde que não 
comprometa o atendimento às populações vitimadas por eventos socionaturais adversos no 
território nacional. (‘Caput’ do artigo com redação dada pela Lei no 12.688, de 18/7/2012)  
§ 1º As doações serão efetivadas por meio de termo firmado pela Companhia Nacional de 
Abastecimento - CONAB e correrão à conta de dotações orçamentárias da Política de 
Garantia de Preços Mínimos - PGPM e do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos - PAA.  
§ 2º Caberá ao Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento:  
I - caso haja necessidade premente, autorizar o beneficiamento dos produtos em alimentos 
prontos para consumo humano; e  
II - disponibilizar, por intermédio da CONAB, os produtos, livres e desembaraçados, dentro 
dos navios nos portos do Rio de Janeiro, no Estado do Rio de Janeiro, de Santos, no Estado 
de São Paulo, de Paranaguá, no Estado do Paraná, de Itajaí, no Estado de Santa Catarina, e 
de Rio Grande, no Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, por meios próprios ou de terceiros, correndo 
todas as despesas decorrentes, inclusive na forma de equivalência em produto, à conta de 
dotações consignadas no orçamento da União.  
§ 3º O frete e demais despesas de transporte serão cobertos pelo PMA, que poderá ser 




§ 4º Em casos excepcionais, nas situações em que o PMA não puder arcar de forma integral 
com as despesas de transporte, os referidos custos deverão ser cobertos pelas dotações 
orçamentárias mencionadas no § 1o.  
Art. 2º As despesas com as doações previstas no art. 1o desta Lei não deverão afetar a 
implementação eficiente da PGPM e do PAA.  
Art. 3º Caberá ao Ministério das Relações Exteriores definir os quantitativos e respectivos 
destinatários dos produtos identificados no Anexo desta Lei, em coordenação com o PMA.  
Parágrafo único. Atendida a demanda dos países previstos no art. 1o desta Lei, o Ministério 
das Relações Exteriores poderá destinar os estoques remanescentes a outros países atingidos 
por eventos sócionaturais adversos ou em situação de insegurança alimentar aguda, 
observados os limites previstos naquele artigo.  
Art. 4º Esta Lei entra em vigor na data de sua publicação. 
Brasília, 20 de junho de 2011.  
 
 
DILMA ROUSSEFF  
Antonio de Aguiar Patriota  
Milton Elias Ortolan  
Afonso Florence  
 
 (Anexo com redação dada pela Lei no 13.001, de 20/6/2014)  
 
PRODUTOS A SEREM DOADOS LIMITES 
Arroz  Até 1.000.000 (um milhão) de toneladas  
Feijão  
 
Até 100.000 (cem mil) toneladas  
Milho  Até 100.000 (cem mil) toneladas  
Leite em pó  Até 10.000 (dez mil) toneladas  






Annex VI. Transcript of the announcement of the new ABC by President Dilma  
Addis Ababa, 25 May 2013  
For us, the relationship with the African continent is very important. As they say here, you 
know, we also consider that there is an African renaissance in recent years, I would say even, 
in the last decade. This African renaissance is responsible for significant growth rates in 
Africa, including, reviews of the IMF show that among the countries that will grow, are 
African countries. We have had an intense relationship with African countries, both in the 
bilateral relationship as the bi-regional relationship. This applies to relationships that we have 
established between Africa and Latin America, between the African Union and Mercosul. 
But above all, I believe that, here in Africa, we have had a strong commitment to expand our 
cultural, commercial and investment relations. Many Brazilian companies invest here in 
Africa, and also increases our business relationship. To make possible and to make this 
relationship more fluid, including Brazil, which had a number of debts with African 
countries, who were debtors of Brazil since the 70s and 80s, we came systematically solving 
this problem for a more effective relationship. That is why we have sent debt forgiveness, 
not full the full debt, but part of the debt. We have forgiven the debt of nine countries and 
forward three more. Nine are now, I would say, the complete process, some of them being 
submitted to the Senate, and three are nearing completion. This is very important so that we 
can indeed establish new standard of relationship at this time, that is, the twenty-first century, 
and not be charging so much debt that we and they consider, actually, passed. Also, today 
I'm here to announce two major instruments so that we can expand relations with Africa. One 
of them, Brazil will create... We have an agency, called ABC, but this agency is a department 
of the Foreign Ministry, in fact. All major countries have international trade agencies. We 
will create an international trading agency for Africa and Latin America. It is a funding 
agency, but also a commercial agency, it is also an agency to enable investments. In short, it 
is an agency that has a very large scope. This agency aims to create a mechanism through 
which the initiatives that Brazil takes do not have to go through other multilateral bodies. 
You can even do in partnership with the UN, but often our actions in Africa are performed 
by one of these international agencies, and not by us directly, even though they are our 
resources. Hence the reason for this agency cooperation, trade and investment with African 
countries. Further concern is to enable adequate funding. There is no one in the world who 
expands their trade relations without supplier credits. And those who are selling [right?], 
ensure the buyer, which is another key element of this relationship. We... I believe we just 
had a very intense process of expanding both the Brazilian private investment here in Africa, 
with Embrapa, with bus production companies, and even large contractors, as well as those 
companies that set forth, for example, to ensure construction material, as explained to me in 
a meeting earlier today. Anyway... it all has to set a framework for expansion of investment. 
And we are very grateful to African countries because we believe that for the election of our 
representative at the WTO we had a great support. I do not know how much, but we have a 
review of a great support from these countries. I had four bilateral meetings: with Guinea, 
with Gabon, Kenya and Congo Brazzaville. I could not do more because we had no time, 
despite having several countries asking us for schedule, which shows that we also have a 
relationship, I think so, seen by Africans as qualitatively adequate. A relationship that we call 
South–South, in which you see mutual benefits, and no relation of superiority, or that uses 
business relationship for other purposes. So, I also believe that this aspect, of being extremely 




largest country of the African descent of the African Diaspora. We admittedly have half our 
population of African descent. Also why we have common roots. A very important vein in 
the formation of our nationality, it has a strong root in diverse culture, too, because Africa is 
not a single, but diverse culture here in this region of the world. That's basically it.  







Annex VII. Article ‘Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.’ Economist, 17 July 2010, 











Annex VIII. Share of FAT resources without BNDES financing from 1995 to 2017, as 
percentage of total BNDES disbursements 
 
 Source:https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/transparencia/fundos-
governamentais/fundo-de-amparo-ao-trabalhador-fat/fat-dados-financeiros (accessed on 











Ethiopia - Foreign Aid Percept ion
SurveyHero
Tit le and Inst it ut ion (no name required)
Number of responses: 22
Text answers:
Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Lecturer, Ethiopian civil service university
Arbaminch university
Lecturer , Aksum University
Lecturer Adama Science and Technology University
Dr, Addis Ababa Science and Technology University
Associate Attorney, Zee Law Office
Exploreomovalley
Program Director at American Relief Agency for the Horn of Africa



































































































































Annex X. Survey on Mozambique’s Foreign Aid Perception  
 
Mozambique - Foreign Aid Percept ion
SurveyHero
Cargo e Inst it uição
Number of responses: 29
Text answers:
directr ex
Reformado do Ministério de Agricultura
Director executivo Capemi
Oficial de programa de AMPARAR e ADAP SF.
Oficial de programas na Livaningo
Director Executivo da Associação Moçambicana Para Promoção do Cooperativismo Moderno (AMPCM)
Assistente de pesquisa
Diretor nacional - ONG KULIMA
Chefe do Departamento de Estatísticas de Bens e de Ambiente/ Instituto nacional de moçambique
Coordenadora do Programa Terra, Vida e Ecossistemas na Justica Ambiental
Cordenador do Programa de Governacao e Direitos Humanos- JustaPaz
Delegado regional do IIAM-Centro Zonal Nordeste (IIAM é Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique)


























































































































Annex XI. Additional Charts on Mozambique’s and Ethiopia’s Perception on Food 
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Annex XII. Photos from events and meetings attended. 
  
 
South-South Global Thinkers at UN Headquarters, New York, September 2018. 
 
 





2018 Global South-South Development Expo at the UN Headquarters in New 
York from 28 to 30 November, 2018. 
 
 
2018 Global South-South Development Expo at the UN Headquarters in New 









Interview with the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, H.E Dr. Eyasu 
Abraha Alle, on August 21, 2018. 
